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PEOPLES OR PERSONS? REVISING RAWLS 
ON GLOBAL JUSTICE 
GARY CHARTIER* 
Abstract: John Rawls's The Law of Peoples offers an account of international 
justice grounded in a hypothetical contract between "peoples." I argue that 
a model of transnational justice rooted in a hypothetical agreement among 
deliberators representing individual persons-like the one that provides 
the basis for Rawls's account of domestic justice-would be preferable. In 
Part I, I focus on Rawls's idea of a "people" before critiquing his almost 
non-existent argument for beginning with peoples rather than persons. In 
Part II, I examine the nature of the human rights protections that follow 
from Rawls's starting point and the appropriate responses of liberal 
societies to violations of these protections. In Part III, I explore and criticize 
Rawls's perspectives on international economic aid and the rules of 
warfare. 
INTRODUCTION 
John Rawls1 has offered a provocative account of international 
justice grounded in a hypothetical contract between "peoples" (i.e., 
organized societies with many, but not all, of the characteristics typi-
cally predicated of states) and explains its significance for issues in-
* © 2004, Gary Chartier, Assistant Professor of Business Ethics and Law, La Sierra Uni-
versity (GChartie@LaSierra.Edu). I am grateful to Carole Pateman, Seana Shiffrin, Thomas 
W. Pogge, Richard Steinberg, Charles Beitz, Ponnekanti Samata Chari, and two anonymous 
readers for comments that have contributed to the development of this Article; to Barbara 
Herman, Annette Bryson, Roger E. Rustad, Jr., and Linn Marie Tonstad for their willingness 
to review it; to Deborah K. Dunn for welcome opportunities for helpful interchange during 
the time it was being edited; to Thomas Ayres, Lindsey Barrett, Ben Dunlap, and Maria Isabel 
Guerrero for editorial assistance; and to Thomas W. Pogge and Fernando Tes6n for supply-
ing copies of relevant essays. John Rawls died while I was completing this Article; I hope it 
helps to advance the conversation his work has initiated and serYes as a modest tribute to his 
contributions to contemporary Anglo-American moral and political philosophy. 
1 Rawls's work includes joHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTICE (reY. ed., 1999) [hereinaf-
ter RAwLs, THEORY]; JoHN RAwLs, PoLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996) [hereinafter RAwLs, 
LIBERALISM]; jOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, WITII THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON RE-
VISITED (1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, LAW];jOHN RAWLS, jUSTICE As FAIRNESS: A RESTATE-
MENT (Erin Kelly ed., 2000) [hereinafter RAWLS, RESTATEMENT];joHN RAwLs, CoLLECTED 
PAPERS (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999); and jOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF 
MoRAL PHILOSOPHY (Barbara Herman ed., 2000). In THEORY, at 332-33, Rawls discusses 
the rudiments of what he later called "the Law of Peoples." 
1 
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eluding war, human rights, and transnational economic assistance. 
What Rawls calls "the Law of Peoples" comprises a set of norms de-
signed to guide the ''foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people."2 
This system of principles is ultimately intended to structure the "real-
istic utopia" Rawls calls "the Society of Peoples"-a cooperative, 
peaceful, international community.3 Even, however, in a world in 
which many peoples do not or cannot conform to the Law of Peoples, 
it can and should serve as an ideal that provides practical guidance 
for the behavior of reasonable peoples-liberal and nonliberal alike.4 
Rawls's theory includes both ideal and nonideal elements.5 The 
ideal (or "strict compliance") portion of the theory concerns the rela-
tionships within an actually existing Society of Peoples and assumes 
that most or all people act in accordance with its dictates. 6 The 
nonideal (or "partial compliance") portion focuses on appropriate 
norms for common departures from the norms delineated in a corre-
sponding ideal theory; it concerns the relationships between well-
ordered societies and others Rawls calls "burdened," as well as the 
conduct of war-both in the present and after the establishment of a 
Society of Peoples. 7 Rawls's Law of Peoples is best understood both as a 
norm for an actually existing Society of Peoples and as a standard of 
justice in transnational relations designed to apply to individual socie-
ties whether or not those societies or others are committed to its prin-
ciples. Absent a functioning Society of Peoples, governments of indi-
vidual peoples would still be bound by it and could rightly demand 
that others conform to it. 
Rawls exhibits commendable concern for the creation of a just and 
cooperative international order, human rights, the status of women, 
and justice in war. His work can and doubtless will make a valuable con-
tribution to the development of norms for our increasingly intercon-
nected world. But I believe his peoples-based approach-by his own 
2 RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 10; see also id. at 82; Charles Beitz, Rawls's Law of Peoples, 
llO Ethics 669, 675 (2000) ("(T]he Law of Peoples is a body of principles for the foreign 
relations of liberal democratic societies: it is an extension of liberal political morality to 
foreign policy."). 
3 See RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 11-23. 
4 See, e.g., id. at 4-5, 58, 85, 89-91, 106. 
5 See, e.g., RAWLS, LAW, supra note 1, at 4-5; RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supm note 1, at 13, 
65; RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 1, at 8, 215-18. 
6 See, e.g., RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 13; RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 1, at 
216. 
7 See, e.g., RAwLs, THEORY, supra note 1, at 8, 215-18. 
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admission "fair to peoples and not to individual persons"B-leads to 
troubling conclusions at a number of points. I attempt in this Article to 
show why it is unwarranted and to show that a model of transnational 
justice rooted in a hypothetical agreement among impartial delibera-
tors representing individual persons--like the one that provides the basis 
for his account of domestic justice-would be preferable. 
A. Rawls's Second Oliginal Position 
A Theory of justice introduced Rawls's readers to an imaginative 
device that embodies some of our culture's most deeply rooted con-
victions about justice. We should think of a society's rules and institu-
tions as fair, he suggests, if they conform to principles that representa-
tives of the society's members would adopt behind a "veil of igno-
rance" in the "original position. ''9 People deliberating behind a veil of 
ignorance do not know the circumstances, abilities, life chances, or 
moral or religious convictions of those they represent in the real 
world of their society.l0 Thus, the actors in the original position, all of 
whom are equal in status and influence, would endorse standards for 
their society that would protect "a fully adequate scheme of equal ba-
sic liberties. "11 They would judge social and economic inequalities ap-
propriate only if "attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity."12 Arid they would decide 
that wealth in their society should be distributed in accordance with 
what Rawls terms the "difference principle," according to which eco-
nomic inequalities are permissible only to the extent that they benefit 
those who are least well-off.13 
While the occupants of the original position at the domestic level 
represent individuals or families, the "second original position" is oc-
cupied by representatives of peoples viewed as unitary entities.14 Rawls 
8 RAwLs, THEORY, supra note 1, at 17 n.9. 
9 See, e.g., RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 27. 
10 See RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 41-42. 
11 Id. at 42. 
12 Id. 
13 See, e.g., RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 61-72; RAWLS, THEORY, supm note 1, 
at 65-73. On the derivation and nature of the basic liberties and the basic norms of justice, 
see RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supm note 1, at 289-371; RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 
39-134; RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 1, at 47-101. 
14 See RAwi"S, LAW, supra note 1, at 17, 23-25; RAwLs, THEORY, supra note 1, at 331-32. 
For an alternate interpretation of the cited passages in A The01y of Justice, see THOMAS W. 
PoGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 242-44 (1989) (hereinafter POGGE, REALIZING] and Thomas W. 
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fails to argue persuasively for the view that peoples, rather than indi-
vidual persons, should be represented behind the veil of ignorance in 
the second original position. And this inadequately defended starting 
point has substantial, and unfortunate, consequences for the position 
Rawls proceeds to elaborate.l5 
B. Rethinking Rawls 
In Part I, I focus on Rawls's idea of a people, elaborating in par-
ticular his understanding of decent nonliberal peoples, before critiquing 
his almost non-existent argument for beginning with peoples rather 
than with persons. In contrast with Rawls, I propose a cosmopolitan 
alternative. I argue that the Law of Peoples should be understood as 
emerging from deliberations among individual persons rather than 
peoples. And I go on to examine alternative arguments for a Rawlsian 
Law of Peoples, suggesting that none provides good reason to endorse 
such a Law of Peoples instead of a cosmopolitan alternative.16 
Rawls's starting point ensures that the Law of Peoples will not 
provide adequate protection for freedom and equality in nonliberal 
societies and makes it less likely that such societies will safeguard some 
human rights. In Part II, I explore the nature of the human rights 
protections that follow from Rawls's starting point and the appropri-
Pogge, A.n Egalitarian Law of Peoples, 23 PHIL. PuB. AFF. 195, 205-6 (1994) [hereinafter 
Pogge, Law]. 
15 Compare Frank]. Garcia, The Usefulness of Which Rawls?, 6 INT'L LEGAL THEORY 39, 39 
(2000) (In The Law of Peoples, "Rawls does not really apply [his norm of justice as fairness] 
to the international arena in [sic] at all, and that is [the book's] main shortcoming.") 
[hereinafter Garcia, Usefulness], with Joel P. Trachtman, The Law and Economics of Global 
justice, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 984, 988 (2002) (reviewing GLOBAL JusTicE (Thomas W. Pogge 
ed., 2001)) ("Could it be that the very respect for state sovereignty (including the sover-
eignty of predatory states) that traditional international law, and to some extent even 
Rawls's law of peoples, regards as fundamental is actually a primary cause of the prob-
lem?"). 
16 In the remainder of this Article, I'll call representatives of peoples in the second 
original position Raw/sian delibemtors; I'll refer to a Law of Peoples of the sort to which 
Rawlsian deliberators would assent as a Raw/sian Law of Peoples. I'll label representatives of 
individual persons in an alternative second original position individual deliberators and a Law 
of Peoples contracting individual de liberators would endorse a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples. I 
will call a person who supports, or would support, a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples a cosmo-
politan liberal. I am not entirely comfortable with the implications of "cosmopolitan," which 
may suggest an egoism, a lack of local loyalty, and a class identification that would not, on 
my view, characterize those I call individual de liberators or a Law of Peoples they could be 
expected to enact; I use the term, nonetheless, to minimize confusion, because Rawls em-
ploys it as well. 
For an effective positive statement of the cosmopolitan case, see MARTHA NussBAUM, 
FoR LOVE OF CoUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM (joshua Cohen ed., 1996). 
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ate responses of liberal societies to violations of these protections. I 
argue that Rawls's Law of Peoples protects too limited a range of hu-
man rights. I also suggest that liberals should sometimes be more will-
ing than Rawls believes they should be to pressure nonliberal socie-
ties, including decent ones, to respect the full array of human rights. 
The "nonideal" portion of Rawls's theory focuses on the duty of 
well-ordered societies to provide economic aid to burdened societies 
and on the duties of all societies in wartime. I explore and criticize 
Rawls's nonideal theory in Part III. According to the Law of Peoples, 
liberal, and decent nonliberal, peoples have a duty to assist any society 
burdened by unfavorable conditions until it reaches an appropriate 
level of political development and stability. Arguing that a society's 
political culture is the prime determinant of its economic well-
being-or will be, at any rate, in a transnational order structured 
fairly, in compliance with the Law of Peoples-Rawls proposes that 
this duty with respect to a given society should end as soon as it has 
become well-ordered. I maintain that his arguments for this conclu-
sion need modification for a variety of reasons. 
Rawls's decision not to adopt a cosmopolitan starting point also 
has unfortunate consequences for his account of the moral norms 
governing warfare. The Law of Peoples usually protects noncombat-
ant civilians and requires fair treatment of ordinary military person-
nel. But Rawls maintains, in a somewhat ad hoc fashion, that there 
should be a "supreme emergency" exception to conventional just war 
standards. I argue, however, that he has not succeeded in undermin-
ing the traditional rules of military conduct. 
C. A Cosmopolitan Alternative 
Rawls's Law of Peoples treats individual persons unequally in two 
ways. By treating vastly different peoples equally, it treats the members 
of these peoples unequally, because a given person's interests will 
count for more or less depending on the size of the people of which 
she is a member. And by treating each people as a unitary entity, it 
denies equal consideration to the interests and perspectives of some 
members of every people. In effect, it privileges the dominant actors 
in each society, treating their society's conceptions of the good and its 
interests as equivalent to theirs. Dissenters and outsiders, whose needs 
and perspectives may be very different from those of their societies' 
leaders, are effectively ignored. By Rawls's own admission, his Law of 
6 Boston College Int~Irnational & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 27:1 
Peoples is unfair to individualsP A cosmopolitan Law of Peoples, by 
contrast, would treat the interests of particular persons as equal and 
distinguishable. Such a Law of Peoples would embody a global version 
of Rawlsian domestic justice-'1ustice as fairness. "18 
Norms of global justice-and thus, in particular, a cosmopolitan 
Law of Peoples-would be worth explicating and defending even if all 
peoples were committed to Rawls's theory of domestic justice. There 
is no guarantee that an array of peoples with just domestic political 
structures would be justly ordered itself. To be sure, just domestic in-
stitutions would be democratic and egalitarian and would protect 
people against domestic violations of human rights. The frequency of 
war might be reduced.19 And just domestic regimes would contribute 
to the creation of a just global regime; such a regime could not come 
into being without the support of just peoples. (At the same time, a 
just global regime could clearly foster the development of greater 
numbers of just domestic regimes.) However, even if every country's 
institutions were just and democratic, global resources might still be 
maldistributed. 20 There is certainly no guarantee that democratic 
17 RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 17 n.9. See Allen Buchanan, Rawls's Law of Peoples: Rules 
for a Vanished Westphalian World, 110 ETHICS 697, 698 (2000) ("To say that the parties [in 
the second original position] represent peoples is, in effect, to ensure that the fundamen-
tal principles of international law that will be chosen reflect the interest of those who sup-
port the dominant or official conception of the good or of justice in the society, and this 
may mean that the interests of dissident individuals or minorities are utterly disre-
garded."). But see Trachtman, supra note 15, at 990 (maintaining that "the representatives 
of peoples should be assumed to represent their principals-individuals-with perfect 
fairness and accuracy, and not with the public choice and other agency problems that are 
endemic in the real world. In this sense, there would be little difference between an origi-
nal position among representatives of peoples, and one among individuals themselves. 
This integrated two-level original position, then, is not different from a single, global 
original position."). Despite Trachtman's argument, a Rawlsian reason for seeing the de-
liberators in Rawls's global original position as fairly representing individuals would also be 
a Rawlsian reason for endorsing a cosmopolitan account of global justice. It is also unclear 
that, even if Rawlsian deliberators regarded themselves as representing individuals, they 
would not, when speaking for their societies, seek to defend the interests of the dominant 
forces in those societies. 
18 Richard Steinberg helped me to see the need to make this point; I am grateful to 
Seana Shiffrin for forcing me to think about it further. 
19 Rawls suggests "that democratic peoples engaged in commerce would tend not to 
have occasion to go to war with one another." RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 46; see id. at 8, 
19, 44-54. See generally DAN REITER & ALLAN C. STAM, DEMOCRACIES AT WAR (2002) for 
some recent empirical support for this view. 
20 Rawls may be right that extreme economic deprivation need not threaten those who 
live in a country with just and democratic institutions. Still, the rules of the transnational 
game might still be rigged in one way or another to keep some democratic societies mar-
ginal. Further, even without rules that deliberately excluded some peoples from the pros-
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peoples would respect each other's independence and territorial in-
tegrity.21 And a commitment to justice as fairness on the part of indi-
vidual states would not necessarily entail a commitment to justice in 
war-to, say, the principle of noncombatant immunity. 
A global regime isn't just simply because the various domestic 
regimes that make it up are just: global and domestic justice are con-
ceptually distinct. Domestic justice cannot determine whether the 
bounds of peoples' territories, as these have developed over time, are 
appropriate, or what duties a given people owes to another people, or 
to individual persons who aren't its members. And even if the ques-
tion of justice in war or transnational economic relations never arose 
in fact, it still would not be settled simply in virtue of the fact that all 
domestic regimes were just. We would still need to ask what global jus-
tice looked like. We would need a way to decide whether a global order 
in which all domestic institutions conform to justice as fairness would 
itself be just. Conceptually, in any case, domestic justice isn't prior to 
global justice. However just domestic regimes may be, the norms of 
transnational justice and the means by which they can be derived and 
justified deserve careful scrutiny. 
l. PEOPLES, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, AND THE SECOND 
ORIGINAL PosiTION 
"[T]he original sin that continues to haunt the state and the in-
ternational system ... [is that] these are artificial entities created and 
maintained to perpetuate the Westphalian balance of power."22 But 
Rawls's model seems to presuppose the existence of these artificial 
entities: it is equal representatives of equal peoples or societies-more 
specifically, it appears, representatives of the dominant actors in these 
societies-who deliberate in the second original position and frame 
the norms of international justice. In this Part, I explain the Law of 
Peoples and its derivation before critically assessing Rawls's account of 
the second original position. 
perity enjoyed by others, historical and geographic circumstances might still lead to severe 
imbalances among societies that would be precluded by a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples. 
There is little indication on the basis of present practice that powerful democratic regimes 
are prepared to structure transnational economic relations in ways that are fair to other 
democratic regimes that lack substantial military, political, or economic power. 
21 Consider the behavior of the United States, a relatively democratic state, in relation 
to Nicaragua, also relatively democratic, during the 1980s. 
22 William J. Aceves, Critical Jurisprudence and International Legal Scholarship: A Study of 
Equitable Dist1ibution, 39 Coi.UM.j. TRANSNAT'L L. 299, 393 (2001) (footnotes omitted). 
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A. The Nature of Peoples 
Perhaps the most significant feature of The Law of Peoples is Rawls's 
focus on groups. He identifies five kinds of political units with which 
the foreign policy of a liberal people will be concerned: liberal peoples 
and nonliberal decent peoples-these two groups together constituting a 
group Rawls terms well-ordered peoples-as well as outlaw states, societies 
burdened by unfavomble conditions, and benevolent absolutisms, which 
"honor most human rights, but ... deny their members a meaningful 
role in making political decisions. "23 His principal, though not exclu-
sive, focus is on liberal and decent nonliberal peoples.24 
A people is not a state. A state, for Rawls, is an entity that claims to 
be sovereign; peoples, by contrast, are organized societies that lack 
the kind of absolute sovereignty characteristically predicated of states. 
This does not mean that peoples are subsumed within a world federa-
tion. It does mean, however, that they are not free to use military 
force-except to defend themselves or others against unjust aggres-
sion-or to abuse the transnationally recognized human rights of per-
sons within their borders. In addition, according to Rawls, because 
states are primarily or exclusively self-interested,25 because their inter-
ests are unlimited by justice, they cannot "firmly accept[] and act[] 
upon a just Law of Peoples. "26 By contrast, we can attribute moral mo-
tives to peoples.27 
The rights and duties of peoples "derive from the Law of Peoples 
itself, to which they would agree along with other peoples in suitable 
circumstances. "28 Unlike states, 'just peoples are fully prepared to 
grant the very same proper respect and recognition to other peoples 
as equals" that they themselves expect from others.29 "U]ust liberal 
peoples [and decent nonliberal peoples] limit their basic interests as 
required by the reasonable," while "the content of the interests of 
states does not allow them to be stable for the right reasons: that is, 
from firmly accepting and acting upon a just Law of Peoples. "3° Peo-
23 RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 63. 
24 !d. 
25 See id. at 27-28. 
26 !d. at 29. 
27 !d. at 17. 
28 RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 27. 
29 !d. at 35. 
30 Id. at 29. Rawls suggests that the difference between peoples and states is starkest 
"[i]f rationality excludes the reasonable (that is, if a state is moved by the aims it has and 
ignores the criterion of reciprocity in dealing with other societies); if a state's concern with 
power is predominant; and if its interests include such things as converting other societies 
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pies acknowledge and act on principle, and not only on the basis of 
"reasons of state. "31 United by "common sympathies, "32 a people has-
as a state does not-"a definite moral nature .... [that] includes a 
certain proper pride and sense of honor. "33 
Rawls does not imply that peoples will or should be constructed 
from scratch. Rather (though he does not, I believe, say so explicitly), 
peoples are often likely to be transformed versions of existing states-
ones whose domestic political institutions and attitudes toward other 
societies take on appropriate characteristics. Some existing societies 
may already resemble Rawlsian peoples tolerably well, though they 
would need to shed their pretensions of sovereignty to qualifY as peo-
ples. Other extant states will likely need to be transformed much 
more radically to become peoples. (How this is to be done is pre-
sumably a question for a nonideal theory of domestic justice, unless 
external intervention is required to facilitate the transition.) 34 
B. Decent Nonliberal Peoples 
Rawls devotes sustained attention to what he calls decent nonliberal 
peoples. A nonliberal society qualifies as Rawlsianly decent if it meets 
several conditions. It must not be aggressive. Its legal order must serve 
the common good and protect human rights. Its legal norms must 
possess moral legitimacy from the standpoint of its people. It must 
view its people as responsible moral actors. And its officials must act 
on the assumption that its legal and political order does and must 
embody a genuine concern for the common good.35 Representatives 
of (the leaders of) decent hierarchical peoples,36 Rawls is confident, 
would endorse the Law of Peoples in the original position.37 This 
means both that liberal peoples may reasonably expect them to ad-
here to the Law of Peoples and that they deserve to be tolerated by 
liberal societies. 
to the state's religion, enlarging its empire and winning territory, gaining dynastic or im-
perial or national prestige and glory, and increasing its relative economic strength." ld. at 
28. 
31 Id. at 27. 
32 Jd. at 23 n.17 (quoting j.S. MILL, CoNSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERN-
MENT (j.M. Robinson ed., 1977)). 
33 RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 44. 
34 Thanks to Seana Shiffrin for helping me to see the need to address this issue. 
35 See RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 64-68. 
36 Sec id. at 69 (maintaining that representatives of decent hierarchical peoples would 
adopt the Law of Peoples). 
37 See id. at 68-70. 
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While he observes that other models are possible, Rawls focuses 
on (imagined) decent hierarchical peoples he depicts as associationist 
as examples of decent nonliberal peoples.38 In these societies, people 
are related to the body politic as members of various societal groups 
with presumed commonalities of interest. An associationist model, 
Rawls suggests, might be preferred by those who find liberal society 
deracinated and who conceive of individuals' identities as to a great 
degree conferred by the groups to which they belong.39 A decent hi-
erarchical society seeks and preserves the common good by means of 
a "decent consultation hierarchy"-an array of bodies representing 
various organic social groups that must be consulted before important 
public decisions are made.40 "Each person [in a decent hierarchical 
society] belongs to a group represented by a body in the consultation 
hierarchy .... "41 In turn: 
Persons as members of associations, corporations, and es-
tates have the right at some point in the procedure of con-
sultation (often at the stage of selecting a group's represen-
tatives) to express political dissent, and the government has 
an obligation to take a group's dissent seriously and to give a 
conscientious reply .... Judges and other officials must be 
willing to address objections. They cannot refuse to listen, 
charging that the dissenters are incompetent and unable to 
understand, for then we would have not a decent consulta-
tion hierarchy, but a paternalistic regime.42 
Assemblies of "bodies in the consultation hierarchy" are free to 
question official positions and the government must respond.43 Its 
response must indicate the way in which it "thinks it can both rea-
sonably interpret its policies in line with its common good idea of jus-
tice and impose duties and obligations on all members of society. "44 
Rawls evidently opts for this consultative structure because there is, he 
38 See id. at 63-68. I use the plural "peoples" advisedly, since Rawls offers only a single 
(imaginary) example of a decent hierarchical people, the Central Asian Muslim society he 
calls "Kazanistan." See id. at 64. 
39 See id. at 72-73 (citing G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT§ 308 (1821)). 
4° RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 71-72. 
41 !d. 
42 !d. at 72. 
43 !d. at 78. 
44 !d. For a critique of Rawls's position that liberal and decent societies can oblige their 
members, see CAROLE PATEMAN, THE PROBLEM OF PoLITICAL OBLIGATION: A CRITIQUE OF 
LIBERAL THEORY 117-20, 125-29 (2d ed. 1985). 
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suggests, some historical precedent for it in Muslim political theory.45 
He proposes an imagined Muslim people, Kazanistan, as a model de-
cent nonliberal society, perhaps because he is concerned with the vi-
ability for Muslims in particular of the consultative hierarchical model 
he has proposed.46 
For a consultation hierarchy to be just, a range of conditions 
must obtain: 
First, all groups must be consulted. Second, each member of 
a people must belong to a group. Third, each group must be 
represented by a body that contains at least some of the 
group's own members who know and share the fundamental 
interests of the group .... Fourth, the body that makes the 
final decision ... must weigh the views and claims of each of 
the bodies consulted, and, if called upon, judges and other 
officials must explain and justify the rulers' decision. In the 
spirit of the procedure, consultation with each body may 
influence the outcome. Fifth, the decision should be made 
according to a conception of the special priorities of [the 
particular society]. . . . Sixth[,] . . . these special priorities 
must fit into an overall scheme of cooperation, and the fair 
terms according to which the group's cooperation is to be 
conducted should be explicitly specified.47 
A decent nonliberal society may have an official religion-or, 
presumably, an official comprehensive doctrine of some other kind. 
That it does, however, need not call into question its status as a decent 
society, because it declines to propagate its comprehensive doctrine 
by force and it allows those who do not share it to practice their tradi-
tions without fear. 48 It may, however, privilege adherents of the domi-
nant comprehensive doctrine by, for instance, giving them the exclu-
sive right to hold certain major public offices.49 
Like other features of the public order of a decent nonliberal 
society, this stance toward religious plurality is not, Rawls maintains, 
45 See RAwLs, LAw, supra note I, at 72 n.I2. 
46 See id. at 75-78; cf Antonio F. Perez, The International Recognition of Judgments: The De-
bate Between Private and Public Law Solutions, I9 BERKELEY J. lNT'L L. 44, 46 n.I3 (200I) 
("Rawls' recognition that even [!] Islam is amenable to participation in public discourse 
with other comprehensive conceptions suggests that his basic methodology can be ex-
tended to global political ordering."). 
47 RAwLs, LAw, supra note I, at 77 (footnote omitted). 
48 See id. at 75-77. 
49 Id. at 75-76. 
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"fully reasonable," but it is compatible with status as a decent society 
and does not warrant intolerant behavior by liberal societies.50 Pro-
vided a society truly is decent, Rawls maintains, liberal societies should 
accept it ungrudgingly as a full-fledged member of the Society of 
Peoples and avoid taking coercive or overly intrusive action designed 
to influence it to change its public order.51 I will argue against this 
conclusion below. 
C. The Content of Rawls's Law of Peoples 
The fact that both liberal and decent nonliberal peoples make up 
the Rawlsian Society of Peoples affects the content of a Rawlsian Law 
of Peoples. A just Law of Peoples, for Rawls, is one that would be en-
dorsed behind a veil of ignorance among representatives of (the 
dominant actors in) both liberal and decent nonliberal societies. 
Rawlsian deliberators do not reflect (like their counterparts at the 
domestic level) on a potentially unlimited range of possible concep-
tions of justice. Instead, they assess some "familiar and traditional 
principles of justice among free and democratic peoples. "52 
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and 
independence are to be respected by other peoples. 
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that 
bind them. 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to insti-
gate war for reasons other than self-defense. 
6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the 
conduct of war. 
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under un-
favorable conditions that prevent their having a just or de-
cent political and social regime. 53 
Rawls suggests that equal representatives of the world's presumptively 
equal peoples, deliberating behind a veil of ignorance, would endorse 
50 See id. at 74-75. 
51 Id. at 59-60. 
52 See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 1, 39-50 (discussing the reasons why certain princi-
ples are selected). 
53 RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 37. 
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these traditional principles with some qualifications,54 with the addi-
tion of "principles for forming and regulating federations (associa-
tions) of peoples and standards of fairness for trade and other coop-
erative institutions."55 Thus, the Law of Peoples is a refinement of ex-
isting norms ofinternationallaw.56 
D. The Equality of Peoples in Rawls's Second 01iginal Position 
The fact that representatives of equal peoples determine the con-
tent of the Law of Peoples is fatefully decisive for Rawls's argument. 57 
It leads to a stark contrast between Rawlsian norms of domestic and 
54 See id. at 37-38. For instance, the fourth principle "will obviously have to be qualified 
in the general case of outlaw states and grave violations of human rights. Although suitable 
for a society of well-ordered peoples, it fails in the case of a society of disordered peoples 
in which wars and serious violations of human rights are endemic." !d. at 37-38. 
55 Id. at 38 (footnote omitted). 
56 See id. at 41. When he first envisioned extending his theory to the international 
arena, Rawls made much the same point. See RAwLs, THEORY, supra note 1, at 332-33. 
Rawls said "the principles chosen would, I think, be familiar ones." !d. at 332 (footnote 
omitted). Referencing jAMES LESLIE BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE (Sir Humphrey WaJdock ed., 6th ed. 1963), he ob-
served, "[t]his work contains all that we need here." RAwLs, THEORY, supra note 1, at 332 
n.27. Of course, the Law of Peoples as Rawls now conceives it does contain more demand-
ing standards for governmental conduct than those commonly regarded as forming part of 
international law in 1963, when the edition of Brierly's book that Rawls cites was pub-
lished; the norms envisioned in The Law of Peoples are more elaborate than those canvassed 
in A Theory of justice. 
By limiting the options on which Rawlsian deliberators would reflect at the global level 
to existing norms of international law, Rawls has not freed himself from the need to claim 
that the principles that form the Law of Peoples are the best available standards. (Thanks 
to Seana Shiffrin for this point.) But Rawls's decision to begin with existing norms of in-
ternational law does highlight, at any rate, his relative comfort with the existing interna-
tional legal order. But Garcia reasonably characterizes Rawls's decision to begin with exist-
ing principles of international law as a "shortcut." Garcia, Usefulness, supra note 15, at 41. 
And Thomas W. Pogge, Rawls on Intemationaljustice, 51 PHIL. Q. 246, 249 (2001) [herein-
after Pogge, justice], plausibly suggests that the model Rawls proposes for determining 
norms of domestic justice "provides more flexibility for adapting social institutions to vari-
able circumstances." By contrast, the approach Rawls proposes in The Law of Peoples "pro-
vides no such flexibility. The members of Rawls's society of peoples are locked into a par-
ticular set of rules which may well prove too rigid to fulfil their interests as peoples under 
diverse global circumstances." !d. 
57 Cf Todd Adams, Using justice as Faimess in Reducing Global Greenhouse Emissions, 16]. 
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 331, 371-72 (2001) (illustrating "the fundamental difficulty of creating 
a second original position based on peoples instead of persons"); Lea Brilmayer, W7wt Use 
Is john Rawls' Theory of Justice to Public Intemational Law?, 6 INT'L LEGAL THEORY 36, 37 
(2000) (Rawls "takes it for granted almost without examination that the morally relevant 
entities in the international arena are states. International lawyers and theoreticians v.ill 
recognize this at once to be an enormously problematic assumption."). 
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global justice58 and between the Law of Peoples and a cosmopolitan 
standard of global justice. A cosmopolitan view "is concerned with the 
well-being of individuals, and hence with whether the well-being of 
the globally worst-off person can be improved. "59 By contrast, what mat-
ters "to ... [a Rawlsian] Law of Peoples is the justice and stability for 
the right reasons of liberal and decent [nonliberal] societies, living as 
members of a Society of well-ordered Peoples. "60 Rawls makes clear 
that his Law of Peoples "is fair to peoples and not to individual per-
sons. "61 I argue here that Rawls provides no good reason to opt 
against a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples and that, given his earlier ar-
gument in A Theory of justice for the equality of persons, we should 
prefer a cosmopolitan to a Rawlsian Law of Peoples. 
1. Rawls's Argument for the Domestic Equality of Persons 
Rawls's arguments about domestic justice show plausibly, if implic-
itly, why a Law of Peoples should be cosmopolitan.62 His arguments for 
the equality of persons at the domestic level, reflected in the equality of 
their representatives in the first original position, seem to provide 
strong support for the equality of persons on the global level. The con-
siderations that lead Rawls to opt for an original position populated by 
individual deliberators at the domestic level seem to apply with equal 
force when the second original position is being designed. Rawls ini-
tially identifies these considerations in A Theory of justice: 
It seems reasonable to suppose that the parties in the original 
position are equal. That is, all have the same rights in the pro-
cedure for choosing principles; each can make proposals, 
58 See also Antonio F. Perez, On the Way to the Forum: The Reconstruction of Article 2(7) and 
Rise of Federalism Under the United Nations Charter, 31 TEX. INT'L LJ. 353, 372 n.89 (1996) 
(observing that "the amorality of international life has infected not only realists but also 
philosophers drawing from idealist traditions" and noting that Rawls "finds a much lower 
standard of international morality than his methodology locates in domestic regimes") 
(footnote omitted); Gerry]. Simpson, Is International Law Fair1, 17 MicH.]. INT'L L. 615, 
618 n.20 (1996) (reviewing THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INSTITUTIONS (1995)) (noting drily that "Rawls [appears] to have confirmed Franck's 
thesis" that "parts of Rawlsian theory [cannot] be applied to international law"); Ian Ward, 
International O-rder, Political Community, and the Search for a European Public Philosophy, 22 
FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 930, 933 (1999) (observing that, substantively, "Rawls does indeed 
abandon the automatic priority of classical liberalism") (footnote omitted). 
59 RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 120 (emphasis added). 
00 ld. 
61 Id. at 17 n.11. 
62 Cf POGGE, REALIZING, supra note 14, at 217-48. 
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submit reasons for their acceptance, and so on. Obviously the 
purpose of these conditions is to represent equality between 
human beings as moral persons, as creatures having a concep-
tion of their good and capable of a sense of justice. The basis 
of equality is taken to be similarity in these two respects. 63 
15 
Rawls frames his argument in A Theory of Justice as a straightfor-
ward claim that those who can participate in shared reflection on the 
norms governing political life should have an equal right to do so. 
"[E]qualjustice is owed to those who have the capacity to take part in 
and to act in accordance with the public understanding of the initial 
situation. "64 Those deliberating in the domestic (first) original posi-
tion-and, by implication, those they represent-are equal in that 
each has certain minimum capacities required for pursuing personal 
goals and assessing the fairness of social arrangements. It seems, at 
least initially, as if, because they possess these moral powers, all per-
sons on our planet should be understood as morally equal and should 
therefore be entitled to equal representation in the second original 
position. 55 But Rawls rejects the view that individual persons should be 
understood as equal according to the Law of Peoples and, with it, a 
cosmopolitan original position. 
Rawls's defense of his starting point is likely to leave readers un-
sure of the grounds of his decision to opt against the equality of per-
sons in the second original position. I will explore his explicit argu-
ments before considering several alternative justifications for the Law 
of Peoples, suggested by his other work, which he might be inclined 
to adduce. None, I believe, is successful. 
63 RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 1, at 17; see afso RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, 79-81; 
RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 20, 87; RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 1, at 441-49; cf 
RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 19 ("Since we start within the tradition of democratic 
thought, we also think of citizens as free and equal persons. The basic idea is that in virtue 
of their two moral powers (a capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the 
good) and the powers of reason (of judgment, thought, and inference connected with 
these powers), persons are free. Their having these powers to the requisite minimum de-
gree to be fully cooperating members of society makes persons equal."). 
64 RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 1, at 442. 
65 See RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 82. Rawls notes the obYiousness of this sort of ar-
gument, see id., but rejects it without careful consideration. See infra Part I.D.2 ("Rawls's 
Explicit Arguments for the Equality of Peoples"). 
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2. Rawls's Explicit Arguments for the Equality of Peoples 
Given the importance of the fact that it is peoples who are repre-
sented in the second original position, it is surprising how little argu-
ment Rawls offers for this arrangement.66 In Section 1 of The Law of 
Peoples, he asks: "Why does the Law of Peoples use an original position 
at the second level that is fair to peoples and not to individual persons? 
What is it about peoples that gives them the status of the (moral) actors 
in the Law of Peoples?"67 The reader will find the answer, he promises, 
in Sections 2 and 11.68 But in Section 2, he clarifies his position rather 
than actually justifying it, and his putative defense in Section 11 is ques-
tion-begging. Elsewhere in The Law of Peoples, he repeats his account of 
the second original position as if doing so justified his decision to re-
gard those deliberating in it as representing peoples rather than per-
sons, but he offers no new argument for this decision. He appeals un-
persuasively-and, again, question-beggingly-to the liberal value of 
tolerance and implies that a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples would be 
unappealingly intolerant. He suggests that a cosmopolitan Law of Peo-
ples would be inappropriate because it would require the pursuit of 
policies damaging to the self-respect of nonliberal peoples. He plausi-
bly undermines the claim that intolerant regimes lose the right to be 
tolerated simply in virtue of their intolerance, but his having done so 
provides no positive reason for endorsing a Rawlsian Law of Peoples. 
None of his arguments justifies rejecting the intuitively attractive view, 
supported by his earlier work, that the second original position should 
be structured in a way that is fair to free and equal persons. 
66 See Brilmayer, supra note 57, at 38, 39 (stating that Rawls "is surely aware that his de-
cision to base his contractarian analysis on the preferences of states is deeply controversial. 
Rawls recognizes the problem, without offering any satisfactory response .... The world is 
not composed only of states, or of peoples, but also of people. There are non-
governmental organizations, universities, human rights organizations, churches, mosques 
and many other institutions that have just as much independent validity internationally as 
states do, from a purely theoretical point of view. There is no reason theoretically to start 
with states as the relevant actors. Or if there is a reason, Rawls does not provide it."). But cf 
Harry D. Gould, .1 Response to Pmfessor Bribnayer on Rawls, 6 lNT'L LEGAL THEORY 42, 43 
(2000) ("The detailed discussions on Human Rights which this generates (§ 10), and its 
concomitant challenge to traditional notions of sovereignty surely indicate that while peo-
ples are primary in the formulation of principles, people are the guiding concern."). 
67 RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 17 n.9. 
68 /d. ("Part of the answer is given in § 2, in which the idea of peoples is specified; but 
the fuller explanation is given in § 11. Those who are troubled by this question should 
turn to it now."). 
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a. Clarifying the Nature of Peoples 
Rawls says that Section 2 of The Law of Peoples contains "[p]art of 
the answer" to the question why a Rawlsian Law of Peoples is grounded 
in a procedure "that is fair to peoples and not to individual persons. 
What is it about peoples that gives them the status of the (moral) actors 
in the Law of Peoples?"69 But Section 2 provides little assistance to the 
puzzled reader. In this section, Rawls spells out the idea of a people as a 
group with a shared cultural identity, united by common sympathy and 
loyalty to a set of public institutions and norms of fairness. 70 These 
characteristics explain why peoples matte1; why they might be thought 
to have morally relevant value, and why liberal peoples-which recog-
nize this value and which are, in any case, committed to norms of re-
spect-would show appropriate regard for other peoples, both liberal 
and nonliberal. But what Rawls says about the nature of a people serves 
at best to lay the groundwork for his later argument. Explaining what 
peoples are is not the same as showing that their interests ought to 
trump those of the particular persons who are their members. Rawls's 
explanation of the nature of peoples does not undermine his argu-
ments for the freedom and equality of persons, for democracy, or for 
the contention that persons should not be asked to sacrifice themselves 
for the well-being of their societies. 
b. Question-Begging Rejection of the Global Equality of Persons 
Rawls tells us that Section 11 offers "the fuller explanation" of his 
decision to treat peoples rather than persons fairly at the global 
level. 71 But it does not. Or, if it does, "the fuller explanation" isn't es-
pecially complete. In Section 11, he explicitly rejects the idea of a 
global original position as the basis for the Law of Peoples.72 We 
should not attempt, he says, to derive a set of global norms by imagin-
ing all individual persons around the world as deliberating in the 
original position or to hold all societies accountable for failing to ad-
here to liberal standards of justice. Advocating a cosmopolitan ap-
proach "amounts to saying that all persons are to have the equal lib-
eral rights of citizens in a constitutional democracy. "73 This approach 
would require liberal societies "to act gradually to shape all not yet 
69 !d. 
7o See id. at 23-25. 
71 !d. at 17 n.9. 
72 RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 82-83. 
73 !d. 
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liberal societies in a liberal direction, until eventually (in the ideal 
case) all societies are liberal. "74 We shouldn't endorse such a require-
ment, however, unless we are sure that nonliberal societies are not 
"acceptable," something we would know only in view of "a reasonable 
liberal Law of Peoples. "75 The fact that we can envision "a global 
original position" doesn't demonstrate that liberal democracy is the 
only reasonable option, "and we can't merely assume it. "76 
To be sure. But the procedure Rawls suggests for the derivation 
of the Law of Peoples guarantees the outcome for which he argues.77 
He emphasizes that "the parties [in the second original position] are 
the representatives of equal peoples, and equal peoples will want to 
maintain this equality with each other."78 No doubt this is true: if peo-
ples begin with equal status behind the veil of ignorance, they will 
undoubtedly seek to maintain this equality. The rejection of cos-
mopolitanism is as much a consequence of the structure of the sec-
ond original position as the rejection of hierarchy is of the structure 
of the first. The equality of peoples is simply assumed in one case as 
the equality of persons is in the other.79 The promised warrants are 
nowhere to be found. For all Rawls has said, his arguments for the 
freedom and equality of persons remain as valid as ever.80 
74 I d. at 82. 
75 I d. at 83. 
76 Id. 
77 In a broad sense, of course, this is true of contractarian theories of all sorts (thanks 
to Carole Pateman for this point). This kind of circularity is not necessarily a fatal flaw in 
Rawls's argument. However, given his argument's circular character, it provides little sup-
port for his starting point. See, e.g., PATEMAN, supra note 44, at 7, 14-20. 
78 RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 60. 
79 Cf id. 
80 Rawls makes a similar move earlier in The Law of Peoples. He notes an apparent 
conflict between the equality of people in the first original position and the equality of 
peoples in the second but does little to justify it. In the first original position, he says, "we 
counted citizens as free and equal because that is how they conceive of themselves as citi-
zens in a democratic society." RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 33-34. Similarly, "[i]n the Law 
of Peoples ... we Yiew peoples as conceiving of themselves as free and equal peopks in the 
Society of Peoples (according to the political conception of that society)." Id. at 34. He 
obserYes only that "[t]his is parallel to, but not the same as, how in the domestic case the 
political conception determines the way citizens are to see themselves according to their 
moral powers and higher-order interests." Id. Current transnational society, in which peo-
ples theoretically conceive of themselves as equals, is treated as a given. Again, Rawls begs 
the question. See id. at 33-34. 
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c. Liberal Tolerance 
Rawls suggests that some observations he makes while arguing for 
liberal tolerance of decent nonliberal peoples help to explain why a 
Rawlsian Law of Peoples should be preferred to a cosmopolitan Law 
of Peoples.81 He contends that liberal societies should tolerate decent 
nonliberal societies-that they should not use military force or eco-
nomic sanctions to coerce such societies in to becoming more liberal. 
[P]arties [deliberating in the second original position] are 
the representatives of equal peoples, and equal peoples will 
want to maintain this equality with each other .... No people 
will be willing to count the losses to itself as outweighed by 
gains to other peoples; and therefore the principle of utility, 
and other moral principles discussed in moral philosophy, 
are not even candidates for a Law of Peoples. 82 
Because Rawlsian deliberators represent peoples, they will doubt-
less wish to maintain the equality of the groups they represent. But 
the original position is a "device of representation,"83 which "models 
what we would regard-you and I, here and now-as fair conditions 
under which the parties ... are to specifY the Law of Peoples, guided 
by appropriate reasons. "84 Rawls simply specifies that "the parties as 
representatives and the peoples they represent are situated symmetri-
cally and therefore fairly. "85 He may be right that symmetry is fair 
here. He cannot, however, simply assert that it is. Mter all, whether it 
is fair is precisely the point at issue. And he has offered independent 
arguments elsewhere for the fundamental equality of persons. It 
might seem that he needs to respond to his own arguments before 
asserting that we ought to accept the view that peoples are equal, 
given that the equality of peoples implies the inequality of persons. 
Sl I d. at 82 ("To proceed in this way ... takes us back to where we were in § 7.2 (where 
I considered and rejected the argument that nonliberal societies are always properly sub-
ject to some form of sanctions), since it amounts to saying that all persons are to have the 
equal liberal rights of citizens in a constitutional democracy."). 
82 !d. at 60. 
83 RAWLS, LIBERAI.ISM, supra note 1, at 25. 
84 RAWLS, LAW, supra note 1, at 32. In the passage quoted, "you and I, here and now" 
are "citizens of some liberal democracy, but not of the same one." Id. at 32 n.35. Subse-
quently, Rawls argues that persons who are "members of decent hierarchical societies, but 
not the same one" would endorse the same eight principles of justice as Rawlsian delibera-
tors (listed in Part I.C, infra, "The Content of Rawls's Law of Peoples"). See id. at 69 n.S. 
85 Id. at 32. 
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Rawls says that, in virtue of a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples as he 
interprets it, liberals would deny "a due measure of respect"86 to non-
liberal peoples. But this way of putting the matter is surely question-
begging because what is at issue is precisely what level of respect lib-
eral peoples should accord the public institutions and cultural patterns 
of nonliberal peoples. In addition, Rawls needs to distinguish between 
the different senses in which liberals might be said to show, or fail to 
show, respect for nonliberal peoples. Liberal peoples could perfectly 
well regard-as they would in any case regard-the institutions of il-
liberal peoples as deficient and unreasonable without seeking publicly 
to humiliate such peoples or show contempt for them. 
Defending Rawls, Harry Gould argues that, given a cosmopolitan 
standard of justice, "decent hierarchical societies are ruled out [if not 
declared oxymoronic], and ... an entire segment of the world is de-
clared morally illegitimate."87 A cosmopolitan standard is objection-
able because it denies the "acceptability" and "dignity of all other 
types of societies than our own. "88 It is not clear what sort of claim 
Gould is making.89 Is it one that liberals ought to accept as liberals? 
From the standpoint of a cosmopolitan theory of justice, Rawls's de-
cent hierarchical societies would, indeed, count as unjust. By denying 
their members full social and legal equality, by refusing to institute 
democratic decision-making procedures, and by declining to respect 
the full panoply of liberal rights, such societies would fail to meet the 
demands of justice. But nothing of great interest follows. Rawls is not 
a relativist. He believes that the version of liberalism he defends is ul-
timately reasonable in a way that competing nonliberal views are 
not.90 And, indeed, this is surely part of what it means to affirm any 
normative view.91 The fact that, if a given view is correct, contradictory 
views will be incorrect should be relatively obvious and noncontrover-
sial. Liberals and nonliberals will doubtless think of each other as 
86 Id. at 61. 
87 Gould, supra note 66, at 44 (alteration in original). 
88 Id. at 44. 
89 Beitz, supra note 2, at 681, considers and rejects as circular the argument that "a 
cosmopolitan approach would necessarily be less tolerant of the diversity of political tradi-
tions and cultures." After all, the question at issue is in part precisely "whether or to what 
extent international institutions and the foreign policies of liberal states should tolerate 
nonliberal cultures." I d. 
90 CHARLES LARMORE, THE MORALS OF MODERNITY 146-51 (1996); see RAWLS, LAW, 
supra note 1, at 62. 
91 See Gary Chartier, Righting Narrative: Robert Chang, Poststructuralisrn, and the Possibility 
of Critique, 7 AsiAN PAC. AM. LJ. 105, 116-17 (2001). 
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wrong in important ways, even if they take each other's dignity and 
value seriously. That a theory justifies liberals in believing there is 
something wrong with illiberal practices should hardly be thought of 
as cause for embarrassment. 
Whatever Rawls says about decent nonliberal societies, he has al-
ready classified "an entire segment of the world" as "morally illegiti- · 
mate."92 He clearly condemns benevolent absolutisms (with 
qualifications) and outlaw states as unjust.93 And he regards even well-
ordered illiberal societies as less just than liberal societies.94 It would 
hardly be open to him to object to a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples 
merely because a variety of regimes appeared to be unjust in its light, 
given that the same is true, even if to a lesser degree, of a Rawlsian Law 
of Peoples. 
d. The Self-Respect of Decent Nonliberal Peoples 
Rawls rightly believes that decent nonliberal societies' undemo-
cratic public institutions and limited human rights protections would 
be inconsistent with a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples.95 Judging nonlib-
eral peoples to be unjust would have negative consequences for their 
self-respect; thus, he implies, we should opt against a cosmopolitan 
Law of Peoples.96 
This is a curious argument. It does nothing to show that persons 
are not equal for political purposes and that they are not entitled to 
equal status domestically and globally, to opportunities for democratic 
participation, and to a range of basic liberties crucial to personal 
autonomy and democratic self-government. And it is logically odd, if 
it is intended as an argument against the claim that a cosmopolitan 
Law of Peoples would be just in a way that a Rawlsian Law of Peoples 
would not. If a given practice is inconsistent with the demands of jus-
tice, recognizing that it is might undermine the self-respect of some 
persons who support it. But even if identifying the practice as unjust 
might undermine their self-respect, this has no tendency to show that 
there is anything wrong with challenging the practice. A norm can be 
just even if it undermines the self-respect of some persons by calling 
92 RAwLs, LAw, supm note 1, at 62; see also Gould, supm note 66, at 44. 
93 RAwLs, LAW, supm note 1, at 62. 
94 See id. 
95 !d. 
96 See id. at 61-62; cf Mark Tushnet, The Law of Peoples /Jy john Rawls, 38 ALBERTA L. 
REv. 1069, 1073 (2001) (book review). Tushnet does not elaborate this argument in order 
to defend it; he is, indeed, unabashedly skeptical. 
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their behavior into question. Obviously, there might be good reason 
for liberals not to announce their disapproval of decent nonliberal 
peoples, but that they ought not to do this is irrelevant to the question 
whether the institutions of such peoples metit their disapproval. In any 
case, the harm to the self-respect of decent nonliberals might be rela-
tively limited, given that liberals would ordinarily avoid interfering 
coercively with decent nonliberal states. The argument from self-
respect leaves Rawls's own arguments for equality, freedom, and de-
mocracy untouched. 
Rawls's self-respect argument focuses on the interest in self-
respect of those who govern decent nonliberal societies or support 
the status quo in those societies; and this interest does not, I believe, 
trump the interest of other citizens of nonliberal societies in freedom, 
equality, and democracy. Just how strong is the interest in self-respect 
which a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples might threaten? Rawls doesn't 
tell us. Mter all, liberals will regard a variety of societies, notably those 
he calls "outlaw states," as governed in unequivocally inappropriate 
ways. Liberal criticisms might adversely affect the self-respect of some 
persons in these societies, but this fact-rightly-fails to persuade 
Rawls that liberals should avoid criticizing them. And Rawls doesn't 
indicate whose self-respect is at issue. Those denied various human 
rights by their decent nonliberal societies presumably wouldn't regard 
calls for their societies to recognize these rights as humiliating. Rawls 
gives us no reason to treat only the self-respect of those committed to 
upholding the status quo as worth protecting while ignoring the self-
respect of those interested in fostering change (which might be en-
hanced by external pressures for liberalization and diminished by in-
ternal disregard for human rights). Indeed, the self-respect of citizens 
of decent nonliberal societies who wanted reforms that would make 
their societies more liberal and democratic might actually be en-
hanced by the recognition that justice was on their side. 
The interest in self-respect grounded in group identity is best 
thought of as an individual interest-an individual interest served by 
group membership, but an individual interest nonetheless. Group 
identity is merely one contributor to the good of individual self-
respect, not a master good that subsumes or trumps all the other pri-
mary goods that individual deliberators might acknowledge.97 Indi-
vidual deliberators might well support the continued existence of or-
ganized peoples as part of a just global order. They might affirm the 
97 Cf Tushnet, supra note 96, at 1074-75. 
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value of self-respect rooted in group membership. They might ac-
knowledge reasons for tolerating decent nonliberal societies. But the 
appropriateness of these judgments would still be a function of the 
individual interests at stake, interests whose independence and value 
are effectively represented by means of a cosmopolitan second origi-
nal position and reflected in a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples. 
Rawls has not shown that recognizing the liberal rights of all per-
sons would necessarily do great harm to the reasonable self-respect of 
particular peoples. He has also failed to show convincingly why a peo-
ple's interest in preserving its identity and self-respect trumps the in-
terests of any of its individual members in something approximating 
the full panoply of liberal rights.98 His argument from the value of self-
respect does not warrant basing norms of global justice on the conclu-
sions of Rawlsian deliberators rather than individual deliberators. 99 
e. Equality for Non-Egalitarians? 
Rawls considers the objection that, because decent nonliberal 
societies are not egalitarian, they should not be entitled to equal rep-
resentation. In response, he maintains, reasonably enough, that this is 
on its face a non sequitur, given that we treat groups with different or-
ganizational patterns (churches, say, or universities) as equal for cer-
tain purposes.l00 But rebutting one objection to his model is not the 
same as offering any persuasive reason for adopting the device of an 
original position in which peoples rather than individual persons de-
liberate. It is hard not to conclude, in short, that abandoning the 
equality of persons at the transnational level is simply "an ad hoc hy-
pothesis"101 that enables Rawls "to reach the results that he has in ad-
vance decided are the most plausible for the law of nations. "1°2 
98 See id. Rawls's belief that liberal societies ought to respect decent nonliberal societies 
does not depend on the conviction that the institutions of decent nonliberal societies are 
as satisfactory as those of liberal societies. RAwLs, LAw, supra note I, at 62. 
99 Cf Pogge,justice, supra note 56, at 248. 
100 RAwLs, LAW, supra note I, at 69-70. Rawls rightly notes that Yarious kinds of deci-
sion-making mechanisms may exist in different kinds of organizations, but that we may 
nonetheless regard these organizations as equal for some purposes. But this observation 
could be challenged on the basis that a uniYersity is easy to lea,·e, as a nation is not, and 
that it is much less obvious that there is a single appropriate form for uniYersity organiza-
tion than it is that democracy is of great moral importance. 
101 Fernando R. Teson, The Rawlsian Theory of International Law, 9 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 
79,85 (I995) (italics supplied). 
102 !d. 
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3. Alternative Rawlsian Justifications for the Equality of Peoples 
Given the liberal conviction that persons are equal and Rawls's 
own arguments that they are, liberals should reject his model of peo-
ples as the contractors in the global original position in light of its po-
tentially problematic consequences for particular persons. 103 Rawls's 
explicit arguments against the alternative, a cosmopolitan Law of 
Peoples, are both unclear and weak. It is worth asking, therefore, 
whether there might be other, more persuasive arguments which he 
might understand as providing a more secure foundation for his peo-
ples-based model,I04 I will consider five such arguments below. One 
argument might depend on Rawls's belief in the undesirability of a 
world government; Rawls may believe that a cosmopolitan Law of 
Peoples would require such a government, and that the unattractive-
ness of such a government makes a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples itself 
an unappealing option. I argue both that a cosmopolitan Law of Peo-
ples would not require a world government and that such a govern-
ment need not, in any case, be objectionable for the reasons Rawls 
believes it would be. 
The second possible argument I will consider focuses on the con-
cern with public justification and legitimacy that has surfaced in 
Rawls's work since A Theory of justice. Perhaps a Rawlsian Law of Peo-
ples could achieve legitimacy, while a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples 
could not; I suggest, however, that a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples 
could achieve Rawlsian legitimacy and that its binding character does 
not depend, in any case, on its Rawlsian legitimacy. 
A third possible argument focuses on the importance of fair coop-
eration for Rawls's position. Rawls might argue that, absent a world 
government, which he opposes on other grounds, a cosmopolitan So-
ciety of Peoples could not quality as a fair system of cooperation that 
deserved the loyalty of the world's people. I suggest, by contrast, that a 
cosmopolitan Law of Peoples could, indeed, ground a fair system of 
global cooperation and that, even if no such system of cooperation ex-
103 Cf Pogge,justice, supra note 56, at 247 ("By accepting an account that makes the in-
terests of peoples morally fundamental, liberals compromise their conviction that social 
institutions should be assessed by appeal to the interests of individuals (normative indi-
vidualism), and by appeal to their freedom and fundamental equality in particular. (De-
cent [nonliberal] societies, by contrast, are so well accommodated by Rawls that they seem 
to pay no price of accommodation at all.)"). 
104 Cf Trachtman, supra note 15, at 989 ("A reasonable conclusion is that Rawls's posi-
tion is not merely mistaken but is so weak that it leaves one searching beyond Rawls's text 
for an explanation."). 
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isted, Rawls seems to hold views which imply that a cosmopolitan Law 
of Peoples could still bind the actions of governments and individuals. 
A fourth argument-trading on some passages that, taken in iso-
lation, could support a relativistic interpretation of Rawls's work-
might suggest that a commitment to democratic equality is a feature 
of Western liberal thought which most peoples (or persons) would 
not share and which they would therefore haYe no reason to endorse. 
I maintain, however, that Rawls's contextualist model of justification 
does not have relativistic implications that would rule out the moral 
universalism of a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples. 
Rawls could also argue for the equality and fundamental impor-
tance of peoples on the basis that responsibility for the world's re-
sources needs to be allocated to particular groups if these resources 
are to be protected. Responding to this fifth argument, I note that 
resources can be appropriately protected, if necessary, eYen if all per-
sons are treated as equal and morally basic for purposes of identifying 
an appropriate global political morality. 
a. The Rejection of a World Government 
Perhaps in A Theory of Justice Rawls simply takes the equality of 
states, and the appropriateness of a Rawlsian Law of Peoples, for 
granted, despite the direct and indirect conflicts between this position 
and the commitment to the equality of persons that grounds his ac-
count of domestic justice.105 Perhaps it simply seems obvious to Rawls 
that peoples, not persons, are fundamental when norms of global jus-
tice are being constructed. If so, pointing out the positive arguments 
he offers elsewhere for the freedom and equality of persons and em-
phasizing the importance of making such freedom and equality the 
basis for global norms of justice may be sufficient to show the inap-
propriateness of his position. 
It is also possible, however, that Rawls regards rooting the Law of 
Peoples in a social contract framed by individual deliberators as im-
105 Rawls notes that "[t] he basic principle of the law of nations is a principle of equal-
ity. Independent peoples organized as states have certain fundamental equal rights. This 
principle is analogous to the equal rights of citizens in a constitutional regime." RAwLs, 
THEORY, supra note 1, at 332. But this is best seen, not as an argument for the design of the 
second original position, but simply as a brief elaboration of the principles that might 
form part of a Law of Peoples (though he doesn't use the term) and as an example of the 
unsurprising congruence between such a Law of Peoples and currently accepted norms of 
international law. 
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plying or necessitating the existence of a putatively undesirable world 
government. Rawls says he 
assume [s] that ... a world government would be either an 
oppressive global despotism or a fragile empire torn by fre-
quent civil wars as separate regions and cultures tried to win 
their political autonomy. A just world order is [thus] perhaps 
best seen as a society of peoples, each people maintaining a 
well-ordered and decent political (domestic) regime .... 106 
Unlike Rawls, I believe a stable, democratic world government is 
a reasonable possibility. He provides no sustained argument for the 
view that such a government would become a despotism or collapse 
into anarchy. Kant's Pe~petual Peace, which Rawls cites in support of his 
position,107 doesn't do so either. Kant simply says that 
the separate existence of a number of neighboring and in-
dependent states ... is better than that all the states should 
be merged into one under a power which has gained ascen-
dancy over its neighbors and gradually become a universal 
monarchy. For the wider the sphere of their jurisdiction, the 
more laws lose in force; and soulless despotism, when it has 
choked the seeds of good, at last sinks into anarchy. los 
Though "every state, or its ruler, desires to establish lasting peace 
in this way, aspiring if possible to rule the whole world," differences in 
language and religion fortunately prevent them from doing so.109 
Kant is surely right that a world government created as a result of one 
state's attempt to rule the world would not be stable. Such a govern-
ment would, indeed, confront regular challenges to its authority from 
oppressed regions and minority groups. Given the scale of its opera-
tions, a world government rooted in conquest might well have 
difficulty maintaining despotic control over the entire planet; break-
aways and civil conflicts might well be common. 
But neither Kant nor Rawls provides any reason to suppose that a 
democratic world government formed by the free choice of the world's 
people would necessarily be unstable or despotic. Provided that a 
global regime was truly democratic and inclusive and that it provided 
106 RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 13 (footnotes omitted); cj RAWLS, LAW, SU-
pra note 1, at 36. 
107 See RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 13. 
10S IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 1st. supp., para. 2 (1795). 
109 See id. 
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substantial opportunities for participation in decision-making by all 
citizens, it could evoke sufficient loyalty to remain stable. Provided that 
ample opportunities were available for popular oversight of policy-
making and implementation and that limits on the concentration of 
power were institutionalized, a democratic world government need not 
become a despotism. And contemporary communication and transpor-
tation technologies would make Kant's proposed inverse-square law of 
the efficacy of political authority less plausible: the extent of a global 
government's reach need not constrain its effectiveness to the degree 
Kant supposed. 
On a broadly Rawlsian view, the principles of justice for a world 
government would presumably be those that would be framed by in-
dividual deliberators. 110 Such deliberators would presumably endorse 
justice as fairness or a nearby position as politically normative for the 
global community. The creation of a global government committed to 
justice as fairness strikes me as appealing and worth pursuing. But the 
appropriateness of a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples does not turn on 
the attractiveness or viability of the goal of a unitary democratic world 
government committed to justice as fairness. 
Suppose Kant and Rawls are right that the idea of a world gov-
ernment is non-viable. Nothing follows at all regarding the status of a 
cosmopolitan Law of Peoples. Indeed, the viability of a world govern-
ment would affect the appropriateness of a cosmopolitan Law of Peo-
ples in only two cases: (1) if we assumed that individual deliberators 
would necessmily opt for a world government, or (2) if the idea of a 
cosmopolitan Law of Peoples were reasonable only on the assumption 
that a world government existed. Neither assumption is plausible. 
No more than their domestic counterparts would individual global 
deliberators rest content with an unfair concentration of wealth in the 
hands of some peoples. They would doubtless opt for extensive human 
rights protections. They would likely also favor the creation of global 
structures designed to secure these protections and foster democ-
racy.m But it does not follow that they would opt for a world govern-
11° Cf PoGGE, REALIZING, supra note 14, at 247-59. 
111 For details regarding some possible structural arrangements, see generally Richard 
Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples il.ssembZv: Legitimacy and the Power of 
Popular Sove1-eignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 191 (2000) (proposing a practical democratic 
mechanism for international governance) and Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaugh-
ter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE LJ. 273 (1997). For a 
broader and more theoretical account of the international system and a possible democ-
ratic future, see generally MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (2000). 
28 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 27:1 
ment. If the sorts of reasons Kant, Rawls, and others have found persua-
sive convinced global deliberators that such a government was undesir-
able, they would opt against it; there is no artificial feature of a cosmo-
politan original position that would Tequire them to opt for a unitary 
world government.112 They could reasonably take into account any ten-
dencies inherent in human social life or individual psychology that 
might lead Kant or Rawls to doubt the viability of a world government. 
If such a government proved either non-viable or unattractive, they 
clearly would not judge that justice required its creation. 
I believe that there is nothing inherently troubling about the idea 
of a world government and that there is a great deal that is attractive. 
But whether I am right or wrong is irrelevant to the appropriateness 
of a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples, which would endorse the existence 
Arguably sympathetic with Rawls, Edward Foley believes that the principles of global 
justice should be determined by what I have termed individual deliberators rather than 
Rawlsian deliberators. See Edward Foley, Human Rights Theory: The Elusive Quest for Global 
justice, 66 FoRDHAM L. REv. 249, 263 (1997). Foley maintains that "recognizing the unac-
ceptable threats to human liberty that a unified global state would present, the parties to 
the original position would adopt principles of global justice that call for the existence of 
separate, sovereign nation-states." !d. at 263. Though this conclusion is possible, it is not 
obvious. A range of possible alternatives would be open to individual deliberators: they 
might endorse a loose global confederation of nation-states, a much stronger federation, 
or even a unitary world-state committed to protecting local autonomy. Even if individual 
deliberators endorsed the existence of nation-states, they might surely raise questions 
about the existence of such large numbers of states and about current state boundaries. 
Indeed, Foley argues that "the scale of government should be as large as is humanly feasi-
ble, without creating an exclusive monopoly of power in a single global state." !d. at 268. 
Foley also suggests that continent-wide governments would be appropriate. See id. at 266-
71. Compare Trachtman, supra note 15, at 991 ("It is difficult to see why the correct exten-
sion of Rawls's theory is not for each individual to enter into a global original position, 
recognizing that in the real world, the satisfaction of each individual's preferences takes 
place at many different levels and utilizes many different kinds of governance: family, 
church, workplace, locality, substate, state, regional, and global. With multiple centers of 
authority, we would seem to require multiple, and interrelated, original-position analyses. 
Each original position would involve some decisions about what is not to be addressed 
within the particular cente1· of authority in question, and may thus be retained by indi-
viduals or assigned to other centers of authority.") (footnote omitted). See generally Stefan 
Gosepath, The Global Scope of justice, in GLOBAL JusTICE (Thomas W. Pogge ed., 2002). A 
variety of ad hoc non-governmental arrangements can obviously make a difference as well. 
See, e.g., Roger E. Rustad, Jr., What Lessig (Almost) Gets, at http:/ /www.kuro5hin.org/ story I 
2002/10/4/23856/9235 (last visited Oct. 19, 2003) (arguing for an international treaty 
governing unsolicited bulk commercial email). 
112 Valuing cultures and traditions and recognizing the practical as well as existential 
significance of local loyalties, global deliberators might even choose a global system featur-
ing peoples with demarcated borders. They might doubt that an organization above a cer-
tain size would prove manageable without the creation of an excessively powerful state 
apparatus that could become tyrannical. They might also consider the value to persons of 
participating in self-governing local communities with traditions of independence. 
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of separate peoples if expediency or justice so required. And a cos-
mopolitan Law of Peoples could enjoy public justification and legiti-
macy and ground a fair system of cooperation in the absence of a 
world government. My subsequent analyses of arguments related to 
public justification and a Society of Peoples as a fair system of coop-
eration will show why. 
b. Public Justification and Legitimacy 
After completing A Theory of Justice, Rawls came increasingly to fo-
cus on stability for the right reasons and related ideas, including the notion 
of an overlapping consensus and the requirement of public justification, as 
essential features of a theory of domestic justice. His growing percep-
tion of the importance of these ideas may have played a role in motivat-
ing his decision to opt against a cosmopolitan original position. He 
might seek to argue that a global order grounded in a cosmopolitan 
Law of Peoples could not be publicly justified and would not enjoy the 
support of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doc-
trines.m I argue, however, that a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples could 
achieve legitimacy. It might, indeed, be publicly justified, either be-
cause an overlapping consensus already exists or could emerge. Rawls 
does not appear, in any case, to regard public justification as essential to 
the validity of basic norms of political morality like those that would 
form the core of a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples. It would therefore be 
difficult for him to claim that lack of public justification deprived such 
a Law of Peoples of legitimacy. 
i. Rawls's Account of Overlapping Consensus and Public 
Justification 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls envisioned a political order in which 
justice as fairness was understood as a "comprehensive doctrine" or-
ganizing the moral as well as political lives of citizens.114 But it was un-
realistic, he subsequently concluded, to believe that, given the "fact of 
reasonable pluralism,"Il5 people in a modern liberal society could be 
expected to unite in endorsing a single comprehensive doctrine.l 16 If 
113 Rawls makes clear that concern with the problem of stability lies at the root of the 
transformation undergone by his theory between its initial formulation and its subsequent 
development. See generally RAwLs, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at xvii-xxxi, xxxix-lxii. 
114 See id. at xviii. 
115 /d. at 36-68; RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 3-4, 40, 84. 
116 RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at xviii-xx. 
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the stability of a society committed to justice as fairness were depend-
ent on the existence of a consensus supporting a particular compre-
hensive doctrine, such a society simply wouldn't be stable. Deciding to 
reformulate his account of justice as fairness, he began to defend it as 
a "political conception," designed to provide a basis for fair coopera-
tion within a diverse society. On this basis, he advanced an alternate 
account of the stability of a society committed to justice as fairness. 117 
The ideas of public justification and legitimacy play important roles in 
this account. 
Justice as fairness is both legitimate and a source of stability, 
Rawls maintains, only if "it can win its support by addressing each citi-
zen's reason, as explained within its own framework."118 He appears 
confident that justice as fairness can meet the test he has proposed. A 
politically liberal society whose institutions are framed in accordance 
with norms endorsed in the first original position would be stable, for 
Rawls, for two reasons. First, people raised in a society endorsing such 
norms would tend to develop, and would have good reason to de-
velop, the sense that institutions consistent with these norms were fair. 
Second, a reasonable citizen in a liberal society would tend to support 
the norms created in the first original position on the basis of the rea-
sonable comprehensive doctrine to which she adhered.119 
Rawls maintains that justice as fairness is not a comprehensive 
moral vision but only a reasonable political morality. He intends his 
theory to be compatible with a wide range of alternative comprehen-
sive doctrines. It is not meant to compete with such doctrines for popu-
lar allegiance. Justice as fairness can therefore enjoy stable support 
even within a highly diverse society. Despite the "fact of reasonable plu-
ralism,"120 representatives of diverse ideological positions could endorse 
justice as fairness, because it is concerned only with the political realm; 
it leaves people free to live out the tenets of their various comprehen-
sive doctrines outside the political sphere. 
The stability of justice as fairness depends on the existence of an 
overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines. While representa-
tives of diverse comprehensive doctrines might have very different rea-
sons for regarding social institutions shaped by justice as fairness as rea-
sonable, their respective doctrines might give each of them reason to 
view such institutions as deserving their support. The point is not that 
117 See id. at xvii-xxxiii. 
11s !d. at 143 (footnote omitted). 
119 See id. at 141-42. 
l20 Jd. at 36-68; RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, sttpra note 1, at 3-4, 40, 84. 
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the norms endorsed in the first original position would be determined 
by means of an empirical inquiry into the various comprehensive doc-
trines endorsed within a given society. Rather, Rawls simply want<; to sug-
gest that persons sharing the basic assumptions about a liberal society 
embodied in the first original position could, despite their doctrinal dif-
ferences, endorse the norms emerging from the original position. "All 
those who affirm the political conception [of justice] start from within 
their own comprehensive view and draw on the religious, philosophical, 
and moral grounds it provides. "121 
At the domestic level, Rawls supposes, justice as fairness would 
gradually be endorsed as its attractiveness became progressively more 
apparent. Initially, liberal institutions would be grudgingly tolerated 
as part of a constitutional settlement. Increasingly, politically liberal 
norms would appreciatively be accepted, without much theoretical 
support, as assumed features of the constitutional order. Finally, wide-
spread affirmation of an overlapping consensus supporting politically 
liberal principles would emerge.l22 Rawls suggests that the pressures 
generated by a liberal constitutional order will tend to lead to the 
creation of a broader, principled commitment to political liberalism 
(and something approximating justice as fairness) .123 
[C]itizens who affirm the political conception [of justice], 
and who have been raised in and are familiar with the fun-
damental ideas of the public political culture, find that, 
when they adopt its framework of deliberation, their judg-
ments converge sufficiently so that political cooperation on 
the basis of mutual respect can be maintained.124 
Rawls emphasizes that his is not a "modus vivendi" position, in 
accordance with which a group unable to exercise commanding 
authority in a given society might endorse political liberalism as a 
matter of expediency.125 "[A] balance of reasons as seen within each 
citizen's comprehensive doctrine, and not a compromise compelled 
by circumstances, is the basis of citizens' respect for the limits of pub-
121 RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 147. 
122 See id. at 158-68. 
123 See id. at 166-67. 
124 Jd. at 156. 
125 Sec id. at 147-49. 
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lie reason. "126 Justice as fairness will enjoy stable support because it is 
endorsed, not out of expediency but out of principle.127 
A society rooted in Rawlsian justice as fairness would be stable 
because justice as fairness is "a liberal political view, one that aims at 
being acceptable to citizens as reasonable and rational, as well as free 
and equal, and so as addressed to their public reason. "128 A position 
accepted by citizens exercising public reason is publicly justified. Rawls 
distinguishes "full justification" from "public justification. "129 On the 
one hand, "full justification is carried out by an individual citizen as a 
member of civil society .... [as she] accepts a political conception and 
fills out its justification by embedding it ... into ... [her] compre-
hensive doctrine as either true or reasonable."130 Rawls notes that 
"[s]ome [citizens] may consider the political conception fully justified 
even though it is not accepted by other people. "131 On the other 
hand, "[p] ublic justification happens when all the reasonable mem-
bers of political society carry out a justification of the shared political 
conception by embedding it in their several reasonable comprehen-
sive views. "132 "There is ... no public justification for political society 
without a reasonable overlapping consensus .... "133 
Determining if "an overlapping consensus on the political con-
ception is possible is a way of checking whether there are sufficient 
reasons for proposing justice as fairness [as a doctrine] ... which can 
be sincerely defended before others without criticizing or rejecting 
their deepest religious and philosophical commitments. "134 In turn, 
provided "there are adequate reasons for diverse reasonable people 
jointly to affirm justice as fairness as their working political concep-
tion, then the conditions for their legitimately exercising coercive po-
126 RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 169; see id. at 169-71. 
127 !d. at 148. 
128 !d. at 143. 
129 !d. at 386-87. 
130 !d. at 386. 
131 RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 386. 
132 !d. at 387. But Rawls doesn't seem to require unanimity elsewhere-for example, 
once "the principles of justice ... [have been] provisionally selected .... [W]e have to 
check whether, when realized, just institutions as specified by those principles can gain 
sufficient support." !d. at 65 (emphasis added). And he can't really mean to require univer-
sal agreement here. Perhaps he should distinguish between "public justification," which 
would occur once a consensus had emerged, and "full public justification," which would 
occur only in the unlikely event that everyone had adopted the position supported by this 
consensus. 
133 !d. at 388. 
134 Id. at 390 (footnote omitted). 
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litical power over one another ... are satisfied. "135 This is because 
"our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exer-
cised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citi-
zens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the 
light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human rea-
son. "136 "Only a political conception of justice that all citizens might 
be reasonably expected to endorse can serve as a basis of public rea-
son and justification. "137 And "the principles of justice ... [the parties 
in the original position] would adopt would in effect incorporate this 
principle of legitimacy and would justify only institutions it would 
count legitimate."l38 
ii. Overlapping Consensus, Public Justification, and the Law of 
Peoples 
An argument against a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples based on 
the need for public justification might proceed as follows. Political 
liberalism is defensible at the domestic level because it en joys the 
support of a consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Many 
of these doctrines are liberal, but even those that are not have been 
shaped by their adherents' experience as members of a liberal society. 
Proponents of illiberal comprehensive doctrines are likely, therefore, 
to recognize the merits of political liberalism as a framework for politi-
cal life, even if they dispute the claims of comprehensive liberalism as 
an account of the momllife. Thus, the fact that a domestic consensus 
of reasonable comprehensive doctrines might come to exist in sup-
port of political liberalism is historically contingent. 
Justice as fairness, defended in politically liberal terms, might 
be-indeed, Rawls clearly thinks it is-more reasonable than any al-
ternative; nonetheless, it is perfectly possible that there might be so-
cieties in which many or most people adhere to comprehensive doc-
trines that provide little or no support for justice as fairness. But if this 
is so, it is plausible to think that there will be many people in our 
world in light of whose comprehensive doctrines political liberalism 
will appear inadequate. Committed to various illiberal ways of life, 
they will resent and resist the implications of a cosmopolitan Law of 
Peoples, which they will decline to endorse. Such a Law of Peoples, 
135 /d. 
136 RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 137. 
137 !d. 
138 !d. at 137 n.5; cf id. at 225. 
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therefore, will be unlikely to garner the support of an overlapping 
consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. 
By contrast, a Rawlsian Law of Peoples might have a reasonable 
chance of gaining the support of such a consensus. Because it gener-
ally assumes the existing norms of international law and the equality 
of states instead of challenging them, and would thus leave room for 
nonliberal societies to continue implementing illiberal public poli-
cies, endorsing it would be far less difficult for most peoples on the 
basis of their comprehensive doctrines. A Rawlsian Law of Peoples 
could therefore be publicly justified, while a cosmopolitan Law of 
Peoples could not. A Rawlsian Law of Peoples would be legitimate 
while a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples would be illegitimate. 
iii. Defending the Legitimacy of a Cosmopolitan Law of Peoples 
There are two possible responses to such an argument. A cosmo-
politan liberal could maintain that such a Law of Peoples would in 
fact garner the support of an overlapping consensus of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines in an actually existing Society of Peoples. 
Alternatively, she might maintain that such a consensus need not be a 
sine qua non of legitimacy. 
A. Securing a Consensus for a Cosmopolitan Law of Peoples 
A cosmopolitan liberal might defend the claim that a cosmopoli-
tan Law of Peoples would be endorsed by an overlapping consensus of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines in several ways. First, she could 
suggest that such doctrines already overlap more than a critic might 
suppose-enough, in fact, that they might yield adequate support for 
a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples. Second, an overlapping consensus in 
support of a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples could emerge over time 
after the initial implementation of such a Law and the gradual emer-
gence of the necessary consensus could provide a cosmopolitan Law 
with Rawlsian legitimacy. Finally, she might seek to limit the relevant 
doctrines to ones that could, in fact, provide support for a cosmopoli-
tan Law of Peoples. 
1. A Surprising Current Consensus 
The cosmopolitan liberal might maintain that, given the wide-
spread influence of the Western media and the intrinsic appeal of lib-
eral ideas, there is more global support for cosmopolitan liberalism 
than might immediately be supposed. While those in power in many 
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of the world's societies might refuse to act in accordance with the 
norms contained in a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples, the cosmopolitan 
liberal need not show that they would support such a Law of Peoples 
or conform their domestic policies, laws, and institutions to it. She 
need only show that, given the opportunity, a substantial majority of 
the world's people would endorse domestic and inter-societal institu-
tions and norms consistent with a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples. Their 
support could be sufficiently widespread to ensure global legitimacy 
for cosmopolitan liberalism. 
This is not a wildly far-fetched idea. Official pundits in various 
illiberal societies may praise the virtues of their societies' institutions, 
but this is no guarantee that their people would share their senti-
ments. The Western media have spread images of freedom and-if 
not often enough-equality all over the world. The development of 
democratic movements in a variety of authoritarian and totalitarian 
societies suggests that liberal and democratic ideas already enjoy some 
support in these societies. The arguments here are, of course, highly 
speculative; however, they do provide ways of blocking a Rawlsian 
challenge to the legitimacy of a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples. 
2. A Possibly Emergent Consensus 
If she chooses not to make the difficult claim that the world is 
already full of anonymous liberals, the cosmopolitan liberal could 
nonetheless argue that support for a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples 
could develop over time. Rawls suggests, of course, that a similar kind 
of development might occur in the case of political liberalism at the 
domestic level.139 Once in place, liberal principles of justice could 
generate their own bases of support.l 40 They respond effectively to the 
diverse convictions prevalent in the environment to which they apply, 
giving adherents of various comprehensive doctrines an opportunity 
to forge satisfactory relationships despite their disagreements. 141 The 
principles of justice as fairness are-says Rawls-clearer and easier to 
apply than those of other, more complex and comprehensive posi-
tions, and thus more likely to be seen as attractive bases for an initial, 
"constitutional," consensus.142 And when liberal principles are en-
dorsed and liberal institutions in place, they "tend to encourage the 
139 See RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 168, 390. 
140 See id. at 161. 
141 See id. at 162. 
142 See id. 
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cooperative virtues of political life: the virtue of reasonableness and a 
sense of fairness, a spirit of compromise and a readiness to meet oth-
ers halnvay, all of which are connected with the willingness to cooper-
ate with others on political terms that everyone can publicly ac-
cept. "143 In short, the viability and attractiveness of liberal principles 
and institutions tends to affect the ways in which people think about 
them at the domestic level. 
Rawls hypothesizes that, over time, variants of previously illiberal 
comprehensive doctrines capable of providing appropriate support for 
an overlapping consensus endorsing political liberalism might 
emerge.144 In turn, the need to justify their views to others who cannot 
simply be ignored or silenced would require people to rethink their 
comprehensive doctrines and to recast their grounds and implications 
in light of their new political environment. They would seek to explain 
their underlying convictions and the specific policy recommendations 
following from these convictions in ways at least comprehensible to 
those who did not share their comprehensive doctrines.145 Doing so 
would be especially challenging because of the need to articulate re-
sponses to a wide range of diverse issues. 146 As with an overlapping con-
sensus developed over time, citizens would come authentically to en-
dorse political liberalism not merely out of expediency but as an ex-
pression of their own underlying convictions. 
There is no reason a consensus of this sort could not emerge at 
the global level. The same kinds of pressures that might incline pro-
ponents of diverse views to support liberal and democratic institutions 
once they were in place domestically could generate support for such 
institutions transnationally. The inherent attractiveness of such insti-
tutions could become apparent once people became accustomed to 
them and were in a position to compare them with alternatives. Even 
were people not liberally inclined initially, they might change their 
minds once given the opportunity to live as equal persons within free 
institutions. Again, there is no way of determining for certain whether 
an overlapping consensus in support of a liberal and democratic 
global regime would develop. However, the same factors that might 
make the cosmopolitan liberal hope that a consensus in support of a 
regime already existed, together with the considerations to which 
Rawls points in support of his contention that such a consensus could 
143 Id. at 163. 
144 See RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 163. 
145 See id. at 165. 
146 See id. at 165-68. 
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develop at the domestic level, might make the cosmopolitan's expec-
tation that such a consensus might emerge globally appear less naive. 
It is obvious that the principles that make up justice as fairness, 
particularly the difference principle, are controversial and will con-
tinue to be so for the foreseeable future.I47 Rawls nonetheless regards 
these principles as capable of earning the support of a domestic po-
litical consensus. In part, this is perhaps best seen as a consequence of 
understanding these principles as derived by implication from convic-
tions widely shared in democratic political cultures. Rawls appears to 
believe that, if taken seriously, the basic norms of equality, freedom, 
and fairness to which people in such cultures assent entail support for 
something like his two principles of justice-even if the implications 
of these basic norms have not previously been evident. Stable support 
for these principles must follow, then, from citizens' recognition that 
to endorse common standards of equality, freedom, and fairness-to 
which they are likely already committed-is therefore also to endorse 
Rawls's principles of justice. Perhaps the same might be true transna-
tionally: while a number of peoples might initially be inclined to re-
ject the specific principles contained in a cosmopolitan Law of Peo-
ples, they might ultimately come to see the acceptance of these prin-
ciples as inescapable because they appear, perhaps surprisingly, to 
follow from more general, abstract norms they already endorse.148 
3. A Constrained Consensus 
A cosmopolitan liberal could argue that a cosmopolitan Law of 
Peoples would enjoy Rawlsian legitimacy were it endorsed by persons 
committed to Rawlsian norms of (domestic) public reason. She could go 
on to note that such norms, themselves grounded in the deliberations of 
I47 Rawls's political conception of justice "tries to put no obstacles in the path of all 
reasonable doctrines endorsing a political conception by eliminating from this conception 
any idea which goes beyond the political, and which not all reasonable doctrines could 
reasonably be expected to endorse." !d. at 389. But even if this refers only to the bare-
bones structure of the original position, it is hard to say that all comprehensive doctrines 
would be likely to endorse it. As far as possible, citizens in a politically liberal regime de-
cline-while engaging in political discourse, not necessarily in their non-political lives-to 
reject as false any particular comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine; taking 
these issues off the table is a crucial part of respecting other citizens and maintaining a 
stability-preserving consensus. See id. at 150-52. However, if "someone insists, for example, 
that certain questions are so fundamental that to insure their being rightly settled justifies 
civil strife," it may be necessary to insist, in practice if not explicitly, that doctrines on the 
basis which she insists that strife is appropriate are incorrect. See id. at 152-53. 
HB Alternatively, of course, they might simply reject or reformulate these underlying 
principles because of their undesired implications. 
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parties in the original position,149 require committnent to freedom and 
equality and exclude comprehensive doctrines, even reasonable ones, 
from the public political realm. She might observe that proponents of 
illiberal positions could not defend their positions using Rawlsian (do-
mestic) public reason. She might conclude, therefore, that, if the kind of 
justification required for Rawlsian legitimacy is justification using Rawl-
sian (domestic) public reason, justice as fairness--or a close cousin-
could achieve global public justification in roughly the same way that a po-
litically liberal view could achieve domestic public justification.150 
This need not be a merely definitional victory. The cosmopolitan 
liberal could offer substantive reasons for her position. She could ar-
gue that she is perfectly prepared to defend a global version of politi-
cal liberalism: she is not simply ruling those who disagree with her out 
of court. She could argue hypothetically using comprehensive doc-
trines she does not share if doing so will make her position compre-
hensible and persuasive to persons with illiberal views. 
Most fundamentally, however, the cosmopolitan liberal could 
note that the idea of free public reason is itself a liberal notion. Be-
cause it depends on the assumption that persons are free and equal, 
the idea of free public reason cannot effectively be invoked in support 
of fundamentally illiberal positions. It requires accountability to all 
persons as reasonable decision-makers and deliberately excludes cer-
tain kinds of reasons from consideration. A nonliberal, then, cannot 
simply invoke this principle to reject a liberal position. 
The canons of public reason constrain the outcome of public de-
bate, requiring broadly liberal conclusions. And the principle of le-
gitimacy itself requires justification in terms of public reason, so that 
the illiberal must either accept justification in terms of public rea-
son-in which case justice as fairness or a cousin will likely achieve 
public justification-or else ask for some other sort of justification. 
But a liberal's failure to justifY an institution or policy in terms other 
than those acceptable as part of public reason need be no bar to le-
gitimacy from the standpoint of individual deliberators in the second 
original position. On its own terms, therefore, justice as fairness could 
be publicly justified. 
149 See RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 225. 
150 The idea of public reason is a politically liberal idea. See RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, 
at 143-44. ("[T]he content of public reason is given by the principles and values of the 
family of liberal political conceptions of justice meeting these conditions. To engage in 
public reason C. to appeal to one of these political conceptions-to their ideals and princi-
ples, standards and values-when debating fundamental political questions."). 
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It would obviously be open to a nonliberal to respond by challeng-
ing political liberalism in general. It is, of course, entirely possible that 
she might be right: there is no guarantee that political liberalism is the 
most reasonable political theory. What she could not do, however, is 
challenge it by maintaining that it lacked Rawlsian public justification. 
At best, a continuing challenge to a global political liberalism would 
undermine the ability of cosmopolitan liberals to bring into being a 
regime marked by a desirable level and kind of stability. It would not 
prevent a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples from achieving Rawlsian public 
justification because illiberal views cannot be defended using public 
reason as Rawls's has defined it at the domestic level. 
Rawls manages to avoid this conclusion only because he evidently 
views global public reason as subject to constraints different than 
those that apply to domestic public reason. The norms of public rea-
son operative in the Society of Peoples are those "appropriate to the 
Society of Peoples."151 And because representatives of peoples rather 
than persons frame Rawls's Law of Peoples, it is to peoples-often 
governed by persons committed to illiberal comprehensive doc-
trines-that public justification will be owed. Rawlsian deliberators in 
the second original position would frame a Law of Peoples that re-
quired that public justification be offered to peoples in ways that re-
spected their freedom and equality. The norms of public justification 
they would adopt would thus not exclude the claims of illiberal socie-
ties from consideration. But this is a consequence of the questionable 
groundrules Rawls has established, and so cannot be used to rule out 
alternatives absent arguments in support of those ground rules. Indi-
vidual deliberators would presumably opt for the same norms of pub-
lic reason that govern domestic public life in a Rawlsianly just society. 
"There is no reason," Rawls says in respect of domestic justice, 
"why any citizen ... should have the right to use state power to decide 
constitutional essentials as that person's ... comprehensive doctrine 
directs. When equally represented, no citizen could grant to another 
person ... that political authority. Any such authority is, therefore, 
without grounds in public reason .... "152 He seems to want to make a 
similar move on the global level. It's as if he were to say: 
151 Id. at 59; see id. at 54-58. Interestingly, Rawls devotes almost no attention to the op-
eration of the norms of public reason in the section of The Law of Peoples concerned with 
decent nonliberal peoples. Id. at 54-58. 
152 RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 226. 
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There is no reason why any people should have the right to 
use its power to decide constitutional essentials for another 
people as its own comprehensive doctrine directs. When 
equally represented, no people could grant to another peo-
ple that political authority. Any such authority is, therefore, 
without grounds in public reason. 
But this application of Rawls's principle of public reason to the trans-
national sphere would fail. 
First, the promotion of democracy and human rights by liberal 
peoples need not involve the imposition of a comprehensive doctrine by 
these peoples on others. Liberal peoples promoting democracy and 
human rights (not necessarily by using military or economic power to 
intervene in radical ways) could do so on the basis of what Rawls him-
self is at pains to emphasize is a purely political conception of justice, 
not a comprehensive doctrine. Second, and fatally, the objection pre-
supposes what Rawls fails to demonstrate: peoples should be treated as 
equal. It is hardly surprising that equal peoples would endorse canons 
of global public reason that would rule out fundamental challenges to 
at least some illiberal cultural, legal, and political regimes. Equal pm'" 
sons, however, would not. They would be much more likely to adopt 
broadly Rawlsian norms of domestic public reason as global norms. 
These norms obviate justification of governmental institutions and 
policies in terms of unreasonable comprehensive doctrines. Their 
adoption would rule out fundamentally illiberal objections to the le-
gitimacy of justice as fairness at the global level. Only those positions 
prepared to argue in publicly defensible ways would count, and since 
only disagreements couched in terms of Rawlsian public reason would 
count, there would be no real question about the legitimacy of an inter-
national regime committed to liberal norms of justice. 
B. Legitimacy Without Consensus 
Rawls's own arguments suggest that, while desirable, the public 
justification of a principle of political morality is not required for it to 
bind persons and institutions. I argue, therefore, that it would be in-
consistent of him to maintain that a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples 
would lack legitimacy until supported by an overlapping consensus of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. We can reasonably believe that 
such a Law of Peoples would be authoritative for the actions of an ac-
tually existing Society of Peoples or an individual government 
whether or not it had achieved public justification. 
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It might appear that, for Rawls, a political conception is publicly 
justified in a given society only if everyone in the society endorses it. It 
would seem, then, that the Law of Peoples could be legitimate, that it 
could bind the world's people, that a global government could act in 
accordance with its terms, and that, absent such a government, gov-
ernments of individual peoples could be bound by it and could de-
mand that others conform to it-but only if all of the world's people 
had assented to it. Rawls sometimes appears to suggest that public 
justification requires unanimity: "Only a political conception of justice 
that all citizens might be reasonably expected to endorse can serve as 
a basis of public reason and justification. "153 But notice that Rawls 
does not say here that all citizens must in fact endorse a political con-
ception for it to count as justified. Rather, Rawls suggests that in a 
well-ordered society, "each [citizen] cooperates ... with the rest on 
terms all can endorse as just. "154 It is one thing to say that everyone 
can reasonably endorse political liberalism, another to say that a po-
litically liberal regime is just only if everyone does, in fact, endorse the 
basic principles that ground it. 
Rawls clearly recognizes that, while everyone adhering to the 
canons of public reason might be able to affirm political liberalism 
and either justice as fairness or some nearby view, not everyone would 
endorse these canons. ''Views that would suppress altogether the basic 
rights and liberties affirmed in the political conception [governing a 
politically liberal society], or suppress them in part, say[,] its liberty of 
conscience, may indeed exist, as there will always be such views."155 
Rawls simply holds out the hope that "they may not be strong enough 
to undermine the substantive justice of the regime."156 If a supporting 
consensus didn't exist, justice as fairness would be "in difficulty";157 it 
might even be the case that no democratic position could attract sta-
ble support.158 Rawls regards this possibility as troubling. But he does 
not-rightly-suggest that it would call into question the actual rea-
sonableness of justice as fairness. Lack of a stable overlapping consen-
sus in support of a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples need not call the le-
gitimacy of such a Law of Peoples into question. A global government 
could still implement it. And, absent such a government, individual 
155 Id. at 137 (footnote omitted). 
154 RAwLs, RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 27 (emphasis added). 
155 RAWLS, LIBERALISM, sttpra note 1, at 65. 
156 !d. 
157 !d. at 65-66. 
158 See id. at 66. 
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peoples could still be bound by it and could still demand that others 
adhere to it. Even if a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples had not yet 
achieved public justification, none of the responsibilities or rights 
flowing from such a Law of Peoples-at least, none with which I am 
concerned here-need be impaired. 
Rawls explicitly grants that peoples have responsibilities and 
rights with respect to other societies that have not, presumably, ac-
knowledged the legitimacy of the Law of Peoples. They have the re-
sponsibility to aid "burdened societies"159 and to respect the rights of 
individual combatants and noncombatants in war.160 They have the 
right to defend themselves and others against attacks by "outlaw 
states. "161 They also have the right-and perhaps the duty-to exert 
cultural, economic, and, in extreme cases, military pressure on outlaw 
states to end human rights abuses.162 Rawls evidently believes, then, 
that a liberal people may be bound by the Law of Peoples whether or 
not any other society endorses it. He is similarly clear that societies 
that do not acknowledge the Law of Peoples are nonetheless respon-
sible for respecting the obligations it embodies. Presuming he is right, 
he can hardly claim that a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples would be ille-
gitimate, and therefore non-binding, because a significant number of 
peoples would not accept its dictates. Whether under a Rawlsian or a 
cosmopolitan Law of Peoples, societies would be seen as bound by a 
Law of Peoples they had not acknowledged as legitimate. And well-
ordered societies would be required to abide by such a Law of Peoples 
whether or not it was globally publicly justified, even when dealing 
with peoples and persons who failed to accept its validity. 
Legitimacy on the basis of public justification appears, in short, 
to play a relatively minor role in determining appropriate norms of 
transnational behavior for Rawls. Given what he says about duties that 
hold in the apparent absence of public justification, he has two op-
tions. He can abandon his principle of public justification entirely. 
159 See RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 105-13. Note that while some burdened societies 
may have democratic political institutions, helping a burdened society change its political 
culture is part of what aiding such a society entails; therefore, it follows that not every bur-
dened society necessarily offers even the relatively minimal human rights protections af-
forded by the Law of Peoples. See id. at 109-10. 
160 See id. at 94-97; RAwLs, THEORY, supra note 1, at 332-35. 
161 See RAwLs, LAw, mpra note 1, at 91. Though Rawls notes that oudaw states are "ag-
gressive and dangerous," id. at 81, he does not regard self-defense as the only appropriate 
reason for confronting outlaw states. See id. at 81 n.26, 93 n.6. 
162 See id. at 93 n.6; cf id. at 80--81. 
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Alternatively, he can claim that a policy or institution is legitimate if it 
could be justified using liberal norms of public reason. 
iv. The Legitimacy of a Cosmopolitan Law of Peoples 
A cosmopolitan Law of Peoples might face justificatory hurdles 
that a Rawlsian Law of Peoples would not. But a cosmopolitan Law of 
Peoples could nonetheless prove legitimate on Rawlsian grounds. A 
supporting overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doc-
trines in support of a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples might already ex-
ist; and, if it does not, it might emerge simply because of the attrac-
tiveness of liberal ideals and their widespread influence. If Rawlsian 
limits on public justification were applied at the global as well as the 
domestic level, so that only reasonable comprehensive doctrines ac-
cepting the canons of Rawlsian public reason needed to be taken into 
account, the likelihood that a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples could 
achieve Rawlsian legitimacy would obviously be even greater. 
Rawls's own stance suggests, in any case, that the validity of some 
aspects of political morality do not depend on legitimacy, and there-
fore on public justification. While specific policies and institutional 
arrangements might lack binding force absent Rawlsian legitimacy, 
basic principles of justice, at any rate, evidently do not. Rawls's own 
treatment of issues including war and transnational aid suggests that 
the demands of justice apply whether or not these demands have 
been publicly justified on a global scale and whether or not those af-
fected acknowledge them. 163 It does not appear, then, that a Rawlsian 
argument focusing on public justification could lead to the conclu-
sion that a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples was illegitimate. 
c. The Society of Peoples as a FaiT System of Cooperation 
For Rawls, a just society is, among other things, a fair system of 
cooperation.I64 A society counts as a fair system of cooperation if the 
following requirements are met: people generally act in accordance 
with suitable regulative norms; these norms are to some extent inter-
nalized (and do not need constantly to be backed up with the threat 
of punitive sanctions); these rules are designed, at least in principle, 
163 See infra Parts I.D.3.b.iii.B ("Legitimacy Without Consensus"), II.D.3.c.iii ("A Cos-
mopolitan Law of Peoples Could Bind Absent a Fair System of Cooperation"). 
164 See RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 5-8; RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 1, at 4; 
cf RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 1 at 50, 95-96. 
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to foster the good of each participant; and social interactions are de-
signed to be reciprocally or mutually beneficial.l65 
Rawls is clear that the use of coercive authority to coordinate the 
behavior of otherwise independent actors does not render a system of 
cooperation £air.l66 Nonetheless, he might suggest that absent a world 
government or other mechanisms for regulating the behavior of par-
ticular national governments, a cosmopolitan Society of Peoples would 
not count as a fair system of cooperation, because peoples and indi-
viduals would be too prone to ignore its requirements. I argue, how-
ever, that a cosmopolitan Society of Peoples could be a fair system of 
cooperation and that, in any case, at least some of the duties incumbent 
on persons and societies under a cosmopolitan or Rawlsian Law of 
Peoples would be binding, by Rawls's own lights, in the absence of a fair 
system of cooperation-that fairness, rather than cooperation, seems to 
be the decisive factor. If I'm right, an objection to a cosmopolitan Law 
of Peoples based on the importance of ensuring that a Society of Peo-
ples was a fair system of cooperation wouldn't rule out a cosmopolitan 
starting point for reflection on international justice. 
i. Why a Cosmopolitan Society of Peoples Might Be Thought Not 
to Be a Fair System of Cooperation 
Rawls maintains that a given set of arrangements are just with re-
spect to those who participate in them only if these arrangements con-
stitute a fair system of cooperation.l67 A Society of Peoples, he might 
argue, could be just to persons-could be a fair cooperative venture 
among them-only if a world government existed. Absent a world gov-
ernment-which Rawls has, recall, characterized as undesirable on 
other grounds168-responsibility for the enforcement of transnational 
legal norms would rest largely with the governments of individual peo-
ples. And since a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples would constrain a gov-
ernment's relationship with its citizens, limit the pursuit of its objec-
tives, and in some cases require that its citizens contribute substantially 
to schemes designed to enhance the welfare of others, the governments 
of individual peoples would be willing to implement it fitfully at best. 
165 Sec RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 7. 
166 See RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 15. 
167 See id. at 15-16. At one point, Rawls frames the fundamental question in which he is 
interested as "\\'hat is the most appropriate conception of justice for specifYing the fair 
terms of social cooperation between citizens of a democratic regime regarded as free and 
equal?" Id. at 391 n.27. 
168 Sec RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 36. 
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Without consistent support from authorities with the power to imple-
ment a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples, it would be inconsistently ap-
plied, and the Society of Peoples would not qualifY as a fair system of 
cooperation.169 The Law of Peoples might be thought to lack binding 
force under such circumstances. 
Any account of international norms will doubtless not prove ef-
fective unless supported at least to some degree by the entities with 
the power to affect the international environment; and, in the ab-
sence of a global government, the governments of individual societies 
would clearly be among those entities. Thus, in turn, such norms also 
require the support of the people to whom democratic governments 
are accountable. It seems possible, however, that a cosmopolitan Soci-
ety of Peoples might enjoy more consistent support than Rawls sup-
poses. Rawls's Law of Peoples might not be easy to enforce in the ab-
sence of a global government, which suggests that his standards for 
fair cooperation ought not to be overly high. And he is not, in any 
case, prepared to make a great deal turn, at least at the global level, 
on the existence of an actual scheme of fair cooperation. It would be 
unreasonable of him to hold proponents of a cosmopolitan Law of 
Peoples to a higher standard than those to which he holds himself. 
ii. The Possibility of Cooperation Under a Cosmopolitan Society 
of Peoples 
A cosmopolitan Law of Peoples could, indeed, be a fair coopera-
tive venture. It would feature mechanisms designed to foster coopera-
tion even in the absence of a global government, and it could rea-
sonably be expected to attract significant support. 
A. Fostering Cooperation Under a Cosmopolitan Law of Peoples 
It is simply not clear that the transnational order is shaped by 
states to the degree Rawls suggests. States may well be less important 
169 Perhaps this sort of analysis lies behind some obserYations offered in (at least par-
tial) explanation of Rawls's preference for peoples oYer persons. Sec Brilmayer, supm note 
57, at 38 ("Rawls transposes his familiar domestic methods to construct a 'Law of Peoples' 
and justifies this by observing that peoples as corporate bodies organized by their govern-
ments already exist in some form all over the world. These existing entities must agree to 
any proposed political reforms. This being the case (Rawls belieYes) all principles and 
standards proposed for the law of peoples must be acceptable to the considered and 
reflective opinion of 'peoples' and their governments."). But this makes little sense as a 
basis for an account of justice. 
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than he appears to assume they are. 170 A variety of existing non-state 
institutions could help to secure support for a cosmopolitan Law of 
Peoples in the absence of a global government. So would the govern-
ments of existing peoples. There would also be other transnational in-
stitutions (a global criminal court, for instance), with which individuals 
might have direct relationships and which would, in any case, help to 
ensure general compliance with the Law of Peoples. 
In any case, it is not clear that enforcement mechanisms are the 
issue here. "Like most laws, international rules are rarely enforced, but 
usually obeyed."171 There is some evidence that governments adhere to 
at least some norms because they perceive these norms to be fair. 172 
And domestic legal systems regularly internalize transnational legal 
norms even in the absence of relevant global enforcement mecha-
nisms.173 Thus, the absence of a global government would not keep a 
cosmopolitan Law of Peoples from functioning as a fair system of coop-
eration. 
The absence of a global government would create potential prob-
lems for a Rawlsian Law of Peoples just as it would for a cosmopolitan 
Law of Peoples. If a Rawlsian Law of Peoples could count as a fair sys-
tem of cooperation in the absence of a world government, this pro-
vides added reason to suppose that a cosmopolitan Society of Peoples 
could as well. 
Supposing states are centrally important, however, this fact could 
create difficulties for a Rawlsian Society of Peoples just as it could for 
a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples. If a world government did not exist, 
arrangements in the Society of Peoples might in fact be fair. But it is 
not clear that a Rawlsian Society of Peoples would be any better at en-
suring the fairness of these arrangements than would a cosmopolitan 
Law of Peoples. Without such a government, militarily or economi-
cally strong peoples would be in a position to be more abusive to weak 
peoples than strong individuals or strong groups of private persons 
would be to weak persons under a world government. Societies might 
well seek to shirk their putative obligations under the Law of Peo-
170 See generally id.; Buchanan, supra note 17. 
171 Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE LJ. 2599, 
2603 (1997) (review essay) (footnote omitted). 
172 See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITU-
TIONS (1995). 
173 See Koh, supra note 171, at 2645-58. 
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ples.174 Rawls might argue that he is talking about fairness under cir-
cumstances in which there is already widespread acceptance of his 
proposed Law of Peoples, but if full compliance can be treated as a 
premise, then it is reasonable to assume that a cosmopolitan Law of 
Peoples would lead to a fair system of cooperation as well. If most or 
all people adhered to a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples, all would be in 
a position to reap its benefits without excessive cost. As Rawls con-
ceives of the Society of Peoples, it is clearly a fair cooperative venture. 
Thus, to imply that a cosmopolitan Society of Peoples minus a world 
government would not be such a venture would be at the same time 
to imply that the Society of Peoples he imagines wouldn't be either. 
The global order might be unstable even if liberal and decent 
nonliberal peoples endorsed the Law of Peoples, given that significant 
numbers of other peoples might not endorse it. But the empirical ex-
tent of the likely support available for a Rawlsian Law of Peoples does 
not appear to occupy a central place in Rawls's argument. Apparently, 
despite the potential lack of widespread support for a Rawlsian Law of 
Peoples, such a Law could still serve as a fair system of cooperation. 
Rawls could not reasonably maintain, then, that a similar lack of sup-
port would prevent a cosmopolitan Society of Peoples from qualifYing 
as a fair system of cooperation. 
B. The Extent of Support for a Cosmopolitan Law of Peoples 
There is an obvious Rawlsian objection, however, to arguments fo-
cusing on alternatives to a global government and on the parity be-
tween a Rawlsian and a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples. The objector can 
grant the potential existence of institutions that might help to imple-
ment a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples absent a global government and 
despite the formal parity between Rawlsian and cosmopolitan Law of 
Peoples. But, she might argue, this misses the point: the ability of a 
cosmopolitan Law of Peoples to ground a fair system of cooperation 
would be limited, given the likelihood of widespread opposition to its 
1' 4 Joseph Heath, Immigration, Multicultumlisrn, and the Social Contract, 10 CAN. J.L. & 
JuRISDICTION 343, 347 (1997) argues that "even if social contract principles would recom-
mend a system of global relations in which freedom of movement among nations was 
guaranteed, there is no reason to think that such principles should be respected by any 
state in the absence of an effective institutional structure that can provide reasonable 
guarantees of compliance among the others." This international structure need not, how-
ever, be a global state; a variety of other possibilities are readily imaginable. 
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radical features. But a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples could enjoy more 
support than a Rawlsian objector might initially suppose.175 
Even if some peoples failed to endorse the terms of a cosmopoli-
tan Law of Peoples, if a substantial majority of peoples did so, support 
for it could continue to prove sufficiendy stable to ground a system of 
cooperative interaction between persons and societies.176 Potential 
instability need not prevent it from grounding a fair system of coop-
eration, even if stability is a requisite of such a system. As Rawls grants, 
a substantial number of peoples may well not endorse a Rawlsian Law 
of Peoples. He does not seem to regard this possibility as justifying the 
further attenuation of his proposed Law of Peoples, however. Indeed, 
he acknowledges elsewhere that "a just scheme of cooperation may 
not be in equilibrium, much less stable."177 
Rawls does not suggest that the Law of Peoples be reframed to se-
cure the support of oudaw states or benevolent absolutisms, whatever 
their numbers or influence. And it would be odd if he did so. In mod-
ern liberal democracies, wealthy people exercise disproportionate 
influence over political decision-making. Under ordinary circum-
stances, it will be extremely difficult to enact or enforce a public policy 
without their support. But he does not, in d1e interests of stability, ac-
cord their voices or interests extra weight when designing the domestic 
l75 Cf infra Parts I.D.3.b.iii.A.1-2 ("A Surprising Current Consensus," "A Possibly 
Emergent Consensus"), I.D.3.c.ii.A-B ("Fostering Cooperation Under a Cosmopolitan Law 
of Peoples," '"The Extent of Support for a Cosmopolitan Law of Peoples"). 
176 Rawls explicitly acknowledges that there might be 
many who do not find a sense of justice for their good; but if so, the forces 
making for stability are weaker. Under such conditions penal devices will play 
a much larger role in the social system. The greater the lack of congruence, 
the greater the likelihood, other things equal, of instability with its attendant 
evils. Yet none of this nullifies the collective rationality of the principles of jus-
tice; it is still to the advantage of each that everyone else should honor them. 
At least this holds true so long as the conception of justice is not so unstable 
that some other conception would be preferable. 
RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 1, at 505. 
177 !d. at 434-35; cf Trachtman, supra note 15, at 989 (observing that "some measure of 
social proximity is necessary for solidarity" but noting that "[t]his position is more a behav-
ioral insight about human nature than a philosophical or logical principle" and thus 
should not be used "as a basis for determining what human action or what institutional 
arrangements would be just" (footnote omitted)). Of course, judgments about human 
nature cannot directly lead to conclusions about justice. However, if certain psychological 
characteristics of a population make a particular scheme of justice difficult to implement, 
this might be an especially strong argument against implementing it, despite its moral 
attractiveness. See generally BERNARD A.O. WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSO-
PHY (1985). 
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original position. It makes no more sense to treat peoples rather than 
persons fairly when designing the second original position. 
Even though only cosmopolitan liberals may at first wholeheart-
edly endorse the principles of a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples, this 
need not mean that a transnational regime governed by such a Law of 
Peoples would enjoy so little support from decent nonliberal peoples 
that it would be too unstable to serve as a system of fair cooperation. 
Decent nonliberal peoples could certainly endorse many of the provi-
sions of a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples. Assuming a Rawlsian Law of 
Peoples would be stable, it seems as if the stability of a cosmopolitan 
Law of Peoples would be threatened, if at all, only when it yielded re-
quirements different from those contained in a Rawlsian Law of Peo-
ples. A cosmopolitan Law of Peoples would, of course, yield some re-
quirements that would be unlikely to attract the support of illiberal 
governments. But it need not affect adherence to norms that aren't in 
dispute. And the overall stability of support for a cosmopolitan Law of 
Peoples might be such that a measure of dissent over certain features 
of such a Law would not lead to significant upset. Governments that 
did not find individual features of a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples at-
tractive might support them because doing so reduced domestic dis-
content-many members of their societies might, after all, respond 
positively to increased liberalization and democratization. And the 
overall stability of a global order shaped by a cosmopolitan Law of 
Peoples might contain the effects of dissent regarding particular, 
more controversial norms. 
iii. A Cosmopolitan Law of Peoples Could Bind Absent a Fair Sys-
tem of Cooperation 
It is unclear, in any case, that Rawls can reasonably maintain that 
the basic norms of his preferred political morality apply only in cir-
cumstances marked by fair cooperation. He makes clear with respect 
to transnational duties that a number of the requirements of his po-
litical morality hold in the absence of a fair system of cooperation. So 
it would be difficult to mount a Rawlsian argument against a cosmo-
politan Law of Peoples on the basis that a cosmopolitan Society of 
Peoples could not count as such a system of cooperation. 
Rawls clearly believes that the Law of Peoples binds individuals in 
the absence of a global government. He notes that the "political 
(moral) force" of the "human rights honored by both liberal and de-
50 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 27:1 
cent hierarchical regimes ... extends to all societies, and they are bind-
ing on all peoples and societies, including outlaw states."178 Among the 
principles making up his proposed Law of Peoples is the requirement 
that peoples "observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of 
war."179 And he makes clear that these restrictions bind individuals. Dis-
cussing the norms of war, he provides good reason to suppose that in 
the second original position, "the traditional prohibitions incorporat-
ing the natural duties that protect human life would be chosen."180 
[C]onscientious refusal in time of war ... is based upon the 
same theory of justice that underlies the [domestic] constitu-
tion and guides its interpretation. Moreover, the legal order 
itself presumably recognizes in the form of treaties the validity 
of at least some of [the traditional] principles of the law of na-
tions. Therefore if a soldier is ordered to engage in certain il-
licit acts of war, he may refuse if he reasonably and conscien-
tiously believes that the principles applying to the conduct of 
war are plainly violated. He can maintain that, all things con-
sidered, his natural duty not to be made the agent of grave in-
justice and evil to another outweighs his duty to obey.tst 
Rawls appears here to envision a case in which an individual sol-
dier refuses to commit an act because she regards it as inconsistent with 
the demands of justice.182 There is no reference to a functioning Soci-
ety of Peoples that might enforce the principles of justice on all com-
batants. The requirements related to war, at any rate, are matters of 
"natural duty. "183 And natural duties "have no necessary connection 
with institutions or social practices. "184 They "are owed not only to 
definite individuals, say to those cooperating together in a particular 
178 RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 80-81. 
179 Id. at 37. 
180 RAwLs, THEORY, sttpra note 1, at 333; see also Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and 
Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REv. 311, 321 n.40 (1996) ("Natural duties do 
not depend on the presence of institutions for their very existence, while artificial duties 
do."). 
181 RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 1, at 333. 
182 Id. 
HIS See id. (characterizing justice in war). 
184 I d. at 98; cJ. Jeremy Waldron, Redressing Historic Injustice, 52 ToRONTO LJ. 135, 138 
n.ll (2002) ("Rawls used a contractarian device to illuminate the content of justice; but 
the duty to be just was understood by him as a categorical natural duty, not as a contractu-
ally incurred obligation."). 
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social arrangement, but to persons generally."185 Rawls's Law of Peoples 
thus appears to bind individuals in at least some instances even absent 
any mechanism designed to secure general compliance with its de-
mands. This implies either that the question whether a fair system of 
social cooperation exists is relevant to the validity of only some norms of 
justice, or that transnational society can be a fair system of cooperation 
absent any global enforcement mechanism. In either case, it does not 
appear as if Rawls could argue against a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples 
on the basis that it could not ground a fair system of cooperation. 
d. Rawlsian Relativism 
If Rawls were a relativist of some sort, as he is sometimes supposed 
to have become, he might be thought to have a reason to oppose cos-
mopolitanism apart from the reasons I have already canvassed. He 
might argue that nonliberals would have no objective reason to en-
dorse a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples. But he is not a relativist and so 
could not argue on relativist grounds against cosmopolitanism. 186 And 
185 RAwLs, THEORY, supra note 1, at 99. This idea might seem more at home in the in-
tellectual world of A Theory of justice than in that of Political Liberalism. But the political 
conception of justice as fairness is still, in a limited but important sense, a moral concep-
tion. There is no reason a proponent of political liberalism, as Rawls characterizes and 
defends this idea in his later work, should object to the notion of natural duties (as elabo-
rated in A Theory of justice) provided that these duties are understood and grounded as part 
of a political conception. 
Rawls's reference to treaty obligations should not be read as implying that the duty to 
observe the requirements of justice in war depends on the existence of international 
agreements embodying these requirements. It is apparent that he believes that a soldier 
might offer a justification rooted in a reasonable political conception of justice for refus-
ing to "engage in certain illicit acts of war." RAwLs, THEORY, supra note 1, at 333. His pur-
pose seems to be to note a further justification (superfluous but still important) that the 
soldier might offer for conscientious refusal. Rawls does not suggest, I think, that a soldier 
would be free to, say, violate the principle of noncombatant immunity in a given case if no 
treaty provision constrained her conduct in a particular case. 
186 See RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 62. While Rawls is not a relativist, it is easy to mis-
read him as if he were ("a liberal constitutional democracy i~. in fact, superior to other 
forms of society"). See id. Thus it is understandable that Teson obsenes that the post-Theory 
of Justice Rawls "embraced a more relativistic, context-based conception of justice and po-
litical morality, in which rights and liberties no longer had a foundation in higher princi-
ples or liberal views of human nature, but were merely the result of the peculiar history 
and traditions of the West." Teson, supra note 101, at 98. My sense is that Rawls believes 
that the liberal rights he defends happen to have been discovered and defended in the 
West and that it might prove difficult to construct an overlapping consensus in support of 
such rights outside the West. But I do not believe he supposes that liberal claims about 
justice are only "true for" people in the West. Rawls may be a relath·ist about justification, 
but he is not a relativist about truth. See JEFFREY SToUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL: THE LAN-
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relativism provides, in any case, no support for an anti-cosmopolitan 
argument as such. 
As I have already suggested, the same argument Rawls offers for 
the equality of persons domestically seem to entail the equality of per-
sons globally. In A Theory of Justice, he defends the equality of the par-
ticipants in the first original position in general terms that do not de-
pend on substantial background assumptions about persons or political 
life.l87 The equality of persons is not, presumably, an unchallengeable 
postulate: like other aspects of justice as fairness, it can and must be 
validated through a process of deliberation leading, ultimately, to wide 
reflective equilibrium among the deliberators' relevant moral and po-
litical beliefs.l88 Nonetheless, there is no indication that Rawls regards 
his argument for equality as valid or objectively reasonable only for 
those who endorse certain presuppositions (though of course it may as 
a matter of fact be likely to persuade only those who already hold cer-
tain beliefs). To the extent that the Rawls of The Law of Peoples endorses 
the views expressed in A Theory of Justice, the same ought to be true 
globally. 
In Rawls's more recent work, however, he appears at first glance 
to offer a more qualified defense of the norms governing the first 
original position. It might be tempting now to read him as arguing 
from within the confines of liberal democracy; if this is, in fact, what 
he is doing, there might be less reason for him to endorse the global 
moral and political equality of persons. He suggests that the princi-
ples of justice as fairness 
are meant to answer the question: once we view a democratic 
society as a fair system of social cooperation between citizens 
regarded as free and equal, what principles are most appro-
priate to it? Alternatively: which principles are most appro-
GUAGES OF MORALS AND TifEIR DISCONTENTS 24-28, 93-94, 244-55 (2d ed. 2001) (distinguish-
ing relativism about justification and relativism about truth). 
187 See RAwLs, THEORY, supra note 1, at 507 ("[T]he principles of justice are argued for 
on the basis of reasonable stipulations concerning the choice of such conceptions. I urged 
the naturalness of these conditions and presented reasons why they are accepted, but it 
was not claimed that they are self-evident, or required by the analysis of moral concepts or 
the meaning of ethical terms."). 
188 See, e.g., id. at 18-19, 42-45, 104, 507-08 (discussing reflective equilibrium). We as 
citizens engage in deliberation leading to reflective equilibrium as we assess the appropri-
ateness of the norms governing the original position and ask whether these norms ade-
quately reflect of our general sense of fairness and our considered judgments about par-
ticular issues. The participants in the original position engage in such deliberation as they 
evaluate proposed principles of justice. See RAwLs, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 28. 
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priate for a democratic society that not only professes but 
wants to take seriously the idea that citizens are free and 
equal, and tries to realize that idea in its main institutions?189 
53 
This might be understood as implying that Rawls's argument as a whole 
takes for granted the basic assumptions of freedom, equality, and de-
mocracy, and then formalizes these assumptions in the original posi-
tion. It might appear that he is simply interested in elaborating the 
implications of what ''we here now" believe about these fundamental 
political issues. 
This interpretation might seem to be suggested by Rawls's sugges-
tion that ''we look to the public political culture of a democratic soci-
ety, and to the traditions of interpretation of its constitution and basic 
laws, for certain familiar ideas that can be worked up into a concep-
tion of political justice. "190 It might also appear to be supported by his 
assertions that "the principles of justice provide a response to the 
fundamental question of political philosophy for a constitutional demo-
cratic regime"191 and that "the conception of the person is worked up 
from the way citizens are regarded in the public political culture of a 
democratic society. "192 
If this broadly relativist reading of Rawls were correct, the free-
dom and equality modeled in the first original position could only be 
defended in hypothetical terms. Since we citizens of democratic socie-
ties assume that we are both free and equal, we can represent our as-
sumptions as Rawls does in the original position. On this sort of in-
terpretation, someone in an illiberal society who did not view persons 
as free and equal would have no good reason to accept Rawls's version 
of the original position. And of course, such a person would have no 
objective reason to accept a Rawlsian Law of Peoples either. But this 
would not prevent liberals from acting on the assumption that such 
principles should guide the foreign policies of their societies.193 They 
could certainly regard these principles as an appropriate expression 
189 RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 39. 
190 I d. at 5. 
191 Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
192 Id. at 19; cf. Richard M. Rorty, Postmodern Bourgeois Liberalism, 80 J. PHIL. 583 (1983); 
Richard M. Rorty, The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in PROSPECTS FOR A CoMMON Mo-
RALITY 254-78 (Gene Outka &John P. Reeder,Jr. eds., 1993). 
193 It obviously would not do to note that, on this interpretation of Rawls, the princi-
ples in question would be ultimately arbitrary and unwarranted, since the sort of relativism 
implied in this interpretation suggests that all deep normatiYe judgments are similarly 
relative, including the contention that it is inappropriate for liberals to act with respect to 
non liberals on the basis of liberal principles. 
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of their sense of justice, to which on relativist grounds there could be 
no objection. They might argue that liberal principles are simply their 
"can't help[s],"l94 grounded in attitudes which they may regard on 
reflection as arbitrary but which are, as contingent matters of fact, 
deeply rooted in their cultures and in their psyches.195 
But Rawls certainly does not talk as if he is a relativist. He affirms 
that "[p]olitical liberalism does not question that many political and 
moral judgments of certain specified kinds are correct and it views many 
of them as masonable."l96 He maintains that "a liberal constitutional de-
mocracy is, in fact, superior to other forms of society. "197 He believes 
that illiberal views of religious toleration are less reasonable than liberal 
alternatives.I9S His suggestions that we begin with the convictions cen-
tral to liberal, democratic cultures when shaping an understanding of 
justice need not be read relativistically. Even if he treated the demo-
cratic principles of freedom and equality as given and beyond criticism 
or demonstration, this would not make him a relativist. Indeed, he 
could simply claim that a democratic culture offers a more satisfactory 
route to objective truth than any other cultural environment and that 
he begins with the assumptions that ground such a culture because 
they are superior, known intuitively, and unequivocally true, even 
though he cannot demonstrate this in any compelling way. It is better, I 
think, to understand him as maintaining that the assumption of, for 
instance, equality, defended with the sorts of arguments offered in A 
Theory of justice and justice as Fairness, shapes the conditions obtaining 
within the first original position, but not that it is presupposed as an 
unquestionable given when those conditions are specified.199 
194 To use Oliver Wendell Holmes's phrase: 
[A]ll I mean by truth is what I can't help believing-! don't know why I 
should assume except for practical purposes of conduct that [my] can't !telp 
has more cosmic worth than any other-1 can't help preferring port to ditch-
water, but I see no ground for supposing that the cosmos shares my weakness. 
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John Gray (Sept. 3, 1905), quoted in SHELDON No-
VICK, HoNORABLE JUsTicE: THE LIFE m OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES 283 (1989). This quota-
tion was brought to my attention by Albert W. Alschuler, whose book is an informative and 
provocatiYe exploration of legal and moral skepticism. ALBl:RT W. ALscHULER, LAW WITH-
ouT VALUES: THE LIH, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HoLMES 24 (2000). 
195 There are good reasons for them not to do so. See, e.g., Chartier, supra note 91, at 
118-21. 
196 RAwLs, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 62 (emphasis added). 
197 RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 62. 
198 !d. at 74-75. 
199 The same argument for equality is articulated in RAwLs, THEORY, supra note 1, at 
441-49; RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 19-20. 
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Uust] because the exposition [of justice as fairness] begins 
with ... [certain familiar ideas that can be worked up into a 
conception of political justice] does not mean that the ar-
gument for justice as fairness simply assumes them as a basis. 
Everything depends on how the exposition works out as a 
whole and whether the ideas and principles of this concep-
tion of justice, as well as its conclusions, prove acceptable on due 
reflection. 200 
55 
Focusing on "the leading conceptions of political justice found in our 
philosophical tradition" is a matter of expediency of limiting the 
plethora of available options for reflection and selecting a convenient 
starting point; it is not a relativistic assumption that the conviction 
that persons are free and equal is only "true for us" (whatever this 
might mean).2°1 If "[w]e turn to political philosophy when our shared 
political understandings . . . break down, and equally when we are 
torn within ourselves,"202 then our "can't help[s] "203 and the assump-
tions dominant in our culture admit of criticism in the light of reason; 
they must be more than prejudices.204 
Rawls must not suppose, then, the assumption that persons are 
free and equal is simply a democratic instinct. He evidently-and ap-
propriately-regards his arguments for freedom and equality as rea-
sonable and worthy of general endorsement (whether or not widely 
endorsed). 205 And his model of international justice is hardly relativ-
ist. Many human rights, even if not all those liberals believe impor-
tant, are integral to the Law of Peoples as Rawls understands it. 206 
2oo RAWLS, REsTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 5 n.5 (emphasis added). 
201 !d. at 31. 
202 RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 44. 
2°3 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John Gray, supra note 194, at 283. 
204 RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 44-46. 
205 Further, even if the validity of claims for democracy and liberal equality were ulti-
mately grounded in nothing more than a Western consensus, this would have no implica-
tions for the particular foreign policy choices of liberal societies. If all norms are culturally 
dependent, liberal states remain perfectly free to act on the norms prescribed by their cul-
ture; relativism affords no support for tolerance. If liberalism dictates that its adherents 
pressure other societies to create democratic institutions and foster social and economic 
equality, the fact that liberalism is understood as a Western idiosyncrasy gives liberals no 
reason to ignore their "can't helps" when determining how best to interact with illiberal 
societies. However, if liberal principles demand effort and sacrifice from liberals, recogniz-
ing that these principles were fundamentally arbitrary might lead liberals to choose less 
strenuous alternatives. But this would be a reflection of liberals' preference for sloth, not 
of the support for tolerance purportedly provided by relath·ism. Cf BERNARD A.O. WIL-
LIAMS, MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 14-37 (1972). 
206 See RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 37, 65, 80-81. 
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Outlaw states are not allowed to behave as if their opposition to hu-
man rights and norms of global amity were true "for themselves," 
even if not for well-ordered societies.2°7 
In any case, in A Theory of justice, before he had begun to articu-
late his understanding of justice as fairness as a political conception 
rather than comprehensive moral doctrine, Rawls maintained that 
societies should be treated as equal for purposes of determining 
norms of transnational justice. Once the principles of justice have 
been determined at the societal level, he wrote, "one may extend the 
interpretation of the original position and think of the parties as rep-
resentatives of different nations who must choose together the fun-
damental principles to adjudicate conflicting claims among states. "208 
At a point when he evidently regarded justice as fairness as a compre-
hensive moral doctrine, he also believed that peoples, rather than 
persons, should be treated as equal for purposes of formulating in-
ternational moral and legal norms. That he argued as he did suggests 
that his growing understanding of justice as fairness as a political con-
ception-even if it were mistakenly taken as a sign of a shift to some 
sort of relativism-isn't responsible for his preference for a Rawlsian 
over a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples. 
Rawls's post-TheoTy of justice formulations are not best read as im-
plying that he is a relativist in any sense that might make it impossible 
for him to endorse universally valid claims about democracy and hu-
man rights. If he were, his relativism wouldn't necessitate tolerance 
for illiberal regimes. And he had decided to treat peoples, rather than 
persons, as equal for purposes of formulating norms of international 
justice before his purported turn to relativism took place. Relativism 
cannot, therefore, account for his preference for Rawlsian rather than 
individual deliberators in the second original position. 
e. Allocated Responsibility 
Perhaps we should see Rawls as emphasizing that someone needs to 
be given responsibility for the world's tangible and intangible resources 
in the absence of a global government and thus as opting for individual 
peoples as the remaining possible loci of responsibility.209 However, an 
2°7 See id. at 80-81. 
2os RAwLs, THEORY, supra note 1, at 331. 
2°9 See Tushnet, supra note 96, at 1074; see also Frank]. Garcia, The Law of Peoples, 23 
Hous.]. INT'L L. 659, 667 (2001) (book review) [hereinafter Garcia, Peoples] ("[Rawls's] 
approach is statist not because he is necessarily enamored of states or their track record 
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argument from the need for allocated responsibility would not warrant 
basing norms of global justice on the conclusions of Rawlsian rather 
than individual deliberators.210 Such an argument would succeed only 
if individual deliberators would opt for a world government and such a 
world government weren't viable. I don't think the cosmopolitan 
should concede either of these points. As I've already noted, a world 
government need not be problematic in the ways or for the reasons 
Rawls suggests, and any arguments against the creation of such a gov-
ernment that would commend themselves to Rawls and others could be 
considered by cosmopolitan deliberators. Thus, the argument shows at 
most why it makes sense to take peoples seriously. The argument does 
not show why, from a normative perspective, peoples, rather than per-
sons, should be the building blocks of the transnational order. 
E. The Equality of Persons in the Second 01iginal Position 
Rawls has advanced good reason to believe that the equality of 
persons should be a bedrock feature of domestic political morality. He 
is unpersuasive when he maintains that it should not similarly be a 
fun dam en tal aspect of global morality. And, in the absence of a strong 
argument against the global equality of persons, which Rawls fails to 
offer, it would be rational for liberals to accept his arguments for the 
domestic equality of persons as entailing the equality of persons glob-
ally as well as domestically.211 Rawls offers no such argument. His own 
defense of the equality of peoples in the second original position is 
unpersuasive. And a variety of broadly Rawlsian arguments that might 
(he clearly is not), but because they remain the primary delh·ery Yehicles for domestic 
justice, which is for Rawls the sine qua non of international justice."). 
Similarly, Charles Beitz. supra note 2, at 682, suggests that Rawls may be arguing "that a 
people should be treated as having special ethical significance because its flourishing as a 
people is essential to its capacity to manage its human, material, and cultural resources, 
and, thus, to sustain its institutions, for the benefit of present and future members." But 
again, even if a world state were impossible or undesirable, a cosmopolitan could justify 
treating peoples as having "special ethical significance" without conceding that the princi-
ples of international justice should reflect the conclusions of Rawlsian rather than individ-
ual deliberators. See id. at 683. 
210 Cf Pogge,justice, supra note 56, at 248. 
211 I mean "rational" here in its ordinary sense-consistent with reason-rather than in 
the increasingly popular sense associated with the "theory of rational choice" (a sense not 
attested at all in the 1989 Oxford English Dictionary), which Rawls seems to endorse. See 
RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 1, at 123-25, 359-72; RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 6-
7, 81-82. For a recent philosophical example of the use of "rational" \Vith its ordinary 
meaning, see generally FAITH AND RATIONALITY: REASON AND BELIEF IN GoD (Ah·in Plant-
inga & Nicholas Wolterstorff eds., 1983). 
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be offered in support of a Rawlsian Law of Peoples are similarly un-
convincing. A cosmopolitan Law of Peoples could achieve Rawlsian 
legitimacy. Such a Law of Peoples need not entail the formation of a 
world government, which need not, in any case, be undesirable. A 
cosmopolitan Society of Peoples could be a fair system of cooperation, 
and a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples could bind even if it were not. 
There is no plausible relativist argument for preferring fairness to 
peoples over fairness to persons on the global stage-and Rawls's own 
views are not, in any case, relativist. There is good reason, therefore, 
to prefer an egalitarian, cosmopolitan Law of Peoples to a one that is 
fair to peoples rather than persons. 
II. HuMAN RIGHTS, ToLERATION, AND THE LAW OF PEOPLES 
Concerned for themselves and those they represent, individual 
deliberators would frame a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples that pro-
tected a range of human rights. "Following the kind of reasoning fa-
miliar in the original position for the domestic case," they "would ... 
adopt a first principle that all persons have equal basic rights and lib-
erties," in a "way [that] would straightaway ground human rights in a 
political (moral) conception of liberal cosmopolitan justice. "212 These 
rights would presumably be those that justice as fairness would safe-
guard at the domestic level-including 
political liberty (the right to vote and to hold public office) 
and freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience 
and freedom of thought; freedom of the person, which in-
cludes freedom from psychological oppression and physical 
assault and dismemberment (integrity of the person); the 
right to hold personal property and freedom from arbitrary 
arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of 
law.213 
A cosmopolitan Law of Peoples would likely also ensure "fair equality 
of opportunity. "21 4 In short, it would safeguard the full array of basic 
212 RAWLS, LAW, supra note 1, at 82 (footnotes omitted). 
213 RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 1, at 53; cj RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 291-99; 
RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 112-14. 
214 See RAWl.S, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 291; RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 
42. It would also probably incorporate a global version of Rawls's difference principle, or 
something similar. On the difference principle globally applied, see infra Part III ("The 
Duty of Assistance and the Just War"). 
2004] Revising Rawls on Global justice 59 
liberal human rights.215 While a Rawlsian Law of Peoples would guar-
antee some human rights, Rawlsian deliberators would endorse a Law 
of Peoples containing more limited human rights protections. Full 
equality of citizens without respect to gender and religion would not 
be guaranteed under the Law of Peoples, there would be no assured 
right of democratic participation, and limits on public debate would 
be acceptable.216 
On Rawls's view, respect for human rights serves as a marker that 
indicates which peoples are well-ordered and which are not and thus 
plays a key role in determining which peoples liberal societies should 
tolerate. At the same time, disrespect for (some) human rights justifies 
humanitarian intervention by well-ordered peoples.21 7 In Part II, I de-
tail the somewhat limited character of the human rights protections 
afforded by the Law of Peoples. Then, I examine the ways in which 
Rawls does, and Rawlsian deliberators might, identity the rights deserv-
ing such protections, contrasting Rawlsian and cosmopolitan conclu-
sions. Finally, I consider the appropriate responses of liberal societies to 
human rights violations by nonliberal regimes, suggesting that Rawls's 
view is overly tolerant of such regimes. A cosmopolitan Law of Peoples, 
I argue, would encourage liberal peoples to take a more active role 
than a would Rawlsian Law of Peoples in fostering the recognition of 
the full panoply ofliberal human rights by nonliberal societies. 
A. The Minimal Nature of the Explicit Human Rights Norms 
Contained in a Rawlsian Law of Peoples 
Rawls acknowledges "the many difficulties of interpreting 
[human] rights and [their] limits," but says he regards "their general 
meaning and tendency as clear enough. "218 In the con text of the Law 
of Peoples, the expression human rights denotes "a special class of ur-
gent rights,"219 including guarantees of the "security of ethnic groups 
from mass murder and genocide "22° as well as 
215 For a broader defense of extensive international human rights norms, see Robert 
D. Sloane, Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the Univcrsalit_v of Intcmational Human 
Rights, 34 VAND.j. TRANSNAT'L L. 527 (2001). 
216 See RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 65, 78-80. 
217 ld. at 80. Rawls also identifies a third function: to set a limit to "the pluralism 
among peoples." !d. (footnote omitted). 
218 Id. at 27. 
219 Id. at 79. 
220 Jd. 
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the right to life (to the means of subsistence and security); to 
liberty (to freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupa-
tion, and to a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to 
ensure freedom of religion and thought); to property (per-
sonal property); and to formal equality as expressed by the 
rules of natural justice (that is, that similar cases be treated 
similarly). 221 
Rawls indicates that the class of "human rights proper" includes the 
rights protected in Articles 3 through 18 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.222 Along with "human rights that are obvious impli-
cations of ... [this] first class of rights," the rights are "the human 
rights connected with the common good," which Rawls's Law of Peo-
ples guarantees to all persons.223 The class of human rights evidently 
does not include rights to full equality, freedom of expression, or 
democratic participation. It is not surprising, then, that Rawls distin-
guishes between "human rights" on the one hand and, on the other, 
"constitutional rights," "the rights of liberal democratic citizenship," 
and "other rights that belong to certain kinds of political institutions, 
both individualist and associationist. "224 
Distinguishing them from "human rights proper," Rawls de-
scribes the rights guaranteed in, for instance, Articles 22 and 23 of the 
Declaration as "presuppos [in g) specific kinds of institutions. "225 It is 
easy to see why this might be true of "the right to social security," 
guaranteed by Article 22; but why is it true of "the right to equal pay 
for equal work," secured by Article 23?226 Paid employment does not 
seem to be a "specific kind[] of institution[]. "227 While a right to so-
cial security could be enjoyed only in some societies, it appears as if a 
right to equal pay for equal work could be enjoyed in all societies. The 
point is not, I think, that some societies lack the institution of paid 
221 RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 65 (footnotes omitted). 
222 Id. at 80 n.23. Rawls gives two examples of "human rights proper" contained in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Article 3 (rights "to life, liberty and security of 
person") and Article 5 (rights to be free from "torture or ... cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment"). ld. (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 
217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Univ. Dec. Hum. Rights]. 
223 RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 79-81. 
224 Id. at 79-80. Recall that the members of "associationist" societies "are viewed in 
public life as members of different groups, and each group is represented in the legal 
system by a body in a decent consultation hierarchy." Id. at 64. 
225 Id. at 80 n.23. 
226 See id. 
227 See id. 
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work, but that some societies fail to provide women with opportunities 
for paid employment. But patriarchy is hardly a "specific kind[] of 
institution[]," except, perhaps, in the sense that American slavery was 
a "peculiar institution."228 
Most obviously absent from Rawls's list are the rights contained in 
Articles 19 through 21 of the Universal Declaration, which guarantee 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, 
and freedom to participate in the governance of one's country "di-
rectly or through freely chosen representatives."229 These are hardly 
"liberal aspirations,"230 in the sense of vague statements of principle 
capable of realization, if at all, only imperfectly through legislation: 
they are rights with sufficient specificity to permit, if necessary, their 
judicial enforcement. 
It is of course quite comprehensible that Rawls's Law of Peoples 
does not safeguard such rights. Some of the peoples represented by 
Rawlsian deliberators are not democratic and will presumably regard 
their political structures as valuable and worth preserving. These rep-
resentatives will not, therefore, consent to the inclusion of rights to 
democratic participation among the norms of global justice embod-
ied in the Law of Peoples, since their societies do not protect these 
rights and do not wish to do so.231 
B. Identifying Rawlsian Human Rights Norms 
While Rawls describes the differences between these classes of 
rights, he does little to justify the distinctions he makes. vVhat justifies 
excluding "freedom of peaceful assembly and association "232 while in-
cluding "the right to own property alone as well as in association with 
others"?233 VVhy is "freedom of thought, conscience and religion "234 
protected, but not "freedom of opinion and expression "?235 It is 
difficult not to see Rawls's prime motivation as the articulation of a set 
of rights a nonliberal society could endorse. Instead of defining a well-
228 See id. 
229 Univ. Dec. Hum. Rights, supra note 222, arts. 19-21. "The will of the people shall be 
the basis of the authority of government; this '"i.ll shall be expressed in periodic and genu-
ine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote 
or by equivalent free voting procedures." !d. art. 21. 
230 RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 80 n.23. 
231 See id. 
232 Univ. Dec. Hum. Rights, supra note 222, art. 20. 
233 !d. art. 17. 
234 !d. art. 18. 
235 !d. art. 19. 
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ordered society as one which accepts a set of human rights justified on 
other grounds, Rawls may have chosen to identifY the human rights 
protections contained in the Law of Peoples by asking, implicitly, what 
the government of a decent nonliberal people could-in fact, and not 
merely when speaking for public consumption-accept. 
It is difficult to be sure because-apart from the rights he 
specifically enumerates-Rawls provides us with relatively little guid-
ance in identifYing the criteria Rawlsian deliberators would use to de-
termine which rights to endorse.236 He characterizes these rights as 
"urgent. "237 But just how "urgent" must rights be to qualifY as human 
rights under the Law of Peoples? 
It is clear, for instance, that the comprehensive doctrines endorsed 
by various societies seem to license or even require the subordination 
of women and of lesbians, gays, and bisexuals.238 We know that under 
the Law of Peoples the "oppression and abuse [of women] ... 
amount[] to the violation of their human rights. "239 But how would we 
know that oppressing and abusing women violates their (Rawlsian) 
human rights had Rawls not so informed us?240 To be sure, gender 
equality is a basic principle of political liberalism, a constituent of equal 
citizenship. 241 Rawls has, however, already told us that the rights of lib-
eral citizenship are not, as such, human rights and has characterized 
Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights-which affirms 
that "[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights," 
as an expression of "liberal aspirations"-implicitly distinguishing it 
from "the human rights connected with the common good. "242 Article 
7 of the Universal Declaration provides: "All are equal before the law 
and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the 
236 See Robert Justin Lipkin, In Defense of Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of Reasonable-
ness, Public Reason, and Tolemnce in Multicultural Constitutionalism, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 263, 
275-76 (1996) (characterizing as arbitrary Rawls's specification of the rights a decent 
non liberal society would necessarily respect). 
237 RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 79. 
238 Rawls suggests that non-religious factors may account for the subordination of 
women in Islam. See RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 110 (citing LEILA AHMED, WoMEN AND 
GENDER IN IsLAM (1992)); cf Joelle En tel is, Note, International Human Rights: Islam's Friend 
or Foe? Alge1ia as an Example of the Compatibility of International Human Rights Regarding 
Women's Equality and Islamic Law, 20 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 1251 (1997). 
239 RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 75; cf id. at 78, 110. 
240 /d. at 75. 
241 /d. at 159-63. 
242 /d. at 80 n.23. Rawls's main focus here may well be on the subsequent claim in Arti-
cle 1 that all human beings "are endowed with reason and conscience and should act to-
wards one another in a spirit of brotherhood." /d.; Univ. Dec. Hum. Rights, supra note 222, 
art. 1. 
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law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in 
violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such dis-
crimination. "243 It falls within the group of articles Rawls says protect 
human rights proper, and so apparently safeguards rights that fall 
within the class protected by Rawls's Law of Peoples. But of course Arti-
cle 7 does not specifY what kinds of discrimination are and are not licit, 
so it provides relatively little check on the behavior of a society whose 
leaders are convinced that the differences between women and men 
are as important and worth embodying in law as those betw·een, say, 
children and adults. 
Perhaps some kind of gender justice forms part of a common good 
conception of human rights because gender equality is an implication 
of "formal equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, 
that similar cases be treated similarly)."244 But whether this principle 
accounts for the endorsement of gender equality by the Law of Peoples, 
it may not help us resolve other difficult questions. Debate will con-
tinue to revolve around the issue of which putative similarities are rele-
vant, and so of which cases really are similar to which others. Is the di-
rection of sexual desire a relevant difference between persons or not? 
What about age? What about socio-economic class? 
Rawls makes clear in general which rights will count as human 
rights.245 But his list isn't exhaustive,246 and it is obviously subject to in-
terpretation.247 It is unlikely that Rawlsian deliberators would adopt a 
complete list of human rights norms and corresponding interpretation 
more demanding than the least restrictive list or interpretation upheld 
by any of the deliberating peoples. 248 Since the peoples are equal, none 
will be have the authority to demand that another accept more rigor-
ous human rights protections. None will deliberate with an awareness 
of its own preferred comprehensive doctrines or political circumstances 
or of the human rights guarantees each affords;249 but each will need to 
243 Univ. Dec. Hum. Rights, supra note 222, art. 7. 
244 RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 65 (footnotes omitted). 
245 See id. at 78-81. 
246 !d. at 78-79 ("Human rights in the Law of Peoples ... [are] urgent rights, such as 
freedom from slavery and serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty) of conscience, and secu-
rity of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide.") (emphasis added). 
247 !d. at 42. ("It is these iuterpn!tatious, of which there are many, that are to be debated 
in the second-level original position."). 
248 This fact leads, from different premises, to Lipkin's tart observation that "in Rawls' 
view, some very nasty countries might be reasonable." Lipkin, supra note 236, at 304. 
249 Rawls says this explicitly with respect to liberal societies and comprehensive doc-
trines and says nothing to imply that the same would not be true for decent nonliberal 
peoples in the original position. RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 34. That individual delibera-
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consider the possibility that its human rights norms are the least pro-
tective of citizens and the least restrictive of officials of all those on of-
fer. And presuming that each participating society has adopted the level 
of human rights protection it offers deliberately, none will want to ac-
cept higher standards, given that doing so would force it to act contrary 
to its considered preferences. Thus, no participating society seems 
likely to opt for a version of the Law of Peoples that warrants affording 
more protection to human rights than is offered by the least protective 
of the participating peoples.25o The human rights norms that form part 
of the Law of Peoples will flow in part from the prior decision about 
which peoples to count as well-ordered.251 
Thus, a Rawlsian Law of Peoples somewhat underdetermines 
which human rights standards ought to be protected. A liberal society 
seeking both to respect human rights and to conduct its foreign policy 
along otherwise Rawlsianly just lines will have no choice but to decide 
on some other basis-say, that of Rawlsian justice as fairness-which 
human rights are essential. On this basis, it can determine which socie-
ties count as decent. Having done so, it will then be able to judge to 
which form of the Law of Peoples Rawlsian deliberators would assent in 
the original position. (It would not, of course, have to expect perfect 
compliance with any set of norms from either liberal or nonliberal so-
cieties.) What it cannot do is to determine these standards by means of 
tors behind the veil of ignorance would be unaware which national human rights norms 
were theirs seems to flow naturally from Rawls's conception of the function of the veil of 
ignorance and the original position. 
250 This does not mean that human rights protections will not be afforded at all. The 
level of human rights protection afforded in a given society will not be determined solely 
by the ideology dominant in that society. Each society has an interest in its own stability, 
and significant human rights abuses can lead to instability. Each society has some reason to 
protect human rights simply as a means of promoting stability, even if respect for some of 
the rights it protects might not be required by-or might even be inconsistent with-the 
ideology dominant in the society. I owe this point to Seana Shiffrin. 
251 Perhaps Rawls intends the claim that "[w]hat have come to be called human rights 
are recognized as necessary conditions of any system of social cooperation," to provide a basis 
for a kind of transcendental argument enabling us to distinguish human rights from other 
kinds of rights. R<~.wLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 68. He explains: "When they are regularly vio-
lated, we have command by force, a slave system, and no cooperation of any kind." /d. Rawls 
could argue that the quality of being essential to a system of social cooperation is what makes 
a given guarantee a human right, but it is unclear how this criterion would work in practice. 
Read as a strong claim about the voluntariness of schemes of social interaction, it seems to 
impose more limits on decent nonliberal societies than Rawls wishes to suggest are legiti-
mate. Read loosely it seems to require very litde in the way of restraint on state power. Rawls 
provides no guidance for the use of this criterion if he designs it as such. See id. 
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a direct appeal to the contracting procedure underlying a Rawlsian Law 
of Peoples. 
C. Human Rights and Liberal Toleration of Nonliberal Societies 
Outlaw states and benevolent absolutisms violate a range of human 
rights (in the case of benevolent absolutisms, at least the right to de-
mocratic participation and political dissent); burdened societies may 
do so as well. Decent nonliberal societies protect some human rights, 
but not others. Their members do not necessarily enjoy full social or 
legal equality. While diverse religions are tolerated, members of some 
religious communities may enjoy more privileges than others. Free-
doms of expression and assembly may be limited. And while govern-
mental leaders must be responsive to popular questions and challenges, 
the people do not have the right to decide who will govern them in elec-
tions in which each person has equal status. 
The practices and institutions of nonliberal societies that violate 
human rights would be inconsistent with a cosmopolitan Law of Peo-
ples, and cosmopolitan liberals might reasonably wish to employ vari-
ous forms of pressure and persuasion to minimize or end these prac-
tices. By contrast, a Rawlsian Law of Peoples would prohibit the use of 
sanctions and military force, and discourage tl1e use of economic in-
centives, to increase human rights protections in decent nonliberal so-
cieties. And it would caution against the use of such pressures in re-
sponse to human rights violations in other societies. In this section, I 
outline Rawls's rationale for the belief that liberal societies should tol-
erate decent nonliberal ones. Then, I argue for the superiority of a 
cosmopolitan view of the treatment of illiberal societies by liberal ones. 
1. Rawlsian Toleration of Decent Nonliberal Peoples 
Rawls argues both from toleration and for toleration. The impor-
tance of toleration serves as a partial justification for a Rawlsian as 
opposed to a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples. But Rawls also argues di-
rectly that liberals should tolerate decent nonliberal peoples. A Rawl-
sian Law of Peoples would prohibit most attempts by liberal peoples 
to pressure decent nonliberal peoples to liberalize and would dis-
courage many of the rest. Just as an individual liberal society should 
tolerate diverse views and lifestyles, so the Society of Peoples should 
tolerate communities with diverse governance structures and human 
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rights norms, as long as they meet certain minimum qualifications.252 
Rawlsian deliberators would wish to preserve their peoples' equality 
and would therefore not sanction rules that would permit coercive 
intervention into their affairs by other peoples.253 Further, to use 
sanctions or military force-or even economic incentives254-to 
influence their policy choices would be to violate the self-respect of 
decent nonliberal peoples. 255 
Rawls himself believes that "a liberal constitutional democracy is, 
in fact, superior to other forms of society."256 He does not maintain 
"that a decent hierarchical society is as reasonable and just as a liberal 
society. For judged by the principles of a liberal democratic society, a 
decent hierarchical society clearly does not treat its members 
equally. "257 Such a society "does not treat its own members reasonably 
or justly as free and equal citizens, since it lacks the liberal idea of citi-
zenship. "258 His argument is not that liberal and illiberal societies are 
morally on a par; it is merely that liberal societies should leave decent 
nonliberal societies alone.259 
This is likely to be a largely moot point even given Rawls's version 
of the Law of Peoples, since no society today qualifies as a decent non-
liberal people, and Rawls himself concedes that his "remarks about a 
decent hierarchical society are conceptuaJ."260 Most nonliberal societies 
in the contemporary world do not accord human rights the respect 
characteristic of decent nonliberal societies (or of benevolent absolut-
isms). Within the limits imposed both by respect for others and by 
pragmatic concerns about effectiveness and the efficient allocation of 
resources, liberal peoples even on Rawls's terms are justified in seeking 
to encourage these societies to exhibit increasing respect for human 
rights-if necessary using sanctions26l and, in extreme cases, military 
force. 262 On my preferred, cosmopolitan, version of the second original 
position, in which the contractors are individual persons rather than 
252 I d. at 59-60. 
253 Id. at 60. 
254 Id. at 84-85. 
255 Id. at 61. 
256 RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 62. 
257 Id. at 83. 
258 I d. 
259 Id. at 62. 
260 Id. at 75 n.16. 
261 Experience, however, suggests that sanctions will often constitute abuses of human 
rights. 
262 See RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 93 n.6. 
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peoples, liberal peoples would also presumably be justified in using ap-
propriate means to encourage them to liberalize and to democratize. It 
seems likely that individual deliberators would regard the promotion of 
social equality, substantial opportunities for democratic political par-
ticipation, and the protection of a wide range of personal liberties 
within nonliberal societies of all sorts as entirely appropriate within rea-
sonable limits. 
a. The Analogy of Domestic Freedom of Association 
One argument for the generalized toleration of decent nonlib-
eral societies depends on 
a straightforward analogy with the domestic situation. In do-
mestic life, a liberal society will fully tolerate illiberal associa-
tions as long as they are compatible with the notion that all 
members of the society are free and equal as citizens. Many 
liberals would prefer a world in which even private associa-
tions reinforced the liberal conception of people as funda-
mentally free and equal. For example, they would prefer a so-
ciety in which offices in all religious organizations were 
equally open to women and men. But they recognize that 
their liberal commitment to freedom of conscience, of 
speech, and of association is incompatible with using the 
power of the state to force their liberal values on those who do 
not embrace them. Likewise, recognition of the importance 
of self-determination or autonomy of peoples requires fully 
tolerating their choice to organize in an illiberal form, at least 
as long as their organization does not violate core human 
rights.263 
The analogy is unpersuasive. Liberals may well grant the appro-
priateness of allowing some private associations to discriminate on the 
basis of gender, for instance. Such associations must, however, operate 
within constraints set by law. The societies within which they function 
guarantee a range of rights to their members which provide the back-
grounds for their choices to participate in-or abandon-private as-
sociations with potentially discriminatory rules of organization or 
membership. These societies, even if not the associations themselves, 
are grounded in commitments to equality and freedom, and they can 
263 Alec Walen, The Significance of Rawls's Law of Peoples, 6 IN'r'L LEGAL THEORY 51, 53 
(2000). 
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create social arrangements that make the costs of exiting oppressive 
associations relatively low. In the same way, a liberal society whose for-
eign policy is guided by a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples can grant that 
nonliberal peoples may seek human flourishing in diverse ways which 
liberals find unappealing. It need not, however, suppose that norms 
of justice do not apply to nonliberal peoples or that these norms do 
not set limits on what they may and may not do. As long as the world's 
peoples continue to be relatively independent, the cost of leaving a 
particular people will be much higher than the cost of exiting a pri-
vate association (presuming that it is possible to leave at all and that 
there is somewhere for an emigrant to go). Thus, peoples will notre-
gard unjust arrangements within individual societies with the same 
sort of tolerance with which they might react to, say, a church's unjust 
refusal to accept women as ministers. 
Peoples are not voluntary associations. They exercise a degree of 
power over their members' lives that makes analogies with private asso-
ciations in liberal societies problematic. Liberal societies can tolerate 
such associations precisely because it is characteristically easy for their 
members to exit and because the sanctions they can impose on the re-
calcitrant are usually not (at least in liberal terms) very costly.264 A lib-
eral society must obviously take a different view of nonliberal peoples, 
even decent ones. It must recognize that members of a nonliberal soci-
ety are deprived of what, by its lights, are significant rights, and it has 
good reason, within appropriate limits, to pursue policies designed to 
help them acquire opportunities to exercise these rights. 
If it is easy not only to leave such a people but also to join another 
people with a more congenial political, legal, and social order in which 
one can enjoy a comparable quality of life, a liberal might have more 
reason to be sanguine about decent nonliberal peoples' failures to en-
force (some) human rights norms. But she would not therefore have 
reason to regard the failure of nonliberal peoples to protect human 
rights with equanimity or to abandon efforts to influence such peoples 
to protect the full panoply of liberal rights. Persons whose human 
rights are violated in decent nonliberal societies are not just as well-off 
if they immigrate to liberal societies as they would be if they did not. 
Leaving a people, especially a nonliberal one whose members have a 
rich sense of communal identity, is unlikely to be cost-free: it may in-
264 Such associations can, of course, impose sanctions that are exceptionally costly 
from the standpoints of their members; consider, for example, a religious community that 
claims the right to determine its members' ultimate destinies. Cf BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE 
AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF MULTICULTURALISM (2001). 
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volve-in addition to significant logistical difficulties-the abandon-
ment not only of a valued community but also of valued relationships 
with particular persons. The price of living in a society that respects 
human rights should not be the abandonment of important identity-
conferring communal and interpersonal relationships.265 
Suppose liberals were prepared to regard the costs of emigration 
as acceptable and therefore to view decent nonliberal peoples as com-
parable to illiberal associations within liberal states, at least where those 
persons whose rights are violated by such peoples are concerned. Even 
so, not all persons whose rights are violated by nonliberal peoples will 
be free to emigrate. Many persons with limited resources will not be 
able to relocate even if they wish to do so-even presuming that no 
immigration restrictions prevented them from joining new peoples. For 
them, immigration will not be an option. Thus, the possibility of emi-
gration would not give cosmopolitan deliberators reason to endorse 
rules that authorized liberal peoples to ignore denials of human rights 
even by decent nonliberal peoples. 
Further, while liberal societies rightly tolerate illiberal voluntary 
associations, they need not regard the oppressive policies and prac-
tices of these associations as morally appropriate. Liberals remain free 
to use various sorts of pressures short of legal sanctions to affect the 
behavior of illiberal associations. They would remain free to do the 
same thing in the transnational arena. Even if the costs of exiting de-
cent nonliberal societies were minimal, so that those who wished to 
265 Thanks to Seana Shiffrin for helping me to see the need to stress this point. As 
Rawls himself observes: 
By contrast with associations within society, the power of the government 
cannot be evaded except by leaving the state's territory .... [N]ormally, leav-
ing is a grave step: it involves leaving the society and culture in which we have 
been raised, the society and culture whose language we use in speech and 
thought to express and understand ourselves, our aims, goals, and values; the 
society and culture whose history, customs, and conventions we depend on to 
find our place in our social world .... 
The state's authority cannot, then, be freely accepted in the sense that the 
bonds of society and culture, of history and social place of origin, begin so 
early to shape our life and are normally so strong that the right of emigration 
... does not suffice to make accepting its authority free, politically speaking, 
in the way that liberty of conscience suffices to make accepting ecclesiastical 
authority free, politically speaking. 
RAwLs, REsTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 93-94 (footnotes omitted). "[I]t is," says Rawls, "no 
defense of the principles of political justice to say to those protesting them: You can always 
leave the country. The analogue of this may hold for associations but not for political soci-
ety itself." !d. at 94 n.15; see also RAwLs, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 136 n.4. 
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leave were free to do so, liberals might still, similarly, employ propa-
ganda and other means to persuade such peoples to protect the com-
plete array of liberal human rights. 
b. Tolerance joT Decent Nonliberal Societies Undcr a Cosmopolitan Law of 
Peoples 
If there were a decent nonliberal society, individual deliberators 
would agree that its denial of the freedom and equality associated with 
democratic citizenship to all citizens and its denial of equal status to 
diverse religious or ideological groups would violate the human rights 
of its citizens. Individual deliberators would also agree, however, that 
these violations of human rights need not-and probably should not-
warrant the use of sanctions or armed invasion to force it to alter its 
policies. From the fact that decent hierarchical societies are wrong 
about matters of considerable importance,266 it does not follow that 
they should be banished from the global system or treated as transna-
tional pariahs. 267 There are perfectly good reasons from a cosmopolitan 
perspective for accepting some limits on routine liberal interference 
with such societies. Cosmopolitan liberals might reasonably oppose 
routine interventions for several reasons: (1) military action and sanc-
tions can lead to substantial harms to both persons and property; 
(2) intervention may be counterproductive if it breeds resentment and 
ultimately gives illiberal forces more credibility; and (3) a general pol-
icy supporting routine intervention might encourage governments to 
use military or economic pressure to pursue selfish agendas while pre-
tending to seek global justice. But liberals can decline to intervene on a 
routine basis in the affairs of decent nonliberal societies without pre-
tending that such societies are necessarily on a par morally with liberal 
ones and while reserving the right to encourage them in appropriate 
ways to guarantee their members more freedom and equality. 
266 As, of course, are many would-be liberal societies; consider the widespread use in 
the United States of execution as a tool of public policy. 
267 I'm not sure one could reach the conclusion that decent nonliberal regimes were 
legitimate on the basis of arguments that "take the interests of persons as morally funda-
mental," Pogge, justice, supra note 56, at 248, in a cosmopolitan second original position. 
Cosmopolitan deliberators might well recognize the appropriateness of more communi-
tarian variants of liberalism, but-provided they accepted Rawlsian canons of public rea-
son-it is not obvious that they would have any reason at the global level to avoid protect-
ing the rights of expression, association, assembly, and democratic participation, which 
they would regard as essential components of justice at the domestic level. They might 
well, of course, regard the tolerance of non liberal regimes as appropriate, but that would be 
quite different from affirming the legitimacy of such regimes. 
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Rawls is also right that were the liberal members of a global asso-
ciation of liberal and decent peoples to use, or seek to use, the asso-
ciation's resources to offer economic incentives to decent nonliberal 
societies to become more liberal, conflict within the association might 
well result. 268 Decent nonliberal societies will not want to subsidize 
propaganda efforts on behalf of ideologies they do not share. But a 
cosmopolitan Law of Peoples would allow, and quite possibly encour-
age, propaganda efforts by individual governments designed to affect 
the culture and institutions of decent nonliberal societies. Liberal so-
cieties would obviously be open to peaceful challenges from nonlib-
eral peoples to their dominant views, and individual deliberators 
would regard it as a requirement of fairness that nonliberal societies 
be open to similar challenges. 
c. The Use of Subsidies to Influence Nonliberal Peoples 
Pragmatic and respectful individual deliberators would presuma-
bly rule out the use of military force against decent nonliberal socie-
ties and would presumably agree about the use of sanctions most or 
all of the time. But I think they would disagree with Rawls that it is 
"not reasonable for a liberal people to adopt as part of its own foreign 
policy the granting of subsidies to other peoples as incentives to be-
come more liberal. "269 Rawls offers two reasons for claiming that such 
incentives are inappropriate-neither persuasive.270 
i. Alternate Foreign Aid Priorities 
First, Rawls suggests that the foreign aid programs of liberal peo-
ples should give priority to helping peoples burdened by unfavorable 
conditions to achieve an appropriate level of economic develop-
ment.271 Doubtless this is true, but unless this were the ouly focus of 
268 RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 84-85. I ignore in the text Rawls's treatment of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) or its equivalent in his imagined Society of Peoples. He 
notes that the IMF often does attach conditions to loans that haw the effect of promoting 
liberalism and democracy, but I suspect even the IMF's practice can be made consistent 
with his general point on the thesis that its putative goal is not to promote democracy but 
to foster political conditions that seem to conduce to loan repayment, an economic objec-
tive which any country supporting the Fund would presumably share. Sec id. at 85 n.30. In 
any event, not all countries belong to the IMF and there might be less ideological conflict 
of the sort to which Rawls alludes within a less inclusive organization. 
269 Id. at 85. 
210 Jd. 
271 !d. at 84-85. 
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liberal societies, they could also provide support for liberalization and 
democratization efforts in nonliberal societies, whether or not bur-
dened. Further, social equality and democratic accountability are 
likely to promote the economic growth of burdened societies.272 
ii. Self-Determination 
Rawls also urges that because self-determination is valuable, lib-
eral societies should avoid appearing to coerce nonliberal societies 
(other than outlaw states and-perhaps-benevolent absolutisms). 
But whether attaching legal or political conditions to an aid offer is or 
appears to be coercive will depend on the economic circumstances of 
the prospective recipient people and its relationship with the donor 
people. Since ex hypothesi a decent nonliberal society is not burdened 
by unfavorable conditions, and so enjoys relative economic well-being, 
a donor society will not be taking advantage of great economic vul-
nerability on the part of the recipient people if it conditions aid to a 
decent nonliberal society on some political or legal reform. It would 
be perverse, in any case, to maintain that encouraging a government, 
whether burdened or not, to establish democratic institutions violates 
the right to self-determination of the society for which it was respon-
sible: such institutions are designed to enhance self-determination. 
"Decent [nonliberal] societies," Rawls says in defense of his posi-
tion, "should have the opportunity to decide their future[s] for them-
selves. "273 But what is it for a society to decide its future for itself? De-
cent nonliberal societies are not authoritarian; that is why it is wrong 
to invade them and probably wrong to sanction them. Because they 
do not guarantee political equality, however, their decent consultation 
hierarchies may tend to give disproportionate weight to the interests 
or views of some sectors of society. (Presumably they do. Decent non-
liberal societies would have little reason to object to the establishment 
of institutions marked by democratic equality and accountability if 
these institutions served the same interests as their existing social in-
stitutions.) 
While Rawls envisions a consultation hierarchy as made up of 
groups representing the various estates in a society, a somewhat at-
272 Rawls notes that ensuring "equal justice for women" is among the simplest ways to 
address the problem of population growth. !d. at llO. And he stresses the importance of 
"prevent[ing] violation[s] of [t]he human rights of women." !d. But the kind of consulta-
tion procedure he imagines would not ensure the equality of women. 
273 RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 85. 
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tenuated sense of representativeness seems to be acceptable. While 
acknowledging that nonliberal societies have often failed to protect 
women's human rights, Rawls is clear that a society must respect such 
rights if it is to qualify as decent. It is somewhat disturbing, however, 
to read that "[o]ne step to ensure that their claims are appropriately 
taken into account may be to arrange that a majority of the members 
of the bodies representing the (previously) oppressed be chosen from 
among those whose rights have been violated"274 and that "any group 
representing women's fundamental interests must include a majority 
of women."275 Why only a majority? It does not follow that an entity 
justly representing women's interests in an associationist society would 
not include men. 
Indeed, men might understand women's concerns and defend 
them vociferously. Recognizing the patriarchal character of their soci-
ety, strong and politically adept women might even choose to include 
men committed to justice for women in a body designed to represent 
their interests because these men might be able more effectively to 
defend their interests in dialogue with their society's patriarchallead-
ers.276 However, if the society in question is a patriarchal one in which 
women continue to be subordinated in various ways to men and may 
be inclined to defer to men's opinions, the presence of men in a body 
intended to distill and articulate the concerns of women might tend 
to reduce the likelihood that women's needs and desires will be ade-
quately expressed. These men might-even with the best of inten-
tions-be tempted to speak too quickly for their female colleagues 
when communicating with national leaders. And patriarchal govern-
ment officials might be inclined to listen more readily to male than to 
female members of bodies designed to represent women, even if 
these men failed adequately to understand the positions of their fe-
male colleagues or the needs of their country's women. 
The leaders of decent nonliberal societies must respond to dissent 
without repressing dissenters but apparently need not alter their poli-
cies in light of what dissenters allege;277 leaders' accountability to the 
people, even as organized in the syndicates Rawls imagines, may be 
relatively limited. To be sure, Rawls emphasizes that the government of 
a decent nonliberal society must e~oy moral legitimacy. Nonetheless, 
widespread popular moral endorsement of a country's leaders is com-
274 Id. at 75. 
275 !d. at 110. 
276 Thanks to Seana Shiffrin for challenging my thinking on this point. 
277 RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 72, 78. 
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patible with the disproportionate impotence of a disfavored minority. 
(Again, a Rawlsian Law of Peoples will find it difficult to take the con-
cerns of such a minority into account, since it views each people as a 
unitary entity.) Leaders' lack of accountability and the subordinate po-
litical standing of women and other potentially marginal groups pro-
vide reasons, then, for individual deliberators to doubt that the views 
and interests of all members of decent nonliberal societies are necessar-
ily being taken adequately into account when these societies are said to 
"decide their future[s] for themselves."278 Individual deliberators would 
not regard Rawlsian consultation hierarchies as adequate substitutes for 
democratically accountable institutions. 
Promoting respect for those human rights that safeguard the lib-
erty and equality of the individual members of a nonliberal society 
may not be defensible as a means of directly enhancing societal self-
determination. But individual deliberators would not regard the soci-
ety's right to self-determination as authorizing it to deny equality to its 
individual members or to restrict their expressive and associational 
freedoms unduly. The importance of self-determination wouldn't jus-
tifY ignoring illiberal intolerance or regarding it as acceptable. 
2. Active Responses to Human Rights Violations by Nonliberal 
Societies 
Individual deliberators might endorse principles permitting more 
aggressive responses to human rights violations by illiberal societies in 
some cases. Decent nonliberal societies that observed only the rights 
Rawls has delineated and ones similar to them might obviously violate 
other rights (and not merely the political ones) which individual delib-
erators would endorse. What if an otherwise decent nonliberal society 
criminalized the sexual conduct of lesbians, gays, and bisexuals? What if 
it excluded them from public employment or the armed forces? 279 In-
dividual deliberators would regard the rights in question as significant 
enough to justifY using positive economic incentives to promote arne-
278 ld. at 85. 
279 According to Rawls, "a religion cannot claim as a justification for its subjection of 
women that it is necessary for its survival. Basic human rights are involved, and these be-
long to the common institutions and practices of all liberal and decent societies." !d. at 111 
(footnote omitted). It may well be that the same is true of an ideologically motivated mar-
ginalization of those involved or disposed to be involved in same-sex romantic or romantic-
and-sexual relationships. I have no doubt that Rawls's inclination would be to say that it is, 
but he provides no reason in the text for assuming that the human rights protected by his 
Law of Peoples include the rights of sexual minorities. 
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lioration. But if they were violated on a regular basis, individual delib-
erators might perhaps regard at least some sanctions, though probably 
not military action, as appropriate. 
In a well-ordered, decent nonliberal society, internally motivated 
political and social change is-by definition-possible. In a society in 
which large numbers of people have genuine, even if imperfect, oppor-
tunities to participate in shaping public institutions and policies, 
changes brought about as a result of internal pressures will often be 
more deeply-rooted and stable than ones fostered by external pressure. 
There will thus be good pragmatic reasons for avoiding overt military 
or economic pressures in preference to ongoing dialogue and 
intercultural exchange as means of fostering the democratization and 
liberalization of decent nonliberal societies. A cosmopolitan Law of 
Peoples will thus likely preclude military interventions into illiberal so-
cieties, whether decent or not, except in extreme cases. It will also raise 
serious questions about the use of economic pressure as a spur to 
change such societies, especially if they qualify as decent. But demo-
cratic freedom and equality would be absent in decent nonliberal socie-
ties to such an extent that individual deliberators would regard not only 
the enthusiastic advocacy of liberal values but also the employment of 
economic "carrots" to foster democratization and liberalization as ap-
propriate (just as decent nonliberal societies might presumably offer 
incentives to liberal societies to adopt their ways oflife).280 
Liberals should respect decent nonliberal societies and acknowl-
edge that example and dialogical persuasion will often be the most 
effective means of fostering liberalization and democratization. They 
have every reason to be concerned about what is pragmatically possi-
ble. And on moral as well as pragmatic grounds, they have good rea-
son to avoid ham-fisted incursions into the affairs of nonliberal socie-
ties. But they ought not to confuse what is pragmatically efficacious 
for them to do with what is just for those who govern nonliberal socie-
ties to do. Liberals will not regard tolerance for societal differences as 
a sufficient reason to disregard the rights of people in both decent 
280 Cf. Mortimer Sellers, The Law of Peoples, 6 Irn'L LEGAL THEORY 44, 48-49 
(2000) ("There may well be nonliberal states that deserve the protection of Rawls' eight prin-
ciples of international law, but their governments should be tolerated (in the ordinary sense 
of the word), not praised. Contrary to what Rawls' [sic] believes, states that disenfranchise 
their peoples should be stigmatized as wrong, even when they must be tolerated, for pruden-
tial reasons .... Rawls' conception of toleration betrays the oppressed by denying the reality 
of their oppression. It encourages liberal peoples to collude with foreign injustice."). 
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and burdened nonliberal societies who may be unfairly affected by 
the public policies of these societies.2s1 
The focus on decent nonliberal societies might obscure the fact 
that there are no such societies in our world. Most societies in our 
world that are not in some broad sense liberal are authoritarian re-
gimes with some of the features of benevolent absolutisms, some of the 
features of liberal societies, and some of the features of outlaw states. 
(Many are, of course, burdened in one or more ways as well, and some 
may share characteristics with decent nonliberal societies.) Even if, for 
pragmatic and moral reasons, liberals thought it appropriate to avoid 
pressuring decent nonliberal societies to liberalize, they would have far 
less reason to refrain from encouraging the actual nonliberal societies 
in the real world to do so. And liberals can and should rightly regard 
nonliberal societies as in some measure unjust-indeed, illegitimate-
even as they make careful choices about the kinds of pressures they can 
appropriately employ to foster the empowerment of those to whom 
nonliberal societies-decent and otherwise-deny proper autonomy 
and opportunities for self-government. 
III. THE DuTY OF AssiSTANCE AND THE JusT WAR 
Rawls argues for a "duty of assistance" to what he calls "burdened 
societies" on the part of well-ordered societies. And he details a set of 
just war principles that societies or sub-societal groups contravene the 
Law of Peoples by engaging in aggressive violence. The principles he 
identifies are, in general, relatively appealing. But because (among 
other things) he treats the interests of peoples rather than individual 
persons as primary, the norms he argues should govern international 
aid and warfare are inadequate. In Part III, I explain and criticize 
these principles. 
A. The Duty of Assistance 
Burdened societies are peoples that "lack the political and cultural 
traditions, the human capital and know-how, and, often, the material 
and technological resources needed to be well-ordered. "282 That they 
do is obviously among the most pressing moral and political concerns 
281 For an extended critique of Rawls's notion of toleration, see id. at 48-51. 
282 RAWLS, LAW, supra note 1, at 106. I will assume in the text that a burdened society is 
also economically deprived. 
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facing the global community.283 A natural Rawlsian response to the 
difficulties faced by such societies would be the redistribution of global 
resources to benefit them. Cosmopolitan deliberators would favor such 
redistribution. 
Presuming Rawls is right that individual deliberators at the level of 
a particular society would agree that the difference principle should 
govern the allocation of wealth in their society,284 individual delibera-
tors on a global scale would likely reach a similar conclusion. Rawls as-
sumes that they would. As he maintains forthrightly, "[t]he cosmopoli-
tan view ... is concerned with the well-being of individuals, and hence 
with whether the well-being of the globally worst-off person can be im-
proved. "285 In light of their concern for individual well-being, cosmo-
politan deliberators would opt for significant global wealth transfers 
designed to benefit the societies Rawls describes as "burdened," as well 
as marginalized persons in other societies. 
A global norm of redistribution in accordance with the difference 
principle could guide a system of transnational institutions, whether or 
not a world government existed. It could not, presumably, provide di-
rect guidance for the behavior of an individual liberal state in the ab-
sence of institutions that ensured the cooperative participation of other 
societies. Rawlsian justice would not make an individual people unilat-
erally responsible for rectifying the imbalance in global wealth distribu-
tion, or, in other words, for providing burdened societies with all of the 
resources to which they would be entitled if all peoples were to con-
tribute the funds needed to implement the difference principle on a 
global basis. In the absence of a functioning Society of Peoples, a cos-
mopolitan Law of Peoples would, however, dictate that each well-
ordered people use a significant portion of its wealth to aid burdened 
societies. No single arrangement might be required, but each people 
283 See, e.g., HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTs: SuBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND US FoREIGN 
PoucY (2d ed. 1996); STANLEY HoFFMAN, DuTIEs BEYOND BoRDERs: ON THE LIMITS AND 
PosSIBILITIES OF ETHICAL INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1981);.JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE LIMITS 
OF OBLIGATION (1982); Thomas Nagel, Poverty and Food: Why Chmity is Not Enough, in Foon 
POLICY: THE REsPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE LIH AND DEATH CHOICES 
(Peter Brown & Henry Shue eds., 1977); ONORA O'NEILL, FAcEs OF HuNGER: AN EssAY ON 
POVERTY, .JUSTICE, AND DEVELOPMENT (1986); THE ETHICS OF AssiSTANCE: MORALITY AND 
THE DISTANT NEEDY (Deen K. Chatterjee ed., 2003); cf Lea Brilmayer, International justice 
and lntemational Law, 98 W.VA. L. REv. 611 (1996) (discussing a range of possible interna-
tional justice claims and arguing, in particular, for international corrective justice). 
284 This presumption has been questioned by, e.g., .JAMES FISHKIN, TYRANNY AND LE-
GITIMACY: A CRITIQUE OF PoLITICAL THEORIES 105-20 (1979). 
285 RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 120. 
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would be responsible for making wise choices appropriately responsive 
to the needs of others with limited resources. 
Rawls's response to the problem of global poverty is not, however, 
rooted in a global application of the difference principle. Rather, he 
maintains that well-ordered peoples have a limited duty of assistance to 
such societies that requires wealth transfers more limited than those 
that would be entailed by a globalization of justice as fairness. 286 Well-
ordered societies, he says, have only a responsibility to bring burdened 
societies (as well as outlaw states, with which they may sometimes be 
forced to engage in military conflict) into full membership in the Soci-
ety of Peoples and to help them become well-ordered. The non-
cosmopolitan starting point for his reflections on global justice helps to 
explain his stance; to accept a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples would pre-
sumably be to accept a global application of justice as fairness. But it 
seems clear that even Rawlsian deliberators would be more inclined 
than he supposes to opt for significant global wealth transfers. I explain 
below what Rawls believes the purpose of duty of assistance to be and 
how recognition of this purpose imposes an upper limit on the aid well-
ordered societies must provide. I indicate what seem to me to be some 
key problems with the assumptions Rawls makes about the wealth and 
poverty of nations. Then, I argue that Rawlsian deliberators would 
reach conclusions closer to those at which individual deliberators would 
arrive than Rawls evidently supposes. 
1. The Limits of a Rawlsian Duty to Assist 
Rawls is anxious to avoid the conclusion that fulfilling the duty to 
assist means adhering to an egalitarian standard of global distributive 
justice.287 Such a standard may well lack "a defined goal, aim, or cut-off 
286 See id. at 106. 
287 Scholars in general sympathy with Rawls have argued for norms of international 
justice more like those Rawls suggests should obtain domestically than those he defends in 
The Law of Peoples. Cf BRIAN BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE: A CRITICAL EXAMI-
NATION OF THE CENTRAL DOCTRINES IN A THEORY OF jUSTICE BY jOHN RAWLS (1973); 
CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 127-43 (1979) 
(hereinafter BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY]; THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (1995); PoGGE, REALIZING, supra note 14, at 240-80; Brian Barry, Statism and National-
ism: A Cosmopolitan Critique, 41 NoMos 12, 35-36 (1999); Ethan B. Kapstein, Distrilrntive 
Justice and Intemational Tmde, 13 ETHICS & INT'L An. 175 ( 1999); David AJ. Richards, In-
ternational Distributive justice, 24 NoMos 275, 292 (1982). As Frank Garcia states bluntly: 
"the failure lies not with Rawls's basic enterprise, but his failure to follow it through as 
rigorously with respect to international justice as he does for domestic justice." Garcia, 
Peoples, supra note 209, at 660. 
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point, beyond which aid may cease"288 and might thus, presumably, be 
both oppressively demanding and difficult to implement. By contrast, 
Rawls says, the duty of assistance that forms part of the Law of Peoples 
has a goal: it is designed to foster the self-sufficiency of the recipients 
and guarantee their capacity to participate fully in the Society of Peo-
ples. In turn, because it ceases when this goal is reached, it has a tar-
get.289 A Rawlsian Law of Peoples entails neither the equalization of the 
conditions of those who belong to different peoples nor the globaliza-
tion of Rawls's difference principle, according to which inequalities are 
permissible only to the extent that they benefit the worst-off.290 Instead, 
Rawls proposes that the goal of the aid rendered in fulfillment of the 
duty of assistance should be "to realize and preserve just (or decent) 
institutions."291 Such institutions will enable burdened societies to over-
come economic hardship and become self-sufficient members of the 
Society of Peoples. Once a previously burdened society becomes a well-
ordered society and can "manage [its] own affairs reasonably and ra-
tionally[,] .... further assistance is not required, even though the now 
well-ordered society may still be relatively poor. "292 
Rawls justifies this cut-off point by arguing that well-ordered so-
cieties should "not act paternalistically"293-the implication appar-
ently being that they should not inadvertently induce dependence by 
giving aid-and that sufficiency rather than unlimited growth and 
accumulation is all that is required for satisfactory life in commu-
nity.294 He also defends his position by maintaining 
that the causes of the wealth of a people and the forms it 
takes lie in their political culture and in the religious, philo-
sophical, and moral traditions that support the basic struc-
ture of their political and social institutions, as well as in the 
288 Garcia, Peoples, supra note 209, at 660. RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 106. 
289 See RAwLs, LAW, supm note 1, at 119. Rawls suggests that there may be little differ-
ence between Thomas W. Pogge's global egalitarian principle and his own conception of a 
duty of assistance. See id. at 118 n.53 (citing Thomas W. Pogge, Human Flourishing and Uni-
versal justice, 16 Soc. PHIL. 333 (1999)). Earlier, Rawls says he doesn't endorse a version of 
the egalitarian principle offered by Pogge as an attempted internationalization of the ac-
count of distributive justice offered in A Theory of Justice. See id. at 116. 
290 ld. at 113-20. 
291 Id. at 107. 
292 Id. at 111. It is perhaps not surprising that one commentator implies that for 
Rawls's position, "the existence of injustice between individuals in different states" may 
seem to be a consequence of "a deep theoretical stance on the nature of justice." Thomas 
Christiano, Secession, Democracy and Distributive justice, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 65,68 (1995). 
293 RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 111. 
294 Id. at 107, 107-08 n.33. 
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industriousness and cooperative talents of its members, all 
supported by their political virtues.295 
He highlights population pressures,296 and thus gender justice,297 as 
well as human rights more generally,298 as particularly significant fac-
tors. 
There are three basic reasons for reducing domestic inequalities, 
Rawls maintains. Each applies transnationally by analogy, and each 
suggests the appropriateness of the upper limit on necessary aid he 
has proposed. Domestic inequalities must not prevent people from 
making "intelligent and effective use of their freedoms and ... 
lead [in g) reasonable and worthwhile lives. "299 Similarly, transnational 
inequalities must not prevent any people from becoming a well-
ordered society.300 Inequalities within a society may lead to shame for 
individual poor persons and discrimination against them; the same 
may be true for poor peoples.30I Discrimination and feelings of infe-
riority thus warrant measures designed to reduce poverty within both 
particular societies and the global community.302 Domestic inequali-
ties may preclude equal participation in public life by all citizens, and 
transnational inequalities might hamper full participation by some 
societies as equal members of the Society of Peoples. Thus, interna-
tional aid must be sufficient to ensure the independence and equality 
of peoples.303 
Provided that a people has become a well-ordered society (which 
means, among other things, that it need not feel ashamed or inferior 
in relation to other peoples) and that the Law of Peoples ensures the 
equality of all members of the Society of Peoples, the global objectives 
analogous to the goals of domestic anti-poverty programs will have 
been met and further redistributive aid will be unnecessary. 304 Once a 
society is well-ordered, feelings of inferiority in relation to other peo-
ples "are unjustified. For then each people adjusts the significance 
and importance of the wealth of its own society for itself. If it is not 
295 Jd. at 108, 117 (citing DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS: 
WHY SoME ARE So Rrcn AND SoME So PooR ( 1998)). 
296 !d. at 108. 
297 !d. at 109-10. 
298 RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 109. 
299 !d. at 114. 
300 !d. 
301 See id. 
302 See id. 
303 See RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 114-15. 
304 See id. at 113-15. 
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satisfied, it can continue to increase savings, or, if that is not feasible, 
borrow from other members of the Society of Peoples. "305 
Rawls recognizes that objections to his proposed duty of assistance 
are conceivable and he attempts to meet them directly. He begins by 
examining a scenario in which every society depends "entirely on its 
own labor and resources without trade of any kind."306 A people's natu-
ral resources would thus arguably be responsible for its wealth or pov-
erty. Its possession of these resources in virtue of its territorial location 
would be arbitrary, not linked in any obvious way with merit. Why 
should the wealth derived from these resources not, therefore, be 
treated as common stock, to be allocated in accordance with some 
principle of global justice to ensure that each society can protect 1m-
man rights and establish just institutions?3°7 Rawls argues against the 
principle of global distributive justice suggested by considerations like 
these by maintaining that natural resources are not primarily responsi-
ble for wealth or poverty. Resource-poor societies (he cites Japan as an 
example) may be wealthy and resource-rich societies (he instances Ar-
gentina) may be poor.308 Because "the crucial element in how a country 
fares is its political culture-its members' political and civic virtues-
and not the level of its resources, the arbitrariness of the distribution of 
natural resources causes no difficulty."309 Alternate approaches to sav-
ing and investing (resulting, presumably, from differences in political 
culture) are especially important. 310 
Substantial redistribution of global wealth makes sense, Rawls ac-
knowledges, given the contemporary world's "extreme injustices, crip-
pling poverty, and inequalities."3ll But applying such a principle once 
"the duty of assistance is fully satisfied" is unnecessary, he believes.312 To 
provide intuitive support for this contention, he offers two examples of 
varying rates of societal development: in each case, one country makes 
choices that improve its economic position when compared with that of 
another less-well-off society that is not impoverished.313 If one society in 
305 /d. at 114. 
306 /d. at 116 (summarizing a state of affairs that provides the basis for an argument in 
BEITZ, PoLITICAL THEORY, supra note 287, at 137-42). 
307 /d. I have attempted to spell out the premises of an argument Rawls presents in el-
liptical form. 
308 RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 108. 
309 /d. at 117. 
310 See id. 
Sll /d. 
312 /d. 
313 RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 117-18. 
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each example chooses freely to grow economically while the other re-
gards economic growth as less preferable than other values, why should 
global wealth transfers be required to make up for the effects of the 
second society's reasonable and uncoerced choice, given that this 
choice leaves it in satisfactory economic condition?314 
2. Problems with Rawls's Account of the Duty of Assistance 
There are a number of reasons to be doubtful about Rawls's ar-
guments for the view that it is not resources, but culture and institu-
tions, that determine whether a society is well-ordered. Appearing 
relatively inattentive to empirical evidence that the transnational sys-
tem is a significant contributor to domestic poverty,3l5 Rawls seems to 
underestimate the significance of the global political, legal, and eco-
nomic environment. He evidently assumes that the culture and insti-
tutions of burdened societies can be changed more readily by delib-
erate public action than I suspect they can. Rawls seems willing to 
treat individuals and groups within burdened societies as responsible 
for the economic conditions of their societies even when they lack a 
significant ability to shape those conditions. And he gives insufficient 
attention to the lack of control a burdened society may have over the 
presence of individual skills and talents within its population. 
a. The Significance of the Global Envimnment 
Factors outside the control of particular societies may have more 
to do with their wealth or poverty than Rawls is prepared to admit. 316 
The design of global financial institutions and trade rules and the ma-
nipulation of some societies' political systems by others may continue to 
limit the economic well-being of poorer peoples in a variety of ways.317 
Of course, equality-inhibiting institutions and manipulative interven-
tions are inconsistent with tl1e Law of Peoples and would not exist were 
the Society of Peoples in place. But to the extent that the Law of Peo-
314 The limit Rawls proposes here is, it is fair to note, arguably consistent with some of 
our moral intuitions. Cf Michael]. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, 
Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26 BROOK.j. INT'L L. 1357, 1399 (2001) (not-
ing, after a reference to Rawls, that "accepting that the international obligations required 
by justice, or by simple humanity, are less than those domestically does not render them 
nonexistent"). 
315 See Thomas W. Pogge, "Assisting" the Global Poor, in THE ETHICS OF AssiSTANCE: Mo-
RALITY AND THE DISTANT NnuY (Deen K. Chatterjee ed., 2003). 
316 Cf Pogge,]ustice, supra note 56, at 251-53. 
317 See Beitz, supra note 2, at 690; Buchanan, supra note 17, at 705-09. 
2004] Revising Rawls on Global Justice 83 
pies is meant to guide the foreign policies of well-ordered societies un-
der nonideal conditions, features of the transnational scene that per-
petuate poverty or compromise autonomy318 deserve to be taken into 
account by such societies in formulating their aid policies; the notion 
that a society's level of well-being is largely its own responsibility has 
especially limited application under present nonideal conditions. 
Rawls's hypothetical cases of two countries derive much of their 
plausibility from the assumption that the two countries under consid-
eration in each case begin at the same level of prosperity.319 The fact 
that one outstrips the other economically seems therefore to be 
purely a function of the choices of each. But even in a world in which 
all societies endorsed the Law of Peoples, countries would not be this 
exclusively responsible for their own fates. Some societies will have 
much more wealth than others will. Achieving parity with these socie-
ties will demand a disproportionate amount of effort on the part of 
other societies, whatever the sources of the wealth gap. And the prior 
wealth of the better-off societies may have been gained in part 
through past exploitation, including exploitation of those societies 
now struggling to prosper. Whatever the responsibility of societies for 
the value they add to their economies once the Law of Peoples is in 
place, the distribution of wealth in today's world is to some degree a 
product of imperialism and neo-colonialism. 
b. The Relative Immobility of Political Culture 
Further, even if cultural factors were primarily responsible for a 
society's level of well-being, it would be excessively voluntarist to as-
sume that the members of a society could alter their society's political 
culture at will and that they were therefore responsible in any straight-
forward sense for the economic circumstances shaped by that culture. 
While people are not the puppets of the cultures into which they are 
born, dominant social institutions and cultural patterns do determine 
in large measure what will count as genuinely live social, economic, 
and political options. Citizens may be unable to envision, much less 
realize, some alternatives to current arrangements; but they may 
nonetheless be adversely affected by the economic consequences of 
their political culture. It is not clear why, in fairness, they should be 
required to bear the cost of these consequences, for which they are 
not responsible. This problem will be most evident in the case of bur-
318 See Beitz, supra note 2, at 691. 
319 RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 117. 
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dened societies, but it will also affect some well-ordered soctetles. 
Even, then, if Rawls is right that political culture is a prime determi-
nant of economic well-being, it does not follow that the economically 
deprived are responsible for their own deprivation. 
c. The Non-Responsibility of Marginal Individuals and Groups Within 
Burdened Societies 
In addition, Rawls's model sometimes seems unrealistically to 
treat a people as a unitary entity marked by commonality of purpose 
when in fact there will almost certainly be serious disagreement 
among the members of a given people regarding appropriate eco-
nomic and political policies. Even in democratic societies, individuals 
may not in any meaningful sense be responsible for the choices made 
by their governments. Individuals who actively protest proposed poli-
cies may be unable to keep these policies from being enacted and may 
suffer because these policies have been adopted. Their suffering, at 
any rate, seems hard to justify on the basis that peoples must be free 
to pursue alternate savings and investment strategies.320 
Related to this point is the observation that the consequences of 
(what may turn out to have been) poor policy choices may well be 
evident only a generation or more after they are made. It looks, then, 
as if Rawls needs to treat the members of a given people as constitu-
ents of a unitary subject not only across space but across time. Other-
wise, it will make no sense to say that those alive at a given time are 
somehow responsible for choices made by their predecessors which 
have resulted in their present impoverishment.321 
d. The Role of Individual Talent 
Similarly, the level of individual talent on which a society can 
draw may not be exclusively within its control, either. Assume that no 
nutritional or other biological factors resulting from the actions of 
other peoples inhibit the development of the society's citizens and 
that there is no significant genetic influence on the abilities relevant 
to economic productivity. (If this assumption is false, of course, my 
argument will be stronger.) It must then be the case that a range of 
political and cultural factors must be significantly responsible for the 
320 But see id. 
321 See id. at 692 (noting that successive generations always bear the costs and reap the 
benefits of the choices of their predecessors, but they are not always treated as responsible 
for those choices). 
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development of children and determine what options they have for 
contributing to their society's well-being. But as I have already sug-
gested, these factors are not wholly within a society's deliberate con-
trol. So, presuming that the level of talent in a society influences its 
prosperity significantly, there is further reason to doubt that any soci-
ety is exclusively responsible for its own level of well-being. 
3. A Rawlsian Law of Peoples Would Contain a Non-Rawlsian Duty of 
Assistance? 
Considerations like these would likely influence Rawlsian as well 
as individual deliberators. I do not think, therefore, that Rawls's ac-
count of the duty of assistance would be endorsed in toto even by 
Rawlsian deliberators.322 Presuming they acknowledged the arbitrari-
ness of the factors that conduce to resource accumulation, they might 
be suspicious of the view that free choices alone accounted for socie-
ties' relative levels of economic growth. They might acknowledge that 
factors outside their exclusive or primary control might inhibit the 
growth of even well-ordered societies. They might also recognize that 
the duty of aid proposed by Rawls ends when a society becomes well-
ordered, when its institutions achieve a certain shape. This may occur 
at a point at which, as Rawls notes, a society is still relatively poor. 
Thus, some peoples will be expected to exert much more effort than 
others to reach the same economic level. 
Recognizing the link between present wealth and past exploita-
tion, as well as the problem of differential effort and the influence of 
arbitrary factors on wealth, Rawlsian deliberators might well opt for a 
more egalitarian duty of aid than the one Rawls proposes.323 It is rea-
sonable to suppose they might choose some version of Rawls's own 
322 See Pogge, Law, supra note 14. I believe Todd Adams is still ultimately correct that 
"[g]rounding the law of peoples on a social contract between peoples and not individuals 
raises the danger of a just society making foreign policy without regard to how it affects the 
least favored members of the societies involved." Adams, supra note 57, at 368. The point is 
even clearer, as I have tried to suggest, in connection with international violence. 
323 They might also, of course, opt for a variety of related or similar but nonetheless 
distinct principles more demanding than the one Rawls endorses; Buchanan suggests that 
Rawlsian deliberators would opt for "at least three types of principles of global distributive 
justice that go far beyond the duty to aid burdened societies: a principal of global equality 
of opportunity, a principle of democratic participation in global gm·ernance institutions, 
and a principle designed to limit inequalities of wealth among societies." Buchanan, supra 
note 17, at 711. 
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difference principle.324 Unsure of their own economic fates, they 
might be inclined to endorse a distributive norm that minimized the 
risks associated with global economic inequalities and required that 
such inequalities be permitted only to the extent that they benefited 
the least well-off peoples. If examples like Rawls's hypothetical cases 
swayed Rawlsian deliberators, they might prefer rules that set a ceiling 
on required redistributive aid. But they would, I suggest, set the ceil-
ing higher than Rawls does. They would be more inclined than he, I 
324 Foley argues that they would do no such thing. Foley, supra note 111, at 264-65. He 
suggests that, having opted for independent states (even if continent-wide ones), they 
would opt against substantial global redistributive measures (aside from a resource extrac-
tion tax). See id. at 258-60. 
[T] he parties in the original position would recognize that the responsibility 
for distributive justice must lie with the separate, sovereign nation-states and 
not with any unified global regime. Each nation-state must be free to deter-
mine its own population growth and education policies, as well as other poli-
cies concerning savings rates and capital investments, and thus each must be 
free to establish its own separate income-sharing programs. 
!d. at 264 (footnote omitted). 
Foley's argument appears to be that if the members of one group are responsible for 
providing financially for the well-being of the members of another, they will understanda-
bly demand the right to ensure that the members of the group they are supporting are 
prevented from making choices that will worsen their circumstances and require more 
support than would otherwise be necessary. Because no group could exercise this right 
without possessing dictatorial or near-dictatorial power, and because actors in the original 
position would not wish to invest anyone with such powers, they would opt against an ex-
tensive aid requirement because it would require giving some global actors excessive au-
thority (and perhaps the creation of a global state that could use taxation to effect global 
wealth redistribution). ld. at 254-56. Focusing on two imagined nations, Barbaria and 
Acadia, Foley says: "The implication of this conclusion is that the Acadian children may be 
left in misery, but this misery is the price of the freedom that Acadia must have to choose 
its own destiny, without the imposition of Barbarian colonialism." ld. at 255. The knowl-
edge that their misery is the price of national independence may not provide much com-
fort to the children of Acadia. Nor should it. This is not the place to provide a detailed 
response to Foley. But it seems to me that individual deliberators might prove less troubled 
by the prospect of global governance than he believes they would be. See infra Part I.D.3.a 
("The Rejection of a World Government"). In any case, individual deliberators would pre-
sumably preclude unjust impositions on those receiving public assistance when framing 
the rules governing institutions in particular nation-states; they would presumably do the 
same when designing an international legal and political order. 
Even absent a global government, significant wealth redistribution would obviously, in 
any case, be possible. If Foley's proposed resource tax is viable, a variety of other redis-
tributive measures would be as well, cf Pogge, Law, supra note 14, including trade regula-
tions designed to change the global allocation ofwealth. See Frank]. Garcia, Buildinga]ust 
Trade Orderjor a New Millennium, 33 GEo. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1015 (2001). Garcia elabo-
rates an account of the version of Rawls's difference principle he believes would be chosen 
by global individual deliberators in Tmde and Inequality: Economic justice and the Developing 
~orld, 21 :rvhcH.J. INT'L L. 975, 1015-18 (2000). 
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think, to require the alleviation of even relative poverty and not 
merely the establishment of just institutions.325 
Rawlsian deliberators would not, I suspect, choose absolute eco-
nomic equality, which is probably not required among or within socie-
ties. But they would not regard the acquisition of the resources neces-
sary to become well-ordered as sufficient either. If the disparities in 
wealth among societies are too great, it will be difficult for those with 
limited resources truly to participate as full members of the Society of 
Peoples. The Law of Peoples may guarantee that they will not be po-
litically disfranchised (though even a system of just institutions like 
those Rawls proposes may not be able to prevent wealthier societies 
from exerting a disproportionate degree of influence). But even if 
societies with limited resources are relatively equal politically, they 
may find it hard to join in the cultural and economic life of the Soci-
ety of Peoples or to feel as if they truly belong.326 These considera-
tions are not decisive. They might nonetheless add to the discomfort 
of Rawlsian deliberators with any proposed norm for global justice 
that seems relatively tolerant of significant wealth disparities. 
Given the vast disparities in wealth among peoples in the con-
temporary world, the acknowledgement of any duty of aid is salutary. 
A commitment on the part of well-ordered societies to fulfill the duty 
Rawls has proposed would itself make a dramatic and positive differ-
ence in the world. But Rawls's proposed duty of international eco-
nomic aid is inadequate. It is inconsistent with the demands of a cos-
mopolitan Law of Peoples; but it is also likely inconsistent with the 
demands of a Rawlsian Law of Peoples. A global difference principle, 
or a similar standard, seems required by either. 
Though Rawls suggests it would not, a global version of the dif-
ference principle would, of course, feature a cut-off of the kind he 
believes necessary. Just as wealth redistribution in accordance with the 
difference principle would cease at the domestic level when it ceased 
to benefit the least well-off, it would also do so at the global level. This 
may not be the sort of cut-off Rawls has in mind, but it is still a cut-off. 
Similarly, it would feature a target: the maximum empowerment and 
solidarity of the members of the global community. No more specific 
target is required at the domestic level, and it is unclear why one 
should be necessary globally. 
325 They might well also impose requirements on aid recipients to ensure that they 
acted responsibly to do their part in reducing their own and others' economic deprivation. 
326 Rawls might say that the feeling of not belonging would be illusory in such a case. 
See RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 114. 
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B. The Just War 
A cosmopolitan Law of Peoples would impose stringent limita-
tions on the conduct of war. A Rawlsian Law of Peoples would contain 
such limits as well. But it would also allow a "supreme emergency" ex-
ception to just war norms permitting the targeting of noncombatants 
and the potential use of nuclear weapons against outlaw states.327 Both 
would be ruled out by a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples. 
1. Cosmopolitan Just War Norms 
A cosmopolitan Law of Peoples, framed by individual deliberators, 
would be fair to individual persons. It would thus likely provide them 
with the full range of protections traditionally afforded by so-called 
'1ust war" norms. In particular, it would preclude direct attacks on non-
combatants and require minimizing damage caused by direct attacks 
on combatants, as well as foreseen but unintended harms to noncom-
batants. Individual deliberators would not wish, if they were noncom-
batants, to be targeted as sacrifices for the greater good of "civilized 
life" and "constitutional democracy."328 They would presumably, there-
fore, refuse to accede to a rule permitting direct attacks on noncom-
batant individuals. On the assumption that the Law of Peoples should 
contain such a rule, adhering to it would be a matter of justice, and so, 
in turn, of maintaining a society's political-moral integrity,329 as also the 
integrity of individual actors within the society. 330 
A cosmopolitan Law of Peoples would thus impose severe limits 
on, among other things, the use of nuclear weapons against outlaw or 
other states. As devices of terror, strategic nuclear weapons are charac-
327 Rawls speaks explicitly only of the retention, not of the use, of nuclear weapons. I as-
sume throughout, however, that he regards the use of such weapons against outlaw states 
as at least potentially appropriate. Nuclear weapons will not restrain outlaw states, as Rawls 
says they will, see RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 9, if they are retained as museum pieces. 
And if their use were prohibited without exception by a Rawlsian Law of Peoples, outlaw 
states aware of this fact and inclined to assume that well-ordered societies would adhere 
consistently to their own norms of international justice would not be restrained by their 
mere possession. Rawls's position does not make sense, therefore, unless it implies that, in a 
limited number of circumstances, nuclear weapons might licitly be used against outlaw 
states. 
328 /d. at 99. 
329 Darrell Cole, 09.11.01: Death Before Dishonor or Dishonor Before Death: Ch1istian Just 
War, Terrorism, and Supreme Emergency, 16 NoTRE DAMEj.L. ETHICS & PuB. PoL'Y 81,93-98 
(2002) (arguing provocatively that a putative democracy's disregard for the demands of 
justice when faced with a "supreme emergency" renders its morals almost indistinguishable 
from those of many modern terrorist movements). 
33° Cf RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 1, at 333. 
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teristically designed for attacks on civilian population centers, which 
would clearly be precluded by the principle of noncombatant immu-
nity. Because of the indiscriminate character of such weapons, they 
would almost certainly cause excessive and unjustifiable harm to non-
combatants even if used against military targets. While the principle 
of noncombatant immunity does not preclude foreseen but unin-
tended harm to noncombatants, it would surely rule out the use of 
high-yield weapons against military targets, which are characteristi-
cally limited in size, given that weapons posing little or no threat to 
surrounding civilian populations could deliver all the firepower nec-
essary to disable any ordinary military target. A cosmopolitan Law of 
Peoples would likely rule out the ordinary use of tactical nuclear 
weapons as well, even against military targets, because of, among 
other things, the effects of fallout on noncombatants in the vicinity of 
military targets and a variety oflong-term environmental effects.331 
2. Rawlsian Just War Norms 
Rawls's own version of the Law of Peoples embodies much of tra-
ditional just war doctrine.332 It precludes wars of aggression and re-
quires that a just peace be acknowledged as a central goal of any war 
and that well-ordered societies wage war where possible in ways that 
"foreshadow ... the kind of peace they aim for and the kind of rela-
tions they seek. "333 Those who plan aggressive wars are criminals, but 
civilians and low-ranking soldiers are not and should not be treated as 
responsible for their leaders' decisions. The human rights of oppo-
nents should be respected, and efficiency considerations may ordinar-
ily be used to justify military action only if all of the other norms for 
warfare have been observed.334 Thus, Rawls's Law of Peoples would 
condemn the use of nuclear weapons against Japan as well as the 
firebombing of Tokyo during World War 11.335 Similarly, the Allied 
331 Even if tactical nuclear weapons proved easier to deliver or less costly than com·en-
tional weapons, it seems clear that individual deliberators would not regard these considera-
tions as justifYing their use, given the risk employing them would pose to noncombatants. 
332 Rawls's account of just war doctrine depends on MICHAEL \VALZER, JusT AND UN-
JUST WARS (1977). Rawls says of this book: "This is an impressive work, and what I say does 
not, I think, depart from it in any significant respect." RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 95 n.S. 
For an earlier version of Rawls's understanding of just war norms, minus the "supreme 
emergency" exception to which I object in the text, see RAwLs, THEORY, supra note 1, at 
332-35. 
333 RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 96. 
334 Id. at 95-97. 
335 Jd. at 95. 
90 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 27:1 
bombing of Dresden resulted from a "failure of judgment" caused by 
"the passion and intensity of the conflict."336 However, a Rawlsian Law 
of Peoples would contain a "supreme emergency"337 exception that 
permits direct attacks on noncombatants under limited circum-
stances.338 And Rawls would allow the use of nuclear weapons "to keep 
... [outlaw] states at bay. "339 A cosmopolitan Law of Peoples, as I have 
already implied, would not include this exception, which reflects an 
inappropriate priority of peoples over people. And it would not allow 
the use of nuclear weapons against outlaw states. 
a. The "Supreme Emergency" Exception 
In broad terms, Rawls's "supreme emergency" exception to tradi-
tional just war norms "gives any nation a right to use any means what-
soever to save itself. "340 Rawls does not spell out in detail when a su-
preme emergency might be said to occur, and he makes clear that dis-
regarding the principle of noncombatant immunity "cannot be justified 
by a doubtful marginal gain."341 But he maintains that intentional, de-
liberate attacks on German civilian populations during the early years 
of World War II, for instance, were justified for two reasons: 
First, Nazism portended incalculable moral and political evil 
for civilized life everywhere. Second, the nature and history 
of constitutional democracy and its place in European his-
tory were at stake .... This kind of threat ... justifies invok-
ing the supreme emergency exemption, on behalf not only 
of constitutional democracies, but of all well-ordered socie-
ties.342 
336 Id. at 101. Rawls is explaining Churchill's own self-assessment here and criticizing 
him for allowing passion to cloud his insight and moral sensitivity. So Rawls does not say 
unequivocally that the assault on Dresden violated the Law of Peoples as he understands it. 
But his characterization of Churchill's remarks-in a paragraph reflecting on other "viola-
tions of the principles for the conduct of war" (vis-a-vis Japan)-makes me confident that 
Rawls shares Churchill's retrospective assessment. Id. at 100. 
337 As Rawls notes, this expression comes from WALZER, supra note 332, at 255-65. 
338 RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 98. 
339 I d. at 9. Rawls does not say whether the mere possession of nuclear weapons would 
keep outlaw states at bay; it is unclear whether they might in principle be detonated for 
this purpose. He notes that "[t] here remains ... the great moral question of whether, and 
in what circumstances, nuclear weapons can be used at all," before referring the reader to 
his later discussion of the just war. !d. 
340 Cole, supra note 329, at 90. 
341 RAwLs, LAW, supra note 1, at 98. 
342 Id. at 99. 
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The implication, though Rawls does not spell it out clearly, is that tar-
geting German civilians was essential to the defeat of Nazism and the 
preservation of civilization and constitutional democracy.343 It is surely 
at least an open question whether this was so; how could anyone 
know? But even supposing it was, we may still ask whether this war-
ranted the evil of direct attacks on civilians. 
A cosmopolitan Law of Peoples, as my description of it has al-
ready suggested, would not be likely to contain Rawls's supreme 
emergency doctrine. Adopting a cosmopolitan starting point would 
be enough, therefore, to rule out this exception as unjust. But it may 
be worth attending to the limited arguments Rawls actually offers for 
his position to highlight their untenability. 
Rawls rejects the more rigorous traditional just war requirement 
that (as he has it) "the innocent" or (as I should prefer) noncombat-
ants may never be directly targeted. He concedes that the traditional 
just war view, familiar from Augustine and Aquinas, "is intelligible 
doctrine"; he dismisses it, however, as "contrary to the duties of the 
statesman in politicalliberalism."344 He tells us that "[t]he statesman 
[and, presumably, the stateswoman] must be prepared to wage a just 
war in defense of liberal democratic regimes."345 The problem, of 
course, is that we do not know simply because Rawls has told us so 
that the supreme emergency exception is just. He does not provide a 
great deal of argument for the conclusion that it is. He simply asserts 
that "the principles for the conduct of war in the social contract con-
ception include the supreme emergency exemption. "346 
Perhaps Rawlsian deliberators would regard the principle that 
the survival of their societies must be ensured as non-negotiable. Op-
erating from the perspective of peoples viewed as cohesive wholes, 
Rawlsian deliberators might accept rules that permitted military 
forces to target noncombatants or subject them to enormous risks, 
just as an individual might endorse a rule permitting the infliction of 
a non-lethal injury as a way of saving a life. But Rawls does not discuss 
their possible reasoning. He simply offers a conclusory judgment 
about what the "social contract" model implies while dismissing the 
traditional just war norm of noncombatant immunity. He character-
izes the principle as an element of Christian doctrine grounded in 
theological conviction. He argues that the rule of double effect-tra-
343 !d. at 98. 
344 !d. at 105. 
345 Jd. 
346 RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 104. 
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ditionally invoked to warrant the distinction between justified and un-
justified killing in war-derives from "the divine command that the 
innocent must never be killed."347 According to Rawls, "[p]oliticallib-
eralism allows the supreme emergency exemption; the Catholic doc-
trine rejects it, saying that we must have faith and adhere to God's 
command."348 Perhaps the implication is that "the statesman" does 
not appropriately invoke religious reasons of this kind at all.349 But 
this kind of argument would be ineffective against the most uncom-
promising contemporary statement of the traditional just war view, 
John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, and Germain Grisez's Nuclear Deterrence, 
Momlity, and Realism,350 which is grounded in a purely philosophical 
argument that does not depend on any sort of divine command. 
In any case, Rawls says the "statesman must look to the political 
world, and must, in extreme cases, be able to distinguish between the 
interests of the well-ordered regime he or she serves and the dictates 
of the religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine that he or she per-
sonally lives by. "351 The implication is clear-and is supported by 
347 Jd. 
348 Id. at 105 (footnote omitted). 
349 According to Rawls, "political liberalism does not say that the values articulated by a 
political conception of justice, though of basic significance, outweigh the transcendent 
values (as people may interpret them)-religious, philosophical, or moral-with which the 
political conception may possibly conflict. To say that would go beyond the political." 
RAwLs, RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 37. Rawls might be inclined to argue that the 
stateswoman is free to regard certain religious norms as overriding the claims of her soci-
ety, and that she might even be right, but that she should resign if faced with a conflict 
between her principles and the obligations associated with her office. 
350 See generally jOHN M. FINN IS ET AL., NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, MORALITY, AND REALISM 
( 1987). To be sure, Finn is, Boyle, and Grisez are theologically conservative Catholics. But it 
does not follow that their argument depends on Catholic theological premises; indeed, the 
moral position they collectively defend is offered in deliberate opposition to divine com-
mand views of ethics. 
For a Kantian, as opposed to a natural law, justification for the rule of double effect 
that is reflected in just war thinking, see, e.g., WARREN QUINN, MoRALITY AND AcTION 
175-97 ( 1993). Standard natural law accounts include Joseph M. Boyle, Toward Understand-
ing the P1inciple of Double Effect, 90 ETHICS 527, 527-38 (1980) and Germain Grisez, Toward a 
Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing, 15 AM.]. juRIS. 64, 64-96 (1970); see also LuciUs 
IWE]URU UGORJI, THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF ITS TRADI-
TIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND ITs MoDERN REINTERPRETATION (1985); jeffrey M. Ross, 
Proportionalism and the P1inciple of Double Effect (1994) (M.A. thesis, Graduate Theological 
Union). 
351 RAWLS, LAW, supra note 1, at 105 (emphasis added). Rawls also maintains that 
someone who "oppose[s] all war" cannot "in good faith, in the absence of special circum-
stances, seek the highest offices in a liberal democratic regime." Id. at 105. But is it so ob-
vious that a liberal democratic regime must be prepared, if necessary, to go to war under 
some circumstances? No doubt political liberalism on its own is compatible with a variety 
of answers to this question, but it cannot, I think, be reasonably understood as imposing a 
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Rawls's remarks in "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," which is 
appended to The Law of Peoples-that liberal political leaders are not 
bound as a matter of course to bracket their religious convictions, 
though they must offer "public justification [s]" for their actions that 
draw on appropriate political, as opposed to religious, values.352 
So the conclusion cannot be that the stateswoman is required to 
ignore her philosophical or religious convictions as such. But she is ap-
parently required to give pride of place in her loyalties to the well-
ordered society she serves.353 The very survival of that society and of the 
way of life it embodies are important enough that the society, if threat-
ened by an unjust aggressor, may violate persons in ways that would 
otherwise contravene their rights. Or so Rawlsian deliberators might be 
thought to conclude. But the political leader who declines directly to 
attack noncombatants need not choose to treat the claims of some 
comprehensive doctrine as trumping those of her society. Instead, she 
is better understood as refusing to allow the claims of her society to 
override the rights of the noncombatants she refuses intentionally to 
attack. She is not treating her society as less important than an abstract 
ideal; she is instead refusing to give it absolute allegiance, to treat it as if 
its interests justified her disregard for the rights of all persons. 354 
And there's another problem. Let's grant that the survival of a lib-
eral society is important. Let's grant that the survival of a transnational 
liberal culture is important. Let's grant that the survival of liberal ideals 
is important. We may still ask whether the survival of a liberal society, 
of a liberal civilization, or of liberal ideals warrants the violation of the 
rights of particular persons. The judgment that it does may be built 
into the contracting procedure Rawls has outlined. If so, however, I 
think tl1is provides us with a reason to question tl1is procedure. I think, 
indeed, that one might claim just as readily that the seriousness with 
which a society regards its ideals is evident precisely when it refuses to 
disregard them in its own interests, even in the interests of its own sur-
duty on a liberal society to opt for war. Cf STANLEY HAUER WAS, AGAINST THE NATIONS: 
WAR AND SURVIVAL IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY (1985). 
!52 RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 155. 
858 See id. 
854 I am therefore uncomfortable with Darrell Cole's way of putting the matter. Cole 
maintains that "Rawls's liberalism makes liberal society, if not an absolute good, then cer-
tainly a good to be sought above God." Cole, supra note 329, at 91. I understand why Cole 
frames matters as he does, but it seems just as true, and more to the immediate point, to 
stress Rawls's disregard for persons. 
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vival,355 This is even truer when what is at issue is disregard not merely 
for an aspirational ideal but for a requirement ofjustice.356 
Rawls does not argue directly for the judgment that the Law of 
Peoples should include a supreme emergency exception to the ordi-
nary just war rule precluding the targeting of noncombatants. He im-
plies, without demonstrating, that Rawlsian contractors would ap-
prove such an exception and that they would authorize well-ordered 
societies to retain, and perhaps to use, nuclear weapons. If they would 
in fact do so, those skeptical of consequentialist disregard for particu-
lar persons may judge that Rawls has provided further-unintended-
evidence for the attractiveness of a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples. 
b. Nuclear Weapons and Outlaw States 
A cosmopolitan Law of Peoples would leave little or no room for 
the use of nuclear weapons against human targets. It would therefore 
impose stringent constraints on the rights of well-ordered societies to 
retain "nuclear weapons . . . to keep [outlaw] states at bay and to 
make sure they do not obtain and use those weapons against liberal or 
decent peoples."3!i7 A cosmopolitan Law might, in principle, legiti-
mate deception of outlaw states, so the fact that the use of nuclear 
weapons was inconsistent with such a Law of Peoples would not imply 
that societies with such weapons were prohibited from threatening 
their use without intending actually to use them. However, if an out-
law state knew that a society adhered to the cosmopolitan Law of Peo-
ples and knew that the cosmopolitan Law of Peoples prohibited the 
use of nuclear weapons, it would understand that any threat by that 
society to use nuclear weapons would be a bluff it could afford to ig-
nore. The bluff would therefore likely be ineffectual. In addition, if a 
society retains nuclear weapons, there is always the risk that they will 
be misused by members of the society's government or stolen, and 
potentially detonated, by terrorists or outlaw states. Given this risk, 
togetl1er with the fact that a cosmopolitan Law of Peoples would pre-
355 Cf id. at 92 (noting that the proponent of traditional just war norms "argues that it 
is better to be occupied by a people such as the Nazis than to behave like Nazis"). 
356 I avoid the question of the stateswoman's responsibility should her conscience sim-
ply dictate action contrary to her duties as a leader of a liberal state, since my concern 
here is with the demands of liberalism itself. On the responsibilities of public serYants with 
dissenting consciences, see ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE Mo-
RALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE 207-39 ( 1999). 
357 RAwLs, LAw, supra note 1, at 9. 
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elude almost any actual use of nuclear weapons, well-ordered societies 
would retain few if any such weapons. 
A cosmopolitan Law of Peoples would contain no supreme emer-
gency exception. It would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons under 
almost all circumstances and would likely impose severe limits on the 
rights of societies and transnational organizations to acquire or retain 
them at all. Such a Law of Peoples is defensible on its own terms. But 
the fact that it tracks traditional just war norms better than Rawls's 
alternative may be seen as an additional reason to prefer it to his view. 
CoNCLUSION 
The arguments Rawls offers for individual freedom and equality 
at the domestic level remain attractive. They apply with as much force 
to persons across our planet as they do to persons in particular socie-
ties already committed to liberal democracy. In virtue of the freedom 
and equality to which these arguments give us reason to believe all 
persons are entitled, a cosmopolitan second original position provides 
a more appropriate means of identifYing suitable principles of global 
justice than its Rawlsian alternative. As Rawls himself acknowledges, 
his proposed Law of Peoples "is fair to peoples and not to individual 
persons."358 His arguments-and those he might have offered but 
didn't advance-for a model of global justice that is not fair to per-
sons are unpersuasive. Especially given his own account of domestic 
justice, persons should be regarded as equal globally as well as domes-
tically, and all principles of global political morality should be assessed 
in light of the equality and distinctness of persons. 
To be sure, Rawls's Law of Peoples provides an attractive frame-
work for the international relations of a reasonably just liberal society. 
Although it is not altogether satisfactory as an account of global justice, 
its adoption by even one major power would bring about remarkable 
wholesale improvement in the state of the world. 359 Nevertheless, it is 
inadequate. It unduly limits the efforts of liberal societies to promote 
democracy and social equality. It leads to unduly minimal global hu-
man rights norms. It might justifY an inappropriate level of transna-
tional economic aid. And it seems to license some unwarranted disre-
358 ld. at 17 n.9. 
359 For one example, compare Adams, supm note 57, at 369 (asserting that the stan-
dards articulated "in The Law of Peoples provide a promising method for addressing equity 
in setting the baseline for greenhouse emissions"). 
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gard for particular persons in time of war and to give too much latitude 
to those who might wish to retain and use nuclear weapons. 
Rawlsian deliberators might not accept all the conclusions Rawls 
thinks they would. In particular, they would likely choose rules stipu-
lating a higher cut-off point for the duty of transnational economic 
aid than Rawls does. Some of Rawls's unsatisfactory conclusions do 
seem, however, to follow from the procedure he has adopted. Rawls 
has provided no persuasive argument for this procedure. It appears as 
much as anything to be a consequence of an attempt to make room in 
the sympathies of liberals for an imaginary species: the decent non-
liberal society. It is unfortunate that Rawls's sense of what is possible 
and appropriate is expressed in a transnational norm designed to be 
acceptable to deliberators representing decent nonliberal societies 
when he grants that there are no such societies. He does not suggest, 
after all, that the Law of Peoples needs to appear attractive from the 
standpoint of benevolent absolutisms, outlaw states, or burdened so-
cieties. His choice to structure a Law of Peoples acceptable to decent 
nonliberals seems to be responsible both for the specific content of 
his proposed transnational norm-for instance, the limited nature of 
the human rights protections it affords-and for its underlying as-
sumption that peoples rather than persons should be treated fairly at 
the global level. Presuming separate peoples should be preserved as at 
least somewhat independent entities, individual deliberators would 
decide on a regime of justice with which their continued existence 
would be consistent. So it cannot be the need to preserve independ-
ent peoples that is primarily responsible for Rawls's assumption of the 
equality of peoples in the second original position. It must rather be 
the fact that individual deliberators would opt for norms, which the 
public policies and cultural standards of decent illiberal societies 
would violate, that accounts for Rawls's preference for the starting 
point he adopts. 
In his discussion of tolerance, which offers some insight into his 
rationale for adopting a peoples-based account of international law, 
Rawls fails satisfactorily to distinguish between the question, What 
Tights should liberals seek to enjoTce? and the related but distinct question, 
What 1ights do the world's people in fact have? The denial that, for prag-
matic reasons, liberals might not wish to compel illiberal societies to 
enjoTce the full panoply of liberal rights need not entail the denial that 
the members of these societies are entitled to those rights. And Rawls 
himself must believe this, since he affirms that a liberal political order 
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is better in some important sense than a nonliberal one.360 To say this 
is presumably to say, among other things, that the claims liberals make 
about human rights are more nearly correct than those made by non-
liberals-to say that people do, in fact, have the rights liberals say they do. 
But in what sense is this so? 
The simplest account Rawls could give of these human rights 
seems to me to be precisely that they are the guarantees that would be 
endorsed in a global version of his domestic original position. He 
would need, in any case, to argue for some process of reasoning, valid 
across cultures, to justifY the assertion that liberal institutions are su-
perior simpliciter to illiberal ones. It seems, then, that Rawls is commit-
ted to the validity of something like a global original position as the 
basis for an account of global justice. His own proposed second origi-
nal position might really best be understood, then, not as an account 
of global justice, but as a means of capturing largely pragmatic intui-
tions about the most effective way for liberal societies to structure 
their foreign policy, given that global justice as liberals understand it 
cannot be immediately achieved. 
Rawls has failed satisfactorily to defend not only his starting point 
but the specific normative recommendations that follow from it. The 
acconn t of justice he offers in A Theory of justice remains more appeal-
ing as a model for decision-makers at the global level than his own 
preferred transnational alternative. I believe, then, that liberal socie-
ties may confidently opt for a cosmopolitan account of global justice. 
Doing so would mean adopting a more inclusive conception of hu-
man rights and a foreign policy more aggressive about human rights 
than would be the case under a Rawlsian Law of Peoples. It would also 
mean acknowledging a greater responsibility for transnational eco-
nomic assistance (at least in principle, since under present circum-
stances versions of the Law of Peoples supported by Rawlsian and in-
dividual deliberators would likely have relatively indistinguishable im-
plications). And it would mean refusing to allow fears for national 
survival to justifY direct attacks on noncombatants or the use of strate-
gic (and, in almost all cases, tactical) nuclear weapons against human 
targets. It would mean, in short, making a significant contribution to 
the creation of a global society governed by a Law of Peoples that em-
bodies a commitment to justice for persons. 
360 See RAWLS, LAW, supra note 1, at 62; cf RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 62 ("Po-
litical liberalism does not question that many political and moral judgments of certain 
specified kinds are correct and it views many of them as reasonable."). 
